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ABSTRACT 
The popularity of Internet access has enabled the wide spread of digital multimedia contents 
in the form of image, video and audio; however, it also makes unauthorized copying and 
distribution easier. Researchers from both the industry and the academy have been trying to 
address this dilemma by watermarking techniques. Watermarking, as a prospective weapon 
against piracy, embeds ownership information into the host contents without degrading the 
perceptual quality of the host contents. The embedder and the detector (or decoder) are the two 
most important components of the digital watermarking systems. Thus in this work, we discuss 
how to design a better embedder and detector (or decoder). Spread spectrum (SS) and quantization 
techniques are the two most appealing embedding techniques in the literature.  
We first explore the optimum detector or decoder according to a particular probability 
distribution of the host signals. The optimum detection or decoding is not new in this work since it 
has already been widely investigated in the literature. However, our work offers new insights into 
its theoretical performance. First, the theoretical analyses presented in the literature are 
unreasonable since their analyses (with the watermark sequence as a random vector) are not in 
accordance with the prerequisite in their deriving the optimum decision rules that the watermark is 
a fixed sequence. Second, we found that for Multiplicative Spread Spectrum (MSS) schemes in 
both Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) and Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT) domains, their 
performance depends on the shape parameter of the host signals. Third, without perceptual 
analysis, the Additive Spread Spectrum (ASS) scheme also has a performance dependent on the 
host signals and outperforms MSS at the shape parameter below 1.3.  
For spread spectrum schemes, the detector or the decoder’s performance is reduced by the 
host interference. Thus, we came up with a new host-interference rejection idea for MSS schemes. 
In this work, we call this new host interference rejection idea an Enhanced Multiplicative Spread 
Spectrum (EMSS) scheme. Moreover, in our scheme, we also consider the probability distribution 
of the host signals, and match the embedding rule with the optimum detection or decoding rule. We 
particularly examined EMSS’s performance in the DCT domain and found that it produced a nicer 
performance than the traditional non-rejecting schemes. Furthermore, this scheme can be easily 
extended to the watermarking in the Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT) or the DFT domain. 
Though the host interference rejection schemes enjoy a big performance gain over the 
traditional spread spectrum schemes, their drawbacks that it is difficult for them to be implemented 
with the perceptual analysis to improve the fidelity of the watermarked contents discourage their 
use in real scenarios. Thus, in the final several chapters of this work, we introduced a double-sided 
technique to tackle this drawback. This idea differs from the host interference rejection technique 
in that it does not reject the host interference at the embedder. However, it also utilizes the side 
host information at the embedder. Moreover, for most of the spread spectrum methods, the detector 
reports the existence of the embedded watermark if its response is above a given threshold. 
However, our double-sided detector reports the existence of the embedded watermark if the 
absolute value of its response exceeds a given threshold. Though our technique does not reject the 
host interference, it can also achieve a great performance enhancement over the traditional spread 
spectrum schemes. Most important of all, it has a big advantage over the host interference rejection 
techniques in that we can embed the watermark with the perceptual analysis to achieve a 
maximum allowable embedding strength.  
 
 
 
KEY WORDS: Digital watermarking, information hiding, watermark verification, watermark 
detection and decoding, spread spectrum scheme, quantization scheme 
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Chapter 1   Introduction 
1.1  Historical relics 
Pictures, music, cinemas and other forms of art are traditionally stored in the physical media, such as CD 
disks, photo paper or films. With the advance of computer technology, these works are digitized as a 
sequence of 0s and 1s for easy storage and distribution. However, the technology has also brought us a new 
dilemma: on the one hand, it offers us the great convenience of storage and duplication; on the other hand, it 
also makes easier the unauthorized copying and redistribution. Copying in the digital world is exact, and no 
technology available can differentiate between the originals and the duplicates. 
The great popularity of Internet even makes things worse. Internet provides us with the great ease of 
exchanging ideas and sharing resources between and among its users. Publishers can sale over Internet to 
save the high cost of transportation and delivery, while at the same time the purchasers can gain quick 
access to the published works. This simple rule works over Internet if all the subscribers are honest not to 
resale the digital works for commercial benefits. However, there are always dishonest people complicating 
the whole business. With the help of Internet, the pirates can redistribute the authorized copies more 
efficiently and effectively.  
The huge losses suffered by the media companies call urgently on a technology for copyright protection. 
Traditional cryptography fails to meet this need since when decrypted, the content data will be fully 
exposed to the pirates who have also purchased the contents. The decrypted contents can thus be easily 
copied and redistributed. Can any further protection be provided to combat this problem? Luckily, the 
watermarking technology is born to meet this growing demand. It embeds perceptibly or imperceptibly the 
copyright or the ownership information into the digital work itself. The embedded information is supposed 
to be permanently coupled with the original work and copied into the duplicated work, and could be 
detected even after any severe removal or confusing attacks.  
Digital watermarking originates from the ancient steganography [1, 2], which secures the 
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communications between the senders and the receivers. The Spartans in the ancient Greek wrote texts on the 
wax-covered tablets. To deliver a hidden message, the sender would scrape the wax off the tablet, write a 
message on the underlying wood and wax the tablet to make it appear blank and unused. The receiver would 
just heat up the tablet to melt the wax and read the hidden message. There are many other ancient tricks for 
covert communications. However, it is not until World War II that invisible inks, such as milk, alum and 
lemon juice, were commonly used for important communications.  
Most of the early secure communication methods fall under steganography instead of cryptography. 
However, compared with cryptography, steganography has never grown up to be an independent discipline 
because it still lacks of solid theoretical foundations. Nowadays, the flourish of digital technologies has 
injected vitality into the ancient steganography. In fact, the watermarking societies have borrowed many 
ideas from cryptography. The rise of theoretical framework for information hiding [3−5] has laid a solid 
foundation for seganography to become a serious discipline. Thus, steganography is sure to be revitalized in 
the digital era.  
1.2  Prospective applications 
1.2.1  What is a watermark? 
In the paper currency, a watermark is a faint image that is (somehow) infused into the paper itself, instead 
of being printed on the top of it.  As a result, the watermark can be seen from either side, and the area 
containing the watermark therefore has no printing over it.  When you see such a blank area on both sides of 
a bill, you can see the watermark by holding it up to the light.  Thus, a watermark is similarly defined to be 
something that is added into the cover materials. This also defines a digital watermark, a digital signal that is 
inserted into the digital host contents. In fact, the versatile hosts may range from paper, digital images, 
videos, audios, software programs and so on. More importantly, the added something is used to mark the 
host’s difference from other products. In the paper currency, the watermark marks its difference from the 
counterfeit currency. Likewise, the digital watermark demonstrates that the host contents are produced by a 
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specific content owner (such as the Central Bank of China who has the right to print the paper currency.) 
1.2.2  Prospective applications 
Prospective applications for digital watermarking (or information hiding) can be classified into the 
following types [3] by different requirements from the content owners: 
 
1) Copyright protection [6, 7]: Watermarking is initially born to provide the copyright protection for the 
media contents. It is required that the embedded copyright information survive all kinds of intentional 
attacks, such as compressions, noises and geometrical attacks. The copyright protection demands that the 
watermarking system still attain a high probability of detection at a very low false alarm probability. In the 
literature, this technology is often termed robust watermarking. Stirmark [8, 9] serves as a good benchmark 
for its performance evaluations. 
 
2) Transaction tracking or fingerprinting [10−19]: It also requires the embedded watermark to have a 
sufficient robustness against malicious attacks. However, the subtle difference between transaction tracking 
and copyright protection is that the former identifies the purchasers, whereas the latter identifies the 
producers. Thus for transaction tracking, the watermarked contents for each purchaser is assigned a unique 
serial number. Should anyone redistribute his copy illegally, the unique serial number could reveal his 
identity at the watermark detector. 
 
3) Content Annotation: The traditional multimedia products, such as CDs, VCDs and DVDs, usually have 
disk containers on which the copyright information is stamped. However, it is not workable for the digital 
contents sold over the Internet. In such a case, the digital watermark can be embedded to identify the 
producers and provide his contact address. The intelligent player can even hook to the producers’ websites 
through the embedded web addresses. Another scenario we are all familiar with is that we wish to 
timestamp the pictures taken by the digital camera. Often the time is stamped visibly on the bottom corner 
Chapter 1 Introduction PhD Dissertation 
 4
of the images for unobtrusiveness. However the watermark technology provides a better alternative to 
embed the time into the pictures invisibly. Moreover, the computer can sort these pictures by the time the 
pictures were taken. Finally, without the guarding of parents, children at home may have easy access to the 
pornographic pictures. If we grade these pictures through the embedded watermarks, the navigator may 
choose to restrict the children from downloading the images. 
 
4) Content authentication: It prevents the attackers from tampering the digital contents. A synonym for 
this application is fragile watermarking [20−24], which detects any form of changes even if one bit is 
converted. However, its role can be fully accomplished by the digital signature in cryptography. In [3], Cox 
shed light on their differences. If, however, we only want to prevent anyone from mounting malicious 
attacks on the digital contents, we may employ semi-fragile watermarks [25−29] to achieve robustness 
against unintentional signal processing operations, such as compressions and channel noises, and fragility 
against malicious tampering. 
 
5) Device control: In this scenario, the media player is controlled by the digital watermark. If the desired 
copyright information cannot be detected from the host contents, the player refuses to play and record the 
unauthorized contents. If all device manufacturers abide to these device control policies, the piracy can be 
discouraged. However, in real scenarios, it is difficult to implement these policies due to the difficulty of 
global cooperation.  
 
6) Broadcast monitoring: In TV advertising, the customers face the difficulty to know whether his due 
time slots have been honored. The traditional approach monitors the TV advertising time by humans. 
However, this approach is quite clumsy and inaccurate. Watermarking technology provides a simple 
monitoring choice by inserting the customer’s watermark into the advertisements. The digital monitor 
inspects the TV advertisements and determines whether his allotted time is shortened. Verance [30] is a 
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company specializing in providing this service.  
 
7) Steganography: It targets at securing the covert communication between the senders and the receivers, 
and has aroused a burst of research interest [31−40] in the recent years. Different from copyright protection, 
steganography emphasizes on undetectable communication: the presence of hidden data should be 
undetectable to the adversary. For copyright protection, the objective is to transmit reliably the copyright 
notice embedded in the host signals. The copyright notice itself need not be a secret, nor is its presence. 
 
There are many other applications that deserve attention. However, we do not cite them here. Interested 
readers may refer to the books [3, 41]. 
1.3  A panorama of watermarking Literature 
The wide-range of prospective applications and the urgent needs for copyright protection from the 
content producers stimulated the great research interest from both the academy and the industry. 
Watermarking can be further subdivided into two closely related areas, namely, watermark verification and 
data hiding. Watermark verification, a synonym for one-bit watermarking, deals primarily with detecting 
the presence of the embedded watermarks to answer a “yes” or “no” question. However, data hiding 
concentrates on the decoding of the embedded information. Multiple bits, such as serial numbers and logos, 
can be buried in the cover contents.  
More than a decade of development has witnessed a flood of novel schemes and techniques with which 
we are gaining increasing insights into the watermarking problems. Among these, spread spectrum (SS) [6, 
42−45] and quantization [46−50] schemes are the two most appealing embedding techniques. They differ in 
how the watermarks are embedded into the host contents. SS schemes simply add an additive or a 
multiplicative watermark into the host contents, whereas quantization techniques watermark the host signal 
by quantizing it to a nearest lattice point. 
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1.3.1  Spread spectrum schemes  
Spread spectrum schemes [6] represent an early type of embedding method. It adds a sequence of 
pseudo-random signals into the host signals to form the watermarked data. According to how the watermark 
is added into the host contents, the spread spectrum schemes can be further subdivided into the additive and 
multiplicative spread spectrum (ASS and MSS) schemes. The signals are usually embedded into the 
perceptually important components of the host image to achieve a balance of perceptual quality and 
robustness. At the detector, the original image should be available to cancel the watermarked image to 
extract the embedded signals. The extracted signals are then correlated with a predefined pattern for 
validation. The detection that requires the original data is called private detection. However, for many 
prospective applications, this requirement is sometimes quite astringent. Later, Piva [51] and Zeng [52, 53] 
designed blind detection techniques which require no presence of the original hosts. The blind detection 
employs the statistical inference to differentiate between the unwatermarked and the watermarked contents. 
However, in these blind schemes, the original work is taken as the noise interfering with the 
watermarking detection. The host interference should not be a problem if it is available at the detector or 
decoder. However, for many prospective applications, this is not the case. This situation can be further 
improved by designing a better embedder or an optimum detector or decoder. The first approach utilizes the 
host information at the embedder, whereas the second improves the performance of spread spectrum 
watermarking schemes by exploiting the probability distribution function (pdf) of the host signals at the 
detector or decoder. 
(1)  Side-informed embedder 
Cox [54] modeled the watermarking as communication with side information, and proposed to utilize the 
host information in the embedding process. The idea was that instead of treating the cover data as noise 
added to the embedded signals, it could be taken as side information to improve both the fidelity and the 
detection rate by means of an appropriate perceptual mask and the knowledge of the detector. 
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a) First Approach: perceptual models. Using a global embedding strength results in the perceptible local 
distortion. Thus many authors proposed to locally bound the maximum embedding strength by the Human 
Perceptual Systems (HPS) to achieve the maximum allowable perceptual distortion and robustness. 
Podilchuk and Zeng [56] utilized the Watson’s perceptual model [55] to embed the perceptually-shaped 
signals into the host contents. The Watson’s model, initially designed for image compression, includes three 
major perceptual functions, namely, frequency, luminance and contrast masking. Tuned with this model, the 
image quality is much improved, especially at the smooth regions of the images that are more sensitive to 
the image manipulations. Since the embedding strength can be locally bounded to achieve a distortion of 
one Just Noticeable Difference (JND) level, a higher robustness can also be achieved at an acceptable image 
quality. The idea of employing perceptual models is further extended to the video watermarking [57]. In 
[58], the authors presented a perceptual model in the DFT domain. In addition to the masking criterion, the 
model also discriminates the different perceptual effects of edge and texture. The model investigated in [59] 
exploits the temporal and the frequency masking to guarantee that the embedded watermark is inaudible and 
robust. Similar ideas of using perceptual models to improve both the perceptual quality and the robustness 
are also reflected in [60−63]. 
 
b. Second approach: side-informed techniques with the knowledge of the structure of the detector (a kind 
of reverse engineering to compute the desired embedding signals.) Based on Cox’s framework [54], a 
side-informed embedder [64] is designed according to a specified criterion, such as maximizing the 
correlation coefficient or maximizing the robustness. Since both the correlation coefficient and the 
robustness are related to the host contents, the embedded signals thus depend on the host contents. In order 
to achieve the best perceptual quality at a fixed robustness, Miller et al. in [65] presented an iterative 
embedding algorithm that builds the watermark by adding perceptually shaped components until the desired 
robustness is achieved. Similar ideas are also formulated in [66, 67]. 
However, these side-informed schemes do not handle the important issue of how to insert the watermark 
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to minimize the error rate at a fixed distortion level. Improved Spread Spectrum (ISS) scheme proposed in 
[43] also exploits the knowledge of host contents by projecting them onto the watermark, and this projected 
host interference is then compensated in the embedding process. The authors claimed that the performance 
measured in probabilities of errors could be improved by tens of magnitudes. This, in fact, is not strange 
since ISS is in fact a quantization scheme with only two quantizers [68].  
The second approach succeeds in removing (or partially removing) the host interference and thus 
improves the system’s performance.  
 
c) Comparison of the above two approaches: The embedder of the first approach does not require the 
knowledge of the detector’s structure, whereas the second does. For instance, Miller’s maximum robustness 
[64, 65] assumes that the detection statistic is the correlation coefficient. For ISS, the detector is a simple 
linear correlator. The second approach excels the first in performance since it offers a property of host 
interference rejection. For instance, ISS can have a complete rejection of the host interference. However, 
also due to the host interference property, it is difficult to implement the perceptual analysis for the second 
approach since the embedded signal relies on the summary of the host features.  
(2)  Informed detector 
The detector has to be informed of the host pdf (and the embedding strengths for some cases, i.e., 
optimum detectors.) Hernandez [69] designed an optimum detector for ASS watermarking in the Discrete 
Cosine Transform (DCT) domain. Their detector exploits the fact that the host’s low- and mid-frequency 
DCT coefficients can be better modeled by Generalized Gaussian Distributions (GGD). The same idea was 
also formulated in [70, 71]. Briassouli [72, 73] exploited the fact that Cauchy pdf also gives a better 
approximation of the low- and mid-frequency DCT coefficients, and designed a locally optimum Cauchy 
nonlinear detector. However, from their comparison results, it is hard to say whether Cauchy model yields a 
better performance than GGD model does. In truth, GGD models are much more popular in modeling the 
DCT coefficients. For MSS, Oostveen [74] and Barni [75, 76] modeled the magnitudes of Discrete Fourier 
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Transform (DFT) coefficients through a Weibull pdf and investigated the optimum detection in the DFT 
domain. For multiplicative watermarking in the DCT domain, Cheng [77] derived the structure of its 
optimum detector. In the paper, Cheng also devised a class of generalized correlators. Unlike the previous 
Universally Most Powerful (UMP) detectors, this class of detectors is derived from the Locally Optimal 
(LO) or Locally Most Powerful (LMP) tests. Recently, an optimum decoder for information hiding in the 
Laplacian Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT) data was proposed in [78]. All the above optimum detectors 
are derived under the hypothesis that no attack is mounted on the host contents. The optimum detection 
under quantization was investigated in [79]. 
1.3.2  Quantization schemes 
Quantization schemes embed the watermarks into the host contents by quantizing the host signals or its 
host features to the fixed lattice points. The early works [80−82] replace the least significant bits of the host 
features (such as pixel values) with the embedded information bits. However, these schemes cannot achieve 
a large payload of information and are also vulnerable to attacks. Chen [46, 47] proposed a pioneering 
dither-based quantization technique that opened a new era of active research on quantization schemes. Their 
Quantization Index Modulation (QIM) schemes are now still under wide investigation [83−88]. The QIM 
technique uses a set of quantizers modulated by the embedded message. The quantizers divide the signal 
space into sets of reconstruction points and the host signal is quantized to the nearest reconstruction point in 
the corresponding set. Since SS and QIM schemes have their own advantages and disadvantages, Chen also 
proposed a spreading technique [46, 47] (also termed spread transform) to bridge SS and QIM methods. The 
proposed Spread Transform Dither Modulation (STDM) incorporating the spreading technique has been 
shown to achieve great signal-to-noise (SNR) advantage over additive SS methods. The spread transform 
technique is further investigated in [4, 49, 89, 90]. For instance, borrowing the idea of STDM, Wong 
proposed SWE and MWE schemes [89] to embed one or multiple watermark sequences into the host image. 
 Chen’s work also inspired Eggers to rediscover the work [91] and propose a suboptimal Scalar Costa 
Scheme [48]. In their work, the random codebook in [91] is approximated by a lattice-structured codebook 
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for the ease of implementation. As a matter of fact, SCS is in essence a Distortion Compensated QIM 
(DC-QIM) scheme [46] and there are other possible implementations of Costa’s results [92, 93, 65]. In the 
literature, the performance of quantization schemes is evaluated in terms of both the information capacity 
[94, 95] and the probability of errors [49, 50, 96]. 
The above quantization schemes use the uniform quantizers to embed the information bit since it is 
simple for both the embedder and the detector to encode and decode the embedded information. There are 
also schemes [97−99] employing non-uniform quantizers to improve the perceptual quality of the 
watermarked image or the robustness of the scheme.  
The quantization schemes are inspected principally under data hiding scenarios. Eggers and Girod [100] 
contributed an early effort to introduce their SCS scheme into the watermark verification problems. 
Recently, Liu and Moulin [101] and Pérez-Freire et al. [102] also applied QIM schemes to watermark 
verification scenarios. These works can achieve a great performance gain over the additive spread spectrum 
(ASS) methods. 
1.4  The task of this work 
As stated in the above section, for spread spectrum schemes, the host interference hampers the detection 
of the embedded watermark, and there are basically two approaches to combating this problem. 
The first approach utilizes the probability distributions of the host signals to design optimum detectors or 
decoders. However, up until now, no mathematically rigorous performance comparisons have been made to 
validate to what extent these detectors or decoders can improve the traditional correlation detectors. 
Moreover, the performance comparisons between these detectors and decoders also lead to another 
interesting question that which method, ASS or MSS, works better in the real scenarios? Therefore, we will 
answer these questions in Chapter 3 of this work. 
The second approach improves the performances of the watermarking systems by canceling the host 
interference at the embedder. Improved Spread Spectrum (ISS) scheme proposed in [43] exploits the 
knowledge of the host content by projecting the host signal onto the watermark, and this projected host 
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interference is then compensated in the embedding process. A problem with ISS is that it does not take the 
probability density function (pdf) of the host signals into account. In fact, the implicit assumption for ISS is 
that the host signals are normally distributed, and thus the optimum detection statistic is the linear 
correlation.  
The above two approaches improve the performance of SS schemes in the embedding and detection 
process, respectively. Can we incorporate both ideas into the same watermarking scheme? We will answer 
this question in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 where a host interference technique, similar to ISS, marring the 
optimum detection or decoding rules is presented.  
Though the host interference rejection schemes (also including the quantization schemes) can achieve a 
large performance improvement over the traditional spread spectrum schemes, they also have a great 
drawback that they have not taken the perceptual quality into account. Their performance advantage, in 
truth, is largely due to the employed MSE metric. In contrast to the SS schemes, it is difficult to implement 
the perceptual models in the host interference rejection schemes. This difficulty thus discourages the use of 
host interference rejection schemes in real scenarios. Can we instead utilize the host information without it 
being cancelled at the embedder? Of course, a possible solution is to use the perceptual models for spread 
spectrum schemes. However, this solution still does not produce a large enough performance improvement. 
In this work, we instead answer this question by presenting a new informed embedder coupled with 
double-sided detection to achieve a large performance improvement over the traditional spread spectrum 
schemes.  More importantly, the perceptual analysis can be easily implemented in the new embedder.  
The rest of this work is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we define the symbols used throughout this 
work and present the fundamentals for future discussions. Chapter 3 investigates and compares the 
performance of optimum detectors and decoders for both MSS and ASS. In Chapter 4 and 5, we marry the 
host interference technique with the optimum detection or decoding rules to improve the performance of 
traditional spread spectrum schemes. In Chapter 6 and 7, we present a new model of watermark detection − 
double-sided detection and validate its performance advantage through both theoretical analyses and 
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extensive experiments. Its performance advantage when the perceptual analysis is implemented is 
demonstrated in Chapter 8. Finally, we summarize the work and present future research directions in the last 
chapter. 
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Chapter 2   Problem Formulation 
2.1  Notation 
In this work, we denote random variables by italic capital letters and their realizations by italic small 
letters, such as X and x. Random vectors and their realizations are denoted by boldface capital and small 
letters, respectively, such as X and x. Other variables are written as italic letters, and vectors as small 
boldface letters. 
Let X = {X1, X2, …, XN} be a collection of N host data, where X1, X2, …, XN are i.i.d. random variables 
with standard deviation σX. In this work, N is supposed to be an even integer. Let x = {x1, x2, …, xN} be a 
particular realization of the host data. Similarly, the watermarked data and its particular realization are given 
by S = {S1, S2, … , SN} and s = {s1, s2, … , sN} respectively. The watermarked data may suffer from 
intentional or unintentional attacks. The characteristics of these attacks vary dramatically. For instance, 
additive noise attacks may be independent of the watermarked data, whereas valumetric scaling attacks 
depend on the watermarked data. Thus there is no simple mathematical framework into which all attacks 
can be successfully formulated. In this work, we denote the attack noise by V = {V1, V2, … VN}, where all 
components Vis are i.i.d. random variables with standard deviation σV. In real scenarios, such an assumption 
may fail to characterize the real attacks. However, it can simplify the performance comparisons. Under 
attacks, the attacked data Y is 
Y = S + V. (2.1) 
In the future discussions, we also drop the index to the vector elements when no specific element is 
concerned. For instance, X may refer to any element Xi in X.  
In this work, we denote the mean and the variance of a random variable by E(·) and Var(·). For instance, 
E(X) and Var(X) refer to the mean and the variance of X, respectively. Moreover, the probability of an event 
A is written as P(A). 
Let w = {w1, w2, … , wN} be a bipolar watermark sequence (with wi = +1 or −1) to be embedded in the host 
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data. For information hiding problems, w is modulated by the message bit b (+1 or −1). Of course, wi is not 
necessary to be +1 or –1. Instead, it can be any real number. For instance, many early works consider w to be 
a sequence of normal random variables [6, 54]. For the convenience of performance comparisons, we also 
assume throughout the thesis that 
1
0N ii w= =∑ , (2.2) 
that is, the numbers of +1s and −1s are equal. This zero-mean sequence ensures that watermark embedding 
does not result in the change of statistical mean of the watermarked data. Moreover, as will also be observed 
in the following chapters, this assumption renders easier the performance analyses. 
2.2  Distortion Measure 
Watermark embedding incurs distortion on the host contents. Most watermarking applications require 
that the distortion be small enough to be imperceptible for humans. However, there is, up till now, no 
mathematically tractable metric that can fully evaluate the perceptual quality of the watermarked contents. 
Of course, the watermark embedder can interact with the viewer to select an appropriate parameter that 
achieves the maximum allowable perceptual distortion. Nevertheless, this approach is impracticable since it 
does not work for a large database of digital contents. This thesis will measure the distortion by the Mean 
Squared Errors (MSE). Most researchers have adopted this measure since it is both simple and 
mathematically tractable. Furthermore, it does characterize the quality of watermarked image for some 
cases. But it is still important to note that it fails to assess the perceptual quality of the attacked image when, 
for instance, the watermarked data suffer from geometrical attacks. 
In this thesis, the embedding distortion is defined as 
2
1
1( , )
N
i i
i
DT s x
N =
= −∑s x . (2.3) 
The expected embedding distortion Dw is given by 
[ ( , )]wD E DT= S X  (2.4) 
The expected attacking distortion Da incurred by attacks can be similarly defined as 
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2
1
1[ ( , )] Na i iiD E DT E Y SN =
 = = − ∑Y S . (2.5) 
In the following discussions, if not explicitly stated otherwise, the distortion refers to the expected 
distortion Dw. For the convenience of performance comparisons, we also define Document to Watermark 
Ratio (DWR) and Watermark to Noise Ratio (WNR) as 
2
10 10DWR 10log [ ( ) / ] and WNR 10log ( / )w w aE X D D D= = . (2.6) 
2.3  Modeling of host signals 
The host signal X can be pixel values, transform coefficients, projected data, or other features of the host 
data. Transform coefficients, such as DCT coefficients and DWT magnitudes, are widely used in the 
literature to carry the embedded information since the embedded watermarks in these data are proven to be 
more robust against many signal processing attacks. In this work, we are also primary concerned with the 
transform coefficients. 
The transform coefficients can be assumed to follow some particular probability distribution function 
(pdf). In the early works, the host data are usually presumed to be normally distributed, which is not valid 
for natural images. For instance, DCT coefficients follow the Generalized Gaussian Distribution (GGD) 
[69−71, 103, 104] defined by 
 | |( ) cxXf x Ae
β−= , (2.7) 
where
1/ 2
1 (3 ) ,    
(1 ) 2 (1 )X
c cA
c c
ββ σ
 Γ= = Γ Γ 
, (2.8) 
σX is the standard deviation of the host signal, and Γ(·) is the Gamma function defined as 
1
0( )
x tx t e dt∞ − −Γ = ∫ . (2.9) 
In the above formula, β is the scale parameter and c the shape parameter. Gaussian and Laplacian 
distributions are just special cases of (2.7) with c = 2.0 and c = 1.0, respectively.  
In [74−76], the DFT magnitudes are successfully modeled by a Weibull distribution 
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1
( ) expX
x xf x
δ δδ
θ θ θ
−     = −         
, (2.10) 
where θ, the scale parameter and δ, the shape parameter, are positive constants controlling the mean, 
variance and shape of the distribution. 
For natural images, the parameters c, σX, θ and δ can be estimated from the images. In [69, 103], the 
authors estimated c and σX by Moment or Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) methods. The θ and δ 
can also be estimated by MLE methods. The likelihood function L(θ, δ) for such a case is 
1 2
1 1
1( , ) ln ( , ,..., ) ln ln ( 1) ln
N N
X N i i
i i
L f x x x N N x xδδθ δ δ δ θ δ θ= == = − + − −∑ ∑ . (2.11) 
Thus, to make the partial derivative ∂L/∂θ = 0 and ∂L/∂δ = 0, we must have 
1
1
0
N
i
i
L N xδδ
δ δ
θ θ θ + =
∂ = − + =∂ ∑ , (2.12) 
1 1 1
ln 1ln ln ln 0
N N N
i i i i
i i i
L N N x x x xδ δδ δ
θθθ δ θ θ= = =
∂ = − + + − =∂ ∑ ∑ ∑ . (2.13) 
Thus, (2.12) leads to 
1
1 N
i
i
x
N
δ δθ
=
= ∑ . (2.14) 
Substituting (2.14) into (2.13), we obtain 
1
1
1
ln
ln 0
N
N
i ii
i N
i ii
N x xN x
x
δ
δδ
=
= =
+ − =∑∑ ∑ . (2.15) 
Solving the above equation numerically gives the estimated δ. The estimated θ can be computed from the 
estimated δ by (2.14).  
2.4  Embedding rules for spread spectrum schemes 
The embedding rules for watermark verification and data hiding problems are a bit different. Thus we 
first review the embedding rules for data hiding problems and then extend them to the watermark 
verification scenarios. 
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2.4.1  Data hiding 
In this thesis, we focus our attention mainly on SS and quantization schemes. Spread Spectrum (SS) [6, 
42, 69−79] watermarking schemes add an additive or a multiplicative watermark into the host signals to 
form the watermarked data. Thus, the embedding rule for the spread spectrum schemes can be given by 
( )i i i i is x b a g x w= + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ . (2.16) 
where i = 1, 2, …, N and g(.) is a function of x. Perceptual analysis may help determine the embedding 
strength ai adaptively for each host feature xi. However, if the perceptual analysis is not implemented, we 
may set ai to be the same value a (with a > 0 for simplicity). If g(xi) = 1, we have the rule for the additive 
spread spectrum (ASS) schemes 
i i is x baw= + . (2.17) 
However, if we assume that g(xi) = xi , the multiplicative spread spectrum (MSS) schemes can be formulated 
as 
i i i is x bax w= + . (2.18) 
In (2.18), we notice that the second term scales proportionally to the value of the host signal. As a matter of 
fact, the multiplicative embedding automatically implements a simple contrast masking of Watson’s 
perceptual model [55]. Thus, multiplicative embedding rules achieve a better perceptual quality. Barni’s 
multiplicative embedding rule [42] can also be derived by letting g(xi) = |xi|, that is, 
i i i is x ba x w= + . (2.19) 
Other embedding functions can also be derived from (2.16). However, in this thesis, we concentrate 
primarily on the additive and multiplicative embedding rules. 
2.4.2  Watermark verification 
In the above subsection, we reviewed the embedding rules for the data hiding problems. In fact, if we fix 
b to 1, these rules can be automatically adapted to the watermark detection problems. Thus we similarly 
have 
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i i is x aw= + , (2.20) 
i i i is x ax w= + , (2.21) 
i i i is x a x w= + . (2.22) 
for ASS, MSS and Barni’s schemes, respectively. 
2.5  Embedding rules for quantization schemes 
2.5.1  Data hiding 
In the spread spectrum schemes (2.16), we observe that the watermarked signal comprises of two parts, 
the host signal and the embedded signal. Usually, in order to keep the embedding distortion imperceptible, 
the embedded signal should be weak enough. The problem of watermark detection thus investigates how to 
detect the hidden weak signals in the strong host signals. However, in the spread spectrum schemes, the host 
signals interfere with the successful detection of the embedded watermark. Hence Chen [46, 47] proposed a 
pioneering class of QIM techniques that can have a complete rejection of the host interference. Its 
embedding rule is given by 
s x aw= + , where ( )ba q x x= − . (2.23) 
In the above equation,  
( ) ( [ ]) [ ]bq x q x d b d b∆= − +  and ( ) / 0.5q x x∆ = ∆ ⋅ ∆ +   , (2.24) 
where ⋅    is the floor function, d[b]s are the dithers and ∆ is the quantization step size. For symmetric 
dithers, d[1] = −d[0] = ∆/4. Usually in the literature, (random and key-dependent) non-symmetric dithers 
are employed to prevent the attackers from decoding the embedded data. However, non-symmetric dithers 
incur a larger distortion than do symmetric dithers. In [46], Chen also proved that Distortion-Compensated 
Quantization Index Schemes (DC-QIM) is optimal in the sense of capacity-achieving. Chen’s work also 
inspired Eggers to rediscover the work [91] and propose a suboptimal Scalar Costa Scheme (SCS) [48]. As 
a matter of fact, SCS is indeed the same as DC-QIM. Its embedding rule can be expressed by scaling the 
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quantization noise as 
s x awλ= + , where ( )ba q x x= − . (2.25) 
where λ is called the rejecting strength since it controls the strength of the host interference being rejected.  
SS and quantization schemes have their own advantages and disadvantages. Chen [46, 47] bridged these 
two schemes by Spread Transform (ST) techniques. With the idea of spread transform, the spread spectrum 
and quantization methods can be formulated into the same framework. This new technique is also termed 
Quantization Projection (QP) in [49, 50]. Since quantization schemes (with w = 1) can be expressed as 
( ) [ ( ) ]b bs x q x x x q xw xw w= + − = + − , (2.26) 
we see that they are just special cases of spread spectrum schemes. Compared with quantization schemes, 
spread spectrum schemes instead use w to secure the embedded data b.  
For N  > 1, we define the projected x on w as 
1
N
i ii
x x w N== ∑ . (2.27) 
, ,X s S are similarly defined. Equation (2.27) can also be interpreted as projecting the host signals on a 
selected pseudo-random sequence, which is the key idea of spread transform techniques. This also gives the 
reason why spread transform dither modulation (STDM) [46] is called quantization projection (QP) [49]. 
Projecting both sides of (2.20) on w, we obtain 
s x a= + , (2.28) 
If we let 
( )bs q x= ,  (2.29) 
then we have 
( )ba q x x= − . (2.30) 
Substituting (2.30) into (2.20), we see that the quantization scheme is a special case of the spread spectrum 
schemes. 
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2.5.2  Embedding rules for watermark detection 
It is also easy to obtain the embedding rules for the watermark verification problems. Pérez-Freire et al. 
[102] applied STDM scheme to the watermark verification scenarios. Its embedding rule is obtained by 
substituting ( )a q x xΛ= − into the additive rule (2.20). In the above rule, qΛ(·) is a Euclidean scalar 
quantizer of step size ∆ whose centroids are defined by the points in the shifted lattice / 2Λ ∆ + ∆ ] (the ∆/2 
is chosen by symmetry reasons). Thus, the embedding rule is 
[ ( ) ] ,   where  ( ) ( )i i is x q x x w q x q x d dΛ Λ ∆= + − = − + , (2.31) 
where i = 1, 2, …, N, q∆(·) is as defined in (2.24) and d is a dither. For symmetrical dithers, d = ∆/2. The best 
performance is achieved at the symmetrical dithers. 
2.6  Random Number Generation 
In this thesis, we validate the theoretical results by both Monte-Carlo simulations and experiments on real 
images. In order to conduct simulations, we have to generate a sequence of pseudo-random host data that 
follow a specific probability distribution. Since the Gamma distribution is often referred to in this work, we 
also formulate its pdf as 
1 exp( / )( )
( )X
x xf x
α
α
β
α β
− −= Γ  (2.32) 
where α and β are shape and scale parameters, respectively. Usually we denote a Gamma random variable 
by Gamma(α, β). 
2.6.1  Generation of GGD data 
 
Lemma 2.1: Let W be a random variable with P(W = 1) = P(W = 0) = 0.5 and E a Gamma random variable 
with shape parameter 1/c and scale parameter 1/βc. Moreover, W is independent of E. Thus the random 
variable X defined by 
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1/
1/
,    if 1;
  if 0.
c
c
E W
X
E W
 == − =
 (2.33) 
 has a GGD pdf given by (2.7). 
Proof: It is easy to see that 
1/ 1/
1/ 1/
( ) ( ) ( | 1) ( 1) ( | 0) ( 0)
          0.5 ( ) 0.5 ( )
0.5 ( ) 0.5,      if 0;
          
0.5 [ ( ) ],         if 0,
c c
X
c c
c
c
F x P X x P E x W P W P E x W P W
P E x P E x
P E x x
P E x x
= ≤ = ≤ = = + − ≤ = =
= ⋅ ≤ + ⋅ ≥ −
 ⋅ ≤ + ≥=  ⋅ ≥ − <
 
where the second equality follows from conditioning on W, the third from (2.33) and the fourth from the fact 
that E is nonnegative. Thus, we obtain 
 
1
1
1/ 1 1/
1
1/ 1 1
1
0.5 ( )               if 0
( ) ( )
0.5 ( ) [( ) ],    if 0
( ) exp( )( )0.5 ,                   if 0
(1/ )
          
[( ) ] exp[ ( ) ]( )0.5 ( )
c c
E
X X c c
E
c c c c c c
c
c c c c c
c
cx f x xdf x F x
dx c x f x x
x xcx x
c
x xc x
β β
β β
−
−
−
−
−
−
 ≥= =  − − <
− ≥Γ= − − −−
/
,    if 0
(1/ )
exp( ) ,         if 0;
2 (1/ )
          
exp[ ( ) ] ,    if 0,
2 (1/ )
c
c c
c c
x
c
c x x
c
c x x
c
β β
β β
 < Γ
 − ≥ Γ=  − − < Γ
 
which is the pdf given by (2.7).  
 
With this lemma, a Gamma random number generator can generate the GGD data. It is possible, though a 
bit hard, to generate a Gamma random number with any given scale and shape parameter. However, in this 
thesis, we focus on three typical cases, i.e., c = 2.0, 1.0 and 0.5 since these typical parameters are sufficient 
for validating the theoretical results obtained in the thesis.  
At c = 2.0, the GGD reduces to a Gaussian distribution. There are many ways, for instance, Box-Muller 
method (See page 261 in Chapter 5 of [114]), to generate Gaussian random numbers. At c = 1.0, E has a 
Gamma distribution with shape parameter 1.0, which indeed is an exponential distribution. We may refer to 
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the transformation method (See page 247 in Chapter 4 of [107]) to generate exponentially distributed 
random numbers. At c = 0.5, E has a Gamma distribution with shape parameter 2.0 and scale parameter 
1/β0.5. Thus, if two independent random variables E1 and E2 follow the same exponential distribution with 
the same scale parameter 1/β0.5, then E1+E2 has a Gamma distribution with shape parameter 2 and scale 
parameter 1/β0.5. Thus, it is easy to generate E at c = 0.5. 
2.6.2  Generation of Weibull data 
 
Lemma 2.2: Let Z be an exponential random variable with scale parameter θδ. Then the random variable 
defined by X = Z1/δ has a Weibull pdf with shape parameter δ and scale parameter θ. 
Proof: Since P(X ≤ x) = P(Z1/δ ≤ x) = P(Z ≤ xδ), we obtain 
1 1 exp( / )( ) ( ) ( )X Z
d xf x P X x x f x x
dx
δ δ
δ δ δ
δ
θδ δ θ
− − −= ≤ = = , 
which is a Weibull pdf with shape parameter δ and scale parameter θ (See 2.10). 
 
Thus with this lemma, we can also generate weibull-distributed data from exponential data. 
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Chapter 3   Performance Comparisons between MSS and ASS 
3.1  Introduction 
For the early spread spectrum schemes, the host signal hinders the detection or decoding of the embedded 
watermark. This situation can be improved by designing a better embedder or an optimum detector or 
decoder. The first approach utilizes the host information at the embedder, whereas the second improves the 
performance of spread spectrum watermarking schemes by exploiting the pdf of the host signals at the 
detector or decoder.  In this chapter, we concentrate on the second approach, while delaying the first one to 
the next chapter.  
Based on the fact that the GGD well models the low- and mid-frequency DCT coefficients, many 
optimum detectors and decoders [69−71, 77] have been proposed. However, in these works, no rigorous 
performance analysis has been given. Thus this chapter will investigate how the performances react to the 
different shape parameters under both no attack and attacks. This will further lead to our highlight on the 
performance comparisons between MSS and ASS since there is still no solid performance comparison 
between these two schemes. The work [108] compared them under the assumption that the host signals are 
normally distributed, which is not the case for natural images.  
We find through comparisons an interesting result that on the contrary to MSS, ASS yields a better 
performance as the shape parameter of host DCT data decreases. Moreover, MSS outperforms ASS at the 
shape parameter above 1.3. 
The rest of this work is organized as follows. Section 3.2 investigates the performance of optimum 
decoders for both ASS and MSS in the DCT domain. The performance of optimum detectors shall be 
examined in Section 3.3. Moreover, in Section 3.3, we also discuss a case where both X and w are assumed 
to be random variables. Finally, we conclude this chapter in Section 3.4. 
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3.2  Data Hiding Scenario 
3.2.1  Optimum decoding statistic for ASS 
The embedding rule for ASS is given by si = xi + b·a·wi, where i = 1, 2, …, N. In order to decode the 
embedded information bit b, we formulate two alternative hypotheses as 
H0: Si = Xi − a·wi and H1: Si = Xi + a·wi. (3.1) 
Based on the classical decision theory, the Bayes test can be formulated as [69, 105], 
1
1 1
1
1 1
( ) exp( ( )
( 1)( )
( 1) ( ) exp( ( )
i
i
N N
c
X i i i i b
i i
N N
c b
X i i i i
i i
f s aw s aw
f bl
f b f s aw s aw
β
ψ
β
=
= =
=−
= =
− − −= >= = = <= − + − +
∏ ∑
∏ ∑
S
S
s |s
s |
, (3.2) 
where the pdf of Xi is given by (2.7) and ψ is the decision threshold given by 
0 10 00
1 01 11
( )
( )
p c c
p c c
ψ −= − , (3.3) 
where p0 = p(b = −1) and p1 = p(b = 1). Please see [105] for a clear definition of other parameters in (3.3). If 
we assume that c00 = c11 = 0 and c01 = c10 = 1, the Bayes test minimizes the total probability of error. If we 
further assume that p0 = p1 = 0.5, then ψ = 1. By taking logarithm on both sides of (3.2), we obtain an 
optimum decision statistic [69] 
1
11
1( ) 0
N bc c
i i i i
bi
L S aw S aw
N
=
=−=
>= + − − <∑S . (3.4) 
In the above equation, we have divided both sides by a factor N for the convenience of performance 
analyses. This would not make any difference on the decoder’s performance. Thus, an equivalent decision 
statistic is given by 
1
1( )
N
i i i i
i
L S aw S aw
N
ξ ξ
=
= + − −∑S . (3.5) 
In the above equation, we have replaced c with ξ for future discussion convenience. In this work, we call 
this form of decoder as ξ-order decoder and ξ is the order parameter (OP). In the following discussions, we 
will show that its best performance is achieved at ξ = c. For ξ = 2.0, the above rule is reduced to the linear 
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correlation, that is, 
1
1( ) N i iiL S wN =
= ∑S . (3.6) 
3.2.2  Optimum decoders for MSS 
The embedding rule for MSS is si = xi + b·a·xi·wi, where i = 1, 2, …, N.  Similarly, we decides between a 
pair of hypotheses  
H0: Si = Xi − a·Xi ·wi and H1: Si = Xi + a·Xi ·wi. (3.7) 
Thus, the optimum test can be similarly formulated as  
0
111
0
1 11
11 exp[ /(1 )] 1 1( ) 1( )  
1( ) 1[ /(1 )] exp1 1 1
cN NN i
cX i i
ii i iH i i
N cN NH iX i i
ci i ii i i
s
f s aw aw awf H awl
f H sf s aw
aw aw aw
β
β
===
= ==
   ⋅ −  + + +  +  = = =   − ⋅ −  − − −    
∑∏∏
∏ ∑∏
1S| 1
S|
s |
s
s |
. (3.8) 
By taking logarithm on both sides, we have  
1 1
1ln( ( )) ln
1 (1 ) (1 )
c cN N
i ii
c c
i ii i i
S Sawl
aw aw aw
β β
= =
 −= + − + − +  
∑ ∑s  . (3.9) 
In the above equation, we have used the fact that | 1 + awi | = 1 + awi and | 1 − awi | = 1 − awi since a << 1. 
Under the same assumption for ASS decoders, the decision threshold ψ, also given by (3.3), is set zero to 
minimize the probability of error. Moreover, since ∑1≤i≤N wi = 0, we have 
1
ln[(1 ) /(1 )] 0N i ii aw aw= − + =∑ . (3.10) 
Hence, an equivalent decision statistic for (3.9) is 
1
01
1 1 1( ) 0
(1 ) (1 )
HN
c
i c c
Hi i i
L S
N aw aw=
  >= −  <− + ∑S . (3.11) 
If a is small, then we have the following approximations 
(1 ) 1xa ax+ ≈ +  and 21 1a− ≈ , (3.12) 
The first approximation in (3.12) can be easily derived from Taylor Series expansion. Then we can 
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approximate (3.11) by 
2 2 1
1
(1 ) (1 )1 1( ) 2
(1 ) (1 )
c cN
Nc ci i
i i ic c i
i
aw awL S S caw
N a a N ==
 + −= − ≈ − − ∑ ∑S . (3.13) 
Therefore, an equivalent decision statistic is  
1
1( ) N i iiL S wN
ξ
== ∑S . (3.14) 
In (3.14), we have replaced c with ξ for future discussion. The above decision statistic is called ξ-order 
decoder and ξ is the order parameter (OP), which closely resembles the generalized correlator [77] derived 
by the locally optimal test. In this work, if the order parameter is not specified, we may also call a ξ-order 
decoder a generalized correlator. 
3.2.3  Performance of ASS 
For the ease of discussions, we denote m0, m1, σ0 and σ1 as the mean and standard deviation of the decision 
statistic under H0 and H1, i.e.,  
0 0 1 1[ ( | )], [ ( | )]m E L H m E L H= =S S , 2 20 0 1 1[ ( | )] and [ ( | )]Var L H Var L Hσ σ= =S S . (3.15) 
These notations will used throughout this thesis and also apply to the scenarios where the attacks are 
involved, for which case S should be replaced by Y. In this thesis, we characterize the performance of data 
hiding systems by the total probability of error (pe). Since the decision statistics, such as (3.5), (3.6) and 
(3.14), are often expressed by a sum of i.i.d. random variables, they can thus be approximated by Gaussian 
random variables due to the central limit theorem. However, it is also important to note that the 
approximation may be not accurate if N is not sufficiently large or the pdf of the constituent random variable 
is not smooth enough. The approximation error is bounded by Berry-Esseen Theorem. Therefore we have 
0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1[ ( | ) 0] [ ( | ) 0] 0.5 ( / ) 0.5 ( / )ep p p L H p p L H Q m Q mσ σ= > + < ≈ − +S S , (3.16) 
where 21( ) exp( / 2)
2 x
Q x t dtπ
∞= −∫ . (3.17) 
We first derive the performance of the correlator which is optimum for Gaussian host data. It is easy to see 
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that m1 = −m0 = a and 20σ = 21σ = Var(X)/N = 2Xσ . Thus the performance is given by 
e
X
a Np Q σ
 =   
. (3.18) 
Under zero-mean noise attacks V, the attacked signal Y is given by Y = S + V, where V is independent of S. 
The decision statistic is then expressed as 
1 1
1 1( ) ( )N Ni i i i i ii iL Y w X w V w baN N= =
= = + +∑ ∑Y . (3.19) 
Therefore, substituting m1 = −m0 = a and 20σ = 21σ = [Var(X)+Var(V)]/N = ( 2Xσ + 2Vσ )/N into (3.16), we obtain  
2 2( )e X Vp Q a N σ σ = +  . (3.20) 
The same result is also reported in Barni’s work [108]. 
The performance of the optimal decoder (3.5) has to be derived numerically. It is easy to see that  
1 1
1 1( | 1) 2  and ( | 0) 2
N N
i i i i i i
i i
L b X aw X L b X X aw
N N
ξ ξ ξ ξ
= =
= = + − = = − −∑ ∑S S . (3.21) 
Since X has a symmetric pdf, E(|X + 2a|ξ −|X|ξ) = E(|X − 2a|ξ −|X|ξ) and Var(|X + 2a|ξ −|X|ξ) = Var(|X − 2a|ξ 
−|X|ξ). Thus the optimum decoder’s performance is determined by 
( ) ( )2 21 0 1 0 12  and  2m m E X a X Var X a XNξ ξ ξ ξσ σ= − = + − = = + − . (3.22) 
Moreover, since 
1 [ / 2 / / ]X X X Xm E X a X
ξ ξξσ σ σ σ= + − , (3.23)  
2 2 2 2 2
2 1 1
1
[( 2 ) ] [( / 2 / / ) ]X X X XE X a X m E X a X m
N N
ξ ξ ξ ξξσ σ σ σσ + − − + − −= = , (3.24) 
and the pdf of X/σX does not depend on σX, the performance for ASS depends only on a/σX or DWR. The 
performance of ASS is drawn in Fig. 3.1. In this figure, we see that the best performance is achieved at ξ = 
c. Moreover, all curves intersect at ξ = 2.0 since the optimum decoder (3.5) at ξ = 2.0 reduces to a correlator 
whose performance is invariant to the shape parameter c.  
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Fig. 3.1. Performance of ASS under no attack (with DWR = 20dB and N = 100). 
 
Now we resort to numerical convolutions to obtain the decoder’s performance under zero-mean noise 
attacks. Let U = X + V.  Thus fU(u) = fX(x)*fV(v), where * represents convolution. Therefore,  
1 0 ( 2 )m m E U a U
ξ ξ= − = + − , (3.25) 
2 2 2 2
1 0 1[( 2 ) ]/ /E U a U N m N
ξ ξσ σ= = + − − . (3.26) 
With (3.25) and (3.26), the performance of ASS can be easily computed. Moreover, since 
1
2
X
X X X X X
X V a X Vm E
ξ ξ
ξσ σ σ σ σ σ
  = + + − +  
, (3.27) 
2
2 2
2 1
1
2X
X X X X X
X V a X V mE
N N
ξ ξξσσ σ σ σ σ σ
   = + + − + −      
 (3.28) 
and the pdf of V/σX depends only on σX /σV , the performance of ASS thus depends only on DWR and WNR. 
3.2.4  Performance of MSS 
Substituting Si = Xi (1 + bawi) into (3.14) and via the approximation (3.12), we readily have 
1 1 1
1 1( ) (1 )
N N N
i i i i i i
i i i
baL X baw w X w X
N N N
ξ ξ ξξξ
= = =
≈ + = +∑ ∑ ∑S . (3.29) 
It thus follows that 
1 0 ( )m m aE X
ξξ= − ≈ .  (3.30) 
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2 2
2 2
1 0
( )(1 ) (1 ) ( )
2
Var Xa a Var X
N N
ξξ ξ ξσ σ + + −= = ≈ . (3.31) 
Substituting (3.30) and (3.31) into (3.16), we see that 
( ) ( )ep Q a N E X Var X
ξ ξξ =    . (3.32) 
We define the Mean-Variation Ratio (MVR) as 
MVR( ) ( ) ( )E X Var Xξ ξξ ξ= . (3.33) 
For GGD host signals with shape parameter c, we have 
 
 
0
1 11  
0
1
( )
            2
2              (Let )
2            [( 1) / ].
c
c c
c
x
x
yc c
E X x Ae dx
A x e dx
A y e dy x y
c
A c
c
ξ ξ β
ξ β
ξ
β
ξ ξβ
+∞ −
−∞
+∞ −
+ −+∞ −
+
=
=
= =
= Γ +
∫
∫
∫
 (3.34) 
Thus the variance is given by 
2 2
2
2
2 1 2 2
2( )
2 2
2 2 2 2
2
var( ) ( ) [ ( )]
2 [(2 1) / ] { [( 1) / ]}              (2 )
[(2 1) / ] (1/ ) { [( 1) / ]}              (2 ) (2 )
[(2 1) / ] (1/ ) { [( 1)              (2 )
a
X E X E X
A c cA c
c
c c cA c A c
c cA c
ξ ξ ξ
ξ ξ
ξ ξ
ξ ξ
β β
ξ ξ
β β
ξ ξ
+ +
+ +
= −
Γ + Γ += −
Γ + Γ Γ += −
Γ + Γ − Γ +=
2
2 2
/ ]}c
ξβ +  (3.35) 
where (a) follows from (2.8). Consequently, we have 
2
[( 1) / ]MVR( )
[(2 1) / ] (1/ ) { [( 1) / ]}
c
c c c
ξ ξξ ξ ξ
Γ += Γ + Γ − Γ + . (3.36) 
We see from (3.36) that MVR does not depend on σX, and thus the decoder’s performance is completely 
determined by the shape parameter c. It is difficult to maximize the MVR analytically. However, we found 
through the numerical search that (3.36) is maximized at ξ = c for all c in [0.1, 2.5], proving that the 
optimum test does yield the best performance. The MVR shown in Fig. 3.2 clearly indicates that the 
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maximum is achieved at ξ = c. What’s more, for any given shape parameter, MVR(ξ) increases as ξ 
increases. Finally, plugging ξ = c into (3.36), we obtain 
2
2
2
2
2
2
(1 1/ ) (1 1/ )[MVR( )]
(2 1/ ) (1/ ) [ (1 1/ )]
(1 1/ ) (1 1/ )                  
(1 1/ ) (1 1/ ) (1/ ) [ (1 1/ )]
(1 1/ )                  
(1 1/ ) (1/ ) (1 1/ )
(1/                  
c c cc
c c c
c c c
c c c c
c c
c c c
c c
Γ + Γ += Γ + Γ − Γ +
Γ + Γ += + Γ + Γ − Γ +
Γ += + Γ −Γ +
Γ= )
(1 1/ ) (1/ ) (1/ ) (1/ )
                  .
c c c c
c
+ Γ − Γ
=  (3.37) 
It therefore follows that 
MVR( )c c= . (3.38) 
In the above derivation, we have used the fact that 
( 1) ( )x x xΓ + = Γ . (3.39) 
Therefore, the larger the c, the better the performance. 
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Fig. 3.2. MVR for different shape parameters.  
 
Now we derive the performance of MSS under noise attacks. At ξ = 2.0, we have 
2 2 2 2
1 1
1 1( ) [ (1 ) 2 (1 ) ]N Ni i i i i i i i ii iL Y w X baw V X baw V wN N= =
= = + + + +∑ ∑Y . (3.40) 
Hence, with some simple algebraic manipulations, we obtain 
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2
1 0 2 Xm m aσ= − = , (3.41) 
4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2
0 1
[(1 ) (1 ) ] ( ) 2[(1 ) (1 ) ] ( ) ( ) ( )
2
a a Var X a a E X E V Var V
N N
σ σ + + − + + − += = + . (3.42) 
Since a << 1, we see that 
2 2 2 2
2 2
1 0
( ) 4 ( ) ( ) ( )Var X E X E V Var V
N
σ σ + += ≈ , (3.43) 
which depends on the type of attacking noise. For Gaussian noise, we obtain 
2 2 4 2 2 2
1 0 [2 4 2 ]/X X V V Nσ σ σ σ σ σ= ≈ + + . (3.44) 
Therefore, the performance for MSS is given by 
2 2 2[ 2 /( )]e X X Vp Q a Nσ σ σ= + . (3.45) 
At ξ ≠ 2.0, the decoder’s performance has to be obtained numerically. Similarly, we have 
1 0 { ( (1 ) ) ( (1 ) )}/ 2m m E X a V E X a V
ξ ξ= − = + + − − + , (3.46) 
2 2
1 0 { ( (1 ) ) ( (1 ) )}/(2 )Var X a V Var X a V N
ξ ξσ σ= = + + + − + , (3.47) 
where the pdfs of X(1+a)+V, X(1−a)+V and X+V have to be obtained through numerical convolutions. As 
we did for ASS under attacks, we can prove similarly that the performance of MSS depends solely on DWR 
and WNR. 
3.2.5  Performance comparisons under no attack 
In this chapter, the performance comparisons are made at the same level of embedding distortion Dw. For 
ASS, it is trivial to see that 
2
wD a= , (3.48) 
and for MSS,  
2 2
w XD a σ= . (3.49) 
(1)  Gaussian hosts 
The correlation decoder is optimal for Gaussian hosts and yields a performance  
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[ / ]e w Xp Q ND σ= . (3.50) 
For MSS, substituting (3.49) into (3.32), we obtain  
[ MVR( ) / ]e w Xp Q ND ξ σ= . (3.51) 
It thus follows from (3.38) that the best performance for Gaussian host signals (c = 2.0) is 
[ 2 / ]e Xp Q DN σ= , (3.52) 
which outperforms its counterpart ASS (3.50).  
(2)  Non-Gaussian hosts 
For c = 1.0, (3.51) produces the best performance 
[ / ]e Xp Q DN σ=  (3.53) 
since MVR(1.0) = 1.0. We find that (3.53) is identical to (3.50). However, at c ≠ 2.0, the correlation decoder 
is not optimal and the optimum performance must be better than (3.50). Since MSS yields a better 
performance as the shape parameter c increases, MSS’s performance at c < 1.0 is worse than (3.53) or (3.50). 
Therefore, for c ≤ 1.0, ASS surpasses MSS in performance. At which shape parameter do ASS and MSS 
achieve the same performance? Fig. 3.3 answers this question. Fig. 3.3(a) depicts the performance of MSS 
and ASS at the same DWR. An astounding result is that on the contrary to MSS, ASS yields a better 
performance as c decreases (also see Fig. 3.1). Furthermore, MSS outperforms ASS at c above 1.3. At a 
small c, for instance c = 0.5, ASS produces a far better performance. Fig. 3.3(b) displays that at c = 1.3, MSS 
behaves almost as well as ASS does. Please note that in Fig. 3.3(b), the embedding strength used for MSS is 
a/σX (see (3.48) and (3.49)) to achieve the same distortion. 
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(a)                                                                                          (b) 
Fig. 3.3. (a) MSS versus ASS under no attack (with N = 100). (b) MSS versus ASS at c = 1.3 (with N = 100, σX = 
10, and the embedding strength for MSS is a/σX). 
3.2.6  Performance comparisons under attacks 
(1)  Gaussian hosts 
Likewise, we first compare MSS with ASS for Gaussian hosts and attacks. Substituting (3.48) into (3.20) 
leads to 
2 2( )e w X Vp Q ND σ σ = +  . (3.54) 
Similarly, the performance for MSS is evaluated by 
2 22
X
e
X V
p Q DN σσ σ
 =  + 
. (3.55) 
Comparing (3.54) with (3.55), we find that MSS outperforms ASS if σV < σX.  
(2)   Non-Gaussian hosts 
If the host signals are not Gaussian-distributed, we have to resort to the numerical approaches to compute 
their performance under noise attacks. In Fig. 3.4(a), we compared MSS with ASS under noise attacks. At c 
= 1.3, MSS outperforms ASS when the noise power is relatively small; ASS surpasses MSS in performance 
when the watermarked data suffer from strong attacks. For c < 1.3, for instance c = 0.5 and c =1.0, a better 
performance can be obtained by ASS. In Fig. 3.4(b), we observe that for noise attacks at WNR= 0dB or 
WNR = −14dB, MSS exceeds ASS in performance at a large c (c > 1.3). However, for very strong noise 
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attacks, ASS can achieve a better performance. 
Under noise attacks, the best ξ may not be achieved at c. Thus, we search for the best ξ under noise attacks 
and compare their best performances. The results are displayed in Fig. 3.5. Fig. 3.5(a) shows that for attacks 
at WNR = 0dB or WNR = −14dB, MSS outperforms ASS at c above 1.3. Another interesting result is that 
even under noise attacks, the smaller c implying the better performance still holds for ASS. Thus for ASS, 
we should select the DCT coefficients with a smaller c, whereas MSS should embed information in the DCT 
data with a larger c.  
The above experiments make performance comparisons under Gaussian noise attacks. Fig. 3.5(b) 
displays the comparison results under GGD noise attacks, where the attack noise is assumed to follow a 
GGD distribution with a shape parameter ac. The comparison results show that as ac increases, ASS yields 
a poorer performance and thus Gaussian noise attacks are not the strongest type of attacking noise. The 
underlying reason is that the attacked data (after noise attacks with a larger ac) have less heavy tails and thus 
can be approximated by a GGD with a larger shape parameter. Therefore, the best ξ would be larger and 
hence the poorer performance since ASS yields a poorer performance at larger shape parameters. This is 
also clearly reflected in Fig. 3.9(a), where the best ξ for ac = 2.0 is larger than that for ac = 1.0. However, for 
MSS, the best performance is almost invariant to the type of attacking noise. Moreover, the same conclusion 
that MSS outperforms ASS at c above 1.3 can also be drawn from this figure. 
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(a)                                                                                       (b) 
Fig. 3.4. MSS versus ASS under Gaussian noise attacks with N = 100. (a) At different attack levels (with DWR 
= 20dB, a = 1.0 for ASS and a = 0.1 for MSS, σX = 10). (b) At different c (with DWR = 20dB). 
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(a)                         (b) 
Fig. 3.5. Performance of the best ξ-order decoder (at DWR = 20dB and N = 100). (a) Under zero-mean Gaussian 
noise attacks. (b) Under zero-mean GGD noise attacks (with the shape parameter ac and WNR = −14dB). 
3.2.7  Monte-Carlo Simulations 
In this section, Monte-Carlo simulations are made to verify the theoretical results derived in the previous 
sections. The shape parameters taken in all experiments are 0.5 and 1.0, which are typical of many natural 
images. Please also note that in the legend of the figures, “E” stands for Empirical results obtained through 
Monte-Carlo simulations, “T” for Theoretical results, and “OP” for the optimum decoder (3.11). 
In the first experiment, we validate the theoretical performances of ASS and MSS under no attack, and 
the experimental results are demonstrated in Fig. 3.6 and Fig. 3.7. Fig. 3.6(a) shows that the theoretical 
performance does match well with the simulated results. Moreover in Fig. 3.6(b), the best performance is 
achieved at ξ = c, though this is not clearly reflected for c = 0.5. In Fig. 3.7(a), we observe that though the 
generalized correlator is only suboptimal, it achieves almost the same performance with the optimum 
decoder. Fig. 3.7(b) demonstates that though the theoretical results can well predict the real performance of 
the optimum decoder at small decoding order parameters, they underestimate the real performance at larger 
ξs. This performance underestimation is largely due to the inaccuracy of approximation by the central limit 
theorem since |X|ξ has a larger dispersion at a larger ξ (especially for the host data with a smaller shape 
parameter.) This thus also explains why the theoretical performance for c = 0.5 displays a larger deviation 
from the experimental results (since the host data for c = 0.5 are more dispersed than that for c = 1.0.) The 
second experiment is done to verify the theoretical performance of both ASS and MSS under noise attacks. 
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The results in Fig. 3.8 demonstrate the nice agreement between the theoretical and the experimental 
performance.  
In the previous section, we find the best ξ through searching. However, in real scenarios, the parameters 
of the added noise and thus the best ξ may not be known. Instead, the best ξ can be roughly approximated by 
the shape parameter of the attacked data. In this experiment, we will verify this. Please note that the shape 
parameter is estimated by the moment method [69]. The comparison results between the theoretically best ξ 
and the estimated shape parameters are shown in Fig. 3.9. In the figures, “T” stands for the theoretically best 
ξ, and “E” for estimated parameters. The estimated parameters in both figures can give a rough 
approximation of the best ξ. 
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Fig. 3.6. Theoretical and simulated performance of ASS with N = 100, σX = 10.  Empirical results are obtained on 
100,000 groups of data. (a) Performance at different Ns with a = 0.5. (b) Performance at different ξs. 
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Fig. 3.7. Theoretical and simulated performance of MSS with N = 100, σX = 10 and a = 0.1.  Empirical results are 
obtained on 100,000 groups of data. (a) Performance at different Ns. (b) Performance at different ξs. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
 o
f e
rro
r
standard deviation of added zero-mean Gaussian Noise
 ASS T c =ξ =0.5 a =1.0
 ASS E c =ξ =0.5 a =1.0
 MSS T c =ξ =0.5 a =0.1
 MSS E c =ξ =0.5 a =0.1
 ASS T c =ξ =1.0 a =1.0
 ASS E c =ξ =1.0 a =1.0
 MSS T c =ξ =1.0 a =0.1
 MSS E c =ξ =1.0 a =0.1
 
Fig. 3.8. Theoretical and simulated performance under zero-mean Gaussian noise attacks at N = 100, σX = 10. 
Empirical results are obtained on 100,000 groups of data. 
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Fig. 3.9. The best ξ and the estimated shape parameter of the attacked data for ASS on 10,000 groups of data 
(with σX = 10, N = 100, the shape parameter ac of the attacking noise). (a) For ASS with a = 1.0 (b) For MSS with 
a = 0.1.  
3.3  Watermark verification scenarios 
In the previous section, we investigate the performance of MSS and ASS under data hiding scenarios. In 
this section, we examine their performances for watermark verification problems. 
3.3.1  Optimum detection rules for ASS 
For ASS, the watermark detection can be formulated as a binary hypothesis test between H0:  Si = Xi and 
H1:  Si = Xi  + a wi. Thus the likelihood ratio test (LRT) leads to 
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Taking logarithms on both sides, we immediately have an optimum decision statistic [69, 70] 
1 1
(S) N Nc ci i ii iL S S aw= == − −∑ ∑ . (3.57) 
Thus an equivalent statistic is given by 
1 1
1( ) ( )N Ni i ii iL S S awN
ξ ξ
= == − −∑ ∑S . (3.58) 
In the above rule, we have also replaced c with ξ for discussion convenience. It can also be verified that the 
best performance is achieved at ξ = c. In this thesis, ξ is called the order parameter (OP). At ξ = 2.0, (3.58) is 
reduced to a linear correlation 
1
1( ) N i iiL S wN =
= ∑S . (3.59) 
The linear correlation, though optimal only for Gaussian host signals, is widely used in the spread spectrum 
schemes. It offers an advantage over (3.58) in that the detector requires no knowledge of the embedding 
strength a. For the above decision statistic, the decision rule is 
1 0( ) ;   ( )L H L Hψ ψ> ⇒ < ⇒S S , (3.60) 
where ψ is the decision threshold.  
3.3.2  Optimum detection rules for MSS 
For MSS, the detector makes a choice between H0: Si = Xi and H1: Si = Xi (1 + a wi). Therefore, the 
likelihood ratio test (LRT) is 
0
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By taking logarithm on both sides of (3.62) and since a <<1, we obtain 
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1 1
1 1ln( ( )) ln 1
1 (1 )
N N c
i ci i
i i
l S
aw aw
β= =
 = + − + + ∑ ∑s  .  (3.63) 
Thus, given any watermark sequence, the decision statistic can be written as 
1
1( ) [1 1 (1 ) ]N c ci iiL S awN =
= − +∑S ,  (3.64) 
The decision rule (3.60) can be employed to decide between H0 and H1. If a is small, the approximation 
technique (3.12) yields 
21 1
(1 )1 1( ) 1
(1 )
c
N Nc ci
i i ici i
awL S S caw
N a N= =
 −= − ≈ − ∑ ∑S . (3.65) 
Therefore, an equivalent one is  
1
1( ) N i iiL S wN
ξ
== ∑S .       (3.66) 
In (3.66), we have replaced c in (3.65) with ξ for the convenience of future discussion. The above decision 
statistic is called ξ-order detector in this work and ξ is the order parameter. The same form of detector can 
also be found in [77] where it was derived from the LO test and called the generalized correlator. The 
ξ-order detector is suboptimal; however, it achieves almost the same performance as the optimal detector 
does since a is rather small. 
3.3.3  Performance of ASS 
The performance of the watermark detection system is characterized by the receiver operating curves 
(ROC) plotting the probability of detection (pd) or the probability of miss (pm) at a specified false alarm 
probability (pfa), where pd, pm and pfa are defined as 
1 0 0 1 1 1(say |   is true),  (say |  is true) and (say |  is true)fa m dp P H H p P H H p P H H= = = . (3.67) 
It is important to note that pm = 1 − pd. Since the decision statistics are often expressed by a sum of a large 
number of independent random variables, they can be approximated by Gaussian random variables due to 
the central limit theorem. Thus we obtain 
0 0 1 1[( ) / ] and 1 [( ) / ]fa mp Q m p Q mψ σ ψ σ= − = − − , (3.68) 
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Substituting pfa into pm, we have alternatively 
1
0 0 1 1 1 {[ ( ) ]/ }m fap Q Q p m mσ σ−= − + − . (3.69) 
In this subsection, we first examine the performance of correlation detectors. Substituting m0 = 0, m1 = a 
and 20σ = 21σ = 2Xσ /N into (3.68), we find that the detector’s performance under no attack is depicted by [71] 
11 [ ( ) / ]m fa Xp Q Q p a N σ−= − − . (3.70) 
Under attacks, the detector decides between H0: Yi = Xi + Vi and H1: Yi = Xi + awi + Vi. Its performance is 
evaluated by [101, 102] 
1 2 21 ( ) /( )m fa X Vp Q Q p a N σ σ− = − − +  , (3.71) 
since m0 = 0, m1 = a and 20σ = 21σ = ( 2Xσ + 2Vσ )/N.  
We have to resort to numerical integrations to obtain the theoretical performance of (3.58) at ξ ≠ 2.0. 
Under H0 and H1, we have L(S|H0) = (∑1≤i≤N |Xi|ξ − |Xi−awi|ξ )/N and L(S|H1) = (∑1≤i≤N |Xi +awi|ξ − |Xi|ξ )/N, 
respectively. Since X has a symmetric pdf, E(|X+a|ξ−|X|ξ) = E(|X−a|ξ−|X|ξ) and Var(|X+a|ξ−|X|ξ) = 
Var(|X−a|ξ−|X|ξ). Thus we obtain 
1 0 ( )m m E X a X
ξ ξ= − = + − , (3.72) 
2 2
1 0 ( ) /Var X a X N
ξ ξσ σ= = + − . (3.73) 
The above means and standard deviations have to be evaluated numerically. The performance for (3.58) can 
thus be evaluated by substituting (3.72) and (3.73) into (3.69). The detector’s performance under attacks 
can be similarly characterized by 
1 0 ( )m m E X V a X V
ξ ξ= − = + + − + , (3.74) 
2 2
1 0 ( ) /Var X V a X V N
ξ ξσ σ= = + + − + , (3.75) 
where the pdf of (X+V) is obtained through convolving the pdf of X and the pdf of V. Similarly, we can 
prove that the performance of ASS under attacks is dependent on only DWR and WNR.  
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3.3.4  Performance of MSS 
In this subsection, we inspect the performance of the optimal detector (3.64) and the generalized 
correlator (3.66). The decision has to be made between H0: Si = Xi and H1: Si = Xi (1+awi). Thus, the 
performance of the optimum detector can be determined by  
0 {[1 1 (1 ) ] [1 1 (1 ) ]} ( ) / 2
cc cm a a E X= − + + − − , (3.76) 
2 2 2
0 {[1 1 (1 ) ] [1 1 (1 ) ] } ( ) /(2 )
cc ca a Var X Nσ = − + + − − , (3.77) 
1 {[(1 ) 1] [(1 ) 1]} ( ) / 2
cc cm a a E X= + − + − − , (3.78) 
2 2 2
1 {[(1 ) 1] [(1 ) 1] } ( ) (2 )
cc ca a Var X Nσ = + − + − − . (3.79) 
For the generalized correlator (3.66), we similarly have 
0 0m = , 20 ( ) /Var X Nξσ = , (3.80) 
1
( )[(1 ) (1 ) ] ( )[(1 ) (1 )]
( )
2 2
E X a a E X a a
m aE X
ξ ξξ ξ ξξ ξ ξ+ − − + − −= ≈ =  (3.81) 
2 2 2
1 [(1 ) (1 ) ] ( ) /(2 ) ( ) /a a Var X N Var X N
ξ ξξ ξσ = + + − ≈ . (3.82) 
Thus, substituting (3.80), (3.81) and (3.82) into (3.69), we obtain 
1 11 ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) MVR( )m fa fap Q Q p a N E X Var X Q Q p a N
ξ ξξ ξ− −   ≈ − − = − −    . (3.83) 
In this thesis, we only examine the suboptimal detector’s performance under noise attacks since it serves 
a benchmark for our informed schemes in our future discussions. The performance for the optimal detector 
can be similarly derived. Under attacks, the detector tests a pair of hypotheses H0: Yi = Xi + Vi and H1: Yi = Xi 
(1+awi) + Vi. At ξ = 2.0, the analytic performance is characterized by 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
0 0 1 1 00,  [ ( ) ( ) 4 ( ) ( )]/ ,  2  and Xm Var X Var V E X E V N m aσ σ σ σ= = + + = ≈ . (3.84) 
Please see (3.40) to (3.43) for a better understanding of the above equation. For Gaussian hosts and 
zero-mean Gaussian noise attacks V, we obtain 
1 2 2 2 1 [ ( ) 2 ( )]m fa X X Vp Q Q p N aσ σ σ−= − − + . (3.85) 
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If ξ ≠ 2.0, the performance of the generalized correlator (3.66) under attacks can be characterized by 
0 0m = , 20 ( ) /Var X V Nξσ = + , (3.86) 
1 [ ( (1 ) ) ( (1 ) )]/ 2m E X a V E X a V
ξ ξ= + + − − + , (3.87) 
2
1 [ ( (1 ) ) ( (1 ) )]/(2 )Var X a V Var X a V N
ξ ξσ = + + + − + . (3.88) 
The pdfs of X(1+a)+V, X(1−a)+V and X+V have to be obtained through numerical convolutions. 
3.3.5  Performance comparisons under no attack 
In this subsection, we compared MSS with ASS under no attack. Likewise, we first make performance 
comparisons at c = 2.0. 
(1)  Gaussian hosts 
Substituting Dw = a2 into (3.70), we obtain 
11 [ ( ) ]m fa w Xp Q Q p ND σ−= − − . (3.89) 
Since MVR reaches its maximum at ξ = c, the optimum performance for MSS is 
11 [ ( ) ]m fa w Xp Q Q p cND σ−= − − , (3.90) 
which achieves a better performance than (3.89) at c > 1.0. Hence, for Gaussian hosts, MSS yields a better 
performance than ASS does.  
(2)  Non-Gaussian hosts 
Following the same arguments in the information hiding scenario, we concludes that MSS outperforms 
ASS at some c larger than 1.0. In fact, at c = 1.3, MSS and ASS achieves almost the same performance. Fig. 
3.10(a) and Fig. 3.10(b) both demonstrate that at c > 1.3, MSS surpass ASS in performance; otherwise, 
MSS is inferior to ASS in performance. We also notice from both figures that in contrast to MSS, ASS 
produces a nicer performance as the shape parameter c decreases. These results are consistent with those 
obtained under data-hiding scenarios. 
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Fig. 3.10. Theoretical Performance comparisons between MSS and ASS at ξ = c. (a) At different cs with N = 
1000, DWR = 20dB and σX = 10. (b) Comparisons at a fixed false alarm probability with c = 1.3 and σX = 10 and 
N = 1000. 
3.3.6  Performance comparisons under attacks 
At the same distortion level Dw, (3.71) and (3.85) can be expressed as 
1 2 21 ( ) /( )m fa w X Vp Q Q p ND σ σ− = − − +  ,  (3.91) 
1 2 2 1 ( ) 2 ( )m fa w X X Vp Q Q p ND σ σ σ− = − − +  , (3.92) 
for Gaussian hosts and attacks. Comparing the above two equations, we find that MSS has a better 
performance if σX > σV. This result is clearly reflected in Fig. 3.11 where MSS intersects ASS at σX = σV = 10. 
Fig. 3.12 compares MSS with ASS at c = 1.2 and 1.3. It can be clearly inferred from both figures that MSS 
outperforms ASS at c above 1.3, which coincides with the result for information hiding.  
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Fig. 3.11. Performance comparisons between MSS and ASS under zero-mean Gaussian noise attacks at DWR = 
20dB, ξ = c = 2.0 and σX = 10.  
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(a)                        (b) 
Fig. 3.12. Theoretical Performance comparisons between MSS and ASS under zero-mean Gaussian noise 
attacks at N = 1000, DWR = 20dB, σX = 10. (a) ξ = c = 1.2. (b) ξ = c = 1.3. 
3.3.7  Monte-Carlo Simulations 
In this section, we made Monte-Carlo simulations to verify the theoretical results obtained in the previous 
sections. In the legends of figures, “E” stands for empirical results, “T” for theoretical results and “OPT” for 
the optimum detector (3.64). Fig. 3.13(a) and Fig. 3.13(b) demonstrate the empirical results obtained for 
ASS under both no attack and attacks. It can be clearly observed from both figures that the theoretical and 
the empirical results agree well. The comparison results for MSS are displayed in Fig. 3.14(a) and Fig. 
3.14(b). The same nice agreements between theoretical and empirical results are observed in these two 
figures. Through comparisons, we also found that the generalized correlator achieves almost the same 
performance with the optimum detector (3.64). This explains why we instead adopt the generalized 
correlator in our discussions. 
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Fig. 3.13. Theoretical and empirical performances of ASS at N = 1000, DWR = 20dB and σX = 10. Empirical 
results are obtained on 1,000,000 groups of GGD host data. (a) Under no attack. (b) Under zero-mean Gaussian 
noise attacks with WNR = −5dB. 
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(a)                       (b) 
Fig. 3.14. Theoretical and empirical performances of MSS at N = 2000, DWR = 25dB and σX = 10. Empirical 
results are obtained on 1,000,000 groups of GGD host data. (a) Under no attack. (b) Under zero-mean Gaussian 
noise attacks with WNR = −10dB. 
3.4  Discussions 
The authors in [77] also called ξ-order detectors generalized correlators. However, their analysis for the 
variance of the decision statistic is not correct (see (20) in [77]). In fact, we have substituted c = 0.5 into 
their variance and found that the detector with ξ = 1 outperforms that with ξ = 0.5. The mistake in their 
analysis lies in their assumption that both the watermark sequence and host signals are random variables, 
whereas their optimum test is derived under the assumption that only host signals are random variables.  
Here we assume that w is a random vector with each element wi independent and identically distributed as 
P(wi = 1) = P(wi = −1) = 0.5. However, for consistency, we don’t change the notation style of w though it 
should be uppercased. Under H0, we have 
0 1
1( | ) N i iiL H x wN
ξ
== ∑S . (3.93) 
Therefore, we obtain 
22
0 0
10 and ( )m E X
N
ξσ= = . (3.94) 
Similarly, we have 
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1 1 1 1
1 1( | ) N N Ni i i i ii i i
aL H S w x w x
N N N
ξ ξ ξξ
= = == ≈ +∑ ∑ ∑S . (3.96) 
Thus, it leads to 
1 ( )m aE X
ξξ= , (3.97) 
2
1 1 1 1 1
2 2 2
2
1 1 2 ,  
( ) ( )
    0
( )
    
N N N N
i i i i i ii i i i
a aVar X W Var X Cov X W X
N N N N
E X a Var X
N N
E X
N
ξ ξ ξ ξ
ξ ξ
ξ
ξ ξσ
ξ
= = = =
     = + +          
= + +
≈
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
 (3.98) 
since a << 1 and Var(|X|ξ) < E(|X|2ξ), where Cov represents covariance. Thus, the performance is described 
by 
21 1 ( ) ( ) ( )m fap Q Q p a N E X E X
ξ ξξ− = − −   . (3.99) 
which is larger than (3.83). For instance, at c = 0.5, we find that 2( ) ( )E X E Xξ ξξ is 0.408 and MVR(ξ) 
= 0.707 if ξ = 0.5; 2( ) ( )E X E Xξ ξξ is 0.548 and MVR(ξ) = 0.655 if ξ = 1.0. In fact, 
2( ) ( )E X E Xξ ξ is an increasing function of ξ. Thus, there is no best performance for the case discussed 
in this subsection. 
To verify this, we also made Monte-Carlo simulations at both c = 0.5 and c = 1.0. The experimental 
results are displayed in Fig. 3.15. In both Fig. 3.15(a) and Fig. 3.15(b), we found that the best performance 
is not achieved at ξ = c and the performance increases as ξ increases. Thus, we emphasize in the beginning 
of this work that our theoretical results are based on the assumption that the watermark sequence is given.  
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Fig. 3.15. Cheng’s performance analysis and our correct analysis at N = 1000 and a = 0.1. Empirical results are 
obtained on 100,000 groups of host data. (a) c = 0.5 and σX = 10. (b) c = 1.0 and σX = 10. 
3.5  Conclusions 
This chapter compared the performance of additive and multiplicative spread spectrum schemes. The 
comparisons are carried out in the DCT domain where DCT data are assumed to follow the generalized 
Gaussian distributions. Through comparisons, we found that on the contrary to MSS, ASS produces a better 
performance as c decreases. Furthermore, MSS outperforms ASS at c above 1.3 (under no attack or 
moderate attacks). This observation also provides a criterion on selecting MSS or ASS. The second 
conclusion relates to the type of strongest noise attacks. We show that the Gaussian noise attacks are not the 
strongest additive noise attacks for watermarking schemes. For ASS, the attacking GGD noise with a shape 
parameter larger than 2.0 causes even more severe performance degradations.  
Chapter 4 EMSS for Watermark Verification PhD Dissertation 
 48
Chapter 4   Enhanced Multiplicative Spread Spectrum Schemes ― 
For Watermark Verification 
4.1  Introduction 
For SS schemes, the host interference reduces the performance of the watermark detector or decoders. 
There are basically two approaches to improve this situation. The first approach, utilizing the host’s pdf to 
obtain an improved detector, has been illumined in the previous chapter. Thus this chapter highlights the 
second approach that cancels the host interference at the embedder. Improved Spread Spectrum (ISS) 
scheme proposed in [43] exploits the knowledge of host content by projecting them onto the watermark, and 
this projected host interference is then compensated in the embedding process. A problem with ISS is that it 
does not take the probability distributions of the host signals into account. In fact, the implicit assumption 
for ISS is that the host signals are normally distributed, and thus the optimum decision statistic is the linear 
correlation. 
The above two approaches improve the performance of SS schemes in the embedding and detection 
process, respectively. Can we incorporate both ideas into the same watermarking scheme? This chapter will 
answer this question. We will extend the ideas explored in [43] to the multiplicative watermarking. 
However, in our scheme, we also consider the pdf of host signals, and match the embedding with optimum 
detection or decoding rules. This chapter will mainly focus on watermark verification problems in the DCT 
domain. However, we will also extend the ideas presented in this chapter to the data hiding problems in the 
next chapter. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents the optimum embedding tailored to the 
optimum detection rules. Further discussion on our scheme and its performance comparisons with 
quantization schemes are included in Section 4.3. In section 4.4, Monte-Carlo simulations are done to verify 
the theoretical results derived in the previous sections. However, the experimental results on real and natural 
images are reported in Section 4.5. Finally, Section 4.6 summarizes this chapter.  
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4.2  Enhanced multiplicative spread spectrum scheme 
4.2.1  New embedding rules 
The watermark detection problem can be formulated by two hypotheses H0:  Si = Xi, and H1:  Si = Xi (1 + 
a wi). In the previous chapter, we have obtained an ξ-order detector L(S) = ∑1≤i≤N |Si|ξ·wi. Under H0, the 
decision statistic is 
0 1
1( | ) N i iiL H X wN
ξ
== ∑S . (4.1) 
Its mean and variance is given by (See (3.80)) 
2
0 00,  ( ) /m Var X N
ξσ= = . (4.2) 
Under H1, we have 
1 1 1
1( | ) N Ni i ii i
aL H X w X
N N
ξ ξξ
= =≈ +∑ ∑S , (4.3) 
where the approximation technique (3.12) is employed. We notice that the first term in (4.3) does not 
depend on the embedding strength a and thus is the host interference on the decision statistic. This inference 
hampers the watermark detection and should be removed to improve the detector’s performance. With this 
in mind, we propose an Enhanced Multiplicative Spread Spectrum (EMSS) scheme whose embedding rule 
is given by  
(1 ),   1,2, , ,i i i is x aw w i Nλη γ= + − = "  (4.4) 
where λ (0 ≤ λ ≤ 1.0) is called the rejecting strength and η is the distribution factor (DF) given by 
1 1
( )N Ni i ii ix w x
γ γη = == ∑ ∑ . (4.5) 
In (4.5), the numerator comes from the host interference and spreads evenly among all host signals. Thus 
the third term in (4.4) cancels the host interference and λ controls the strength of the host interference being 
eliminated. If λ = 0, EMSS degenerates into MSS. The above embedding rule (4.4) is called γ-order 
embedder and γ is a parameter closely related with the shape parameter c. Our future discussion will show 
that the best performance for EMSS is achieved at γ = ξ = c.  
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4.2.2  Distribution Factor 
The distribution factor η is of great importance for our scheme since larger ηs would incur greater 
embedding distortion on the host contents and invalidate the approximation technique (3.12) (which is 
employed in (4.9)). By invoking the central limit theorem, the pdf of η can be approximated by a Gaussian 
pdf with a mean and variance given by 
2 2( ) 0,  var( ) var( ) /{ [ ( )] }E X N E Xγ γηη η σ= = ≈ . (4.6) 
The detailed proof of (4.6) can be found in Appendix A. Therefore, we see from (4.6) that η is statistically 
small at a sufficiently large N.  
4.2.3  Embedding distortion 
Our method incurs more distortion than MSS method since it uses this extra distortion to compensate the 
host interference. The embedding distortion Dw for EMSS is  
2 2 2 2 2 2( / )w X XD a ησ λ γ σ σ≈ + . (4.7) 
The detailed deduction of the above equation can be found in Appendix B. Precise calculation of the 
expected distortion is also available in Appendix B. However, for comparison convenience, we are just 
satisfied with this simple approximation. Inserting (4.6) into (4.7), we obtain 
2 2 2 2[ / MVR( )] /w X XD a Nσ λ γ σ≈ + .  (4.8) 
where MVR(·) is defined in (3.33). Since MVR reaches its maximum at γ = c, the embedding distortion 
achieves its minimum at γ = c. Please also note that the second term in (4.8) is the extra distortion incurred 
by our scheme.  
4.2.4  Performance 
For EMSS, we adopt the same ξ-order detector (3.66) for watermark detection. It is difficult to obtain an 
optimum detector for EMSS since η is a random variable. However, as η is statistically small at a large N, 
(3.66) may be a suboptimal choice for EMSS. Plugging (4.4) into (3.66) and using the same approximation 
technique (3.12), we obtain 
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1 1 1 1 1
1 1( | ) (1 )  N N N Ni i i i i i i ii i i i
aL H X aw w w X w X X
N N N N
ξ ξ ξ ξληξ ξ λξηξ γ γ= = = =≈ + − = + −∑ ∑ ∑ ∑S . (4.9) 
If γ = ξ, the above equation can be expressed as 
1 1 1
(1 )( | ) N Ni i ii i
aL H X w X
N N
ξ ξλ ξ
= =
−= +∑ ∑S . (4.10) 
Consequently, for (4.10), we have 
1 ( ),m aE X
ξξ≈    (4.11) 
2 2 2 2
1 [(1 ) ] ( ) /a Var X N
ξσ λ ξ= − + ⋅ . (4.12) 
Putting (4.11), (4.12) and (4.2) into (3.69), we obtain 
1
2 2 2
var( ) ( ) ( )
1
(1 ) var( )
fa
e
X Q p N aE X
p Q
a X
ξ ξ
ξ
ξ
λ ξ
− − = −  − + 
.  (4.13)  
It is a bit more complex to derive the performance at γ ≠ ξ. In Appendix C, we show that 
1 ( )m aE X
ξξ= , (4.14) 
22 2 2 2
2
1 2 2
[ ( )] var( ) ( )[ ( ) ( ) ( )]1 2var( )
[ ( )] ( )
E X X E X E X E X E Xa X
N N NE X E X
ξ γ ξ ξ γ ξ γ
ξ
γ γ
ξ λ ξ λξσ γ γ
+ −+≈ + − .  (4.15) 
In particular, when γ = ξ, (4.15) is identical to (4.12). Thus the detector’s performance at γ ≠ ξ can be 
characterized by substituting (4.14), (4.15) and (4.2) into (3.69). 
4.2.5  Optimality at γ = ξ = c 
In this subsection, we prove that EMSS achieves its best performance at γ = ξ = c for a fixed λ and 
compare EMSS with MSS at the same distortion level. To continue the discussion, we define the critical 
false alarm probability as 
1 0 0[( ) / ]
crit
fap Q m m σ= − , (4.16) 
which is the false alarm probability at which the probability of miss is 0.5. We choose 0.5 because this 
probability of miss is achieved at ψ = m1 in Fig. 4.2 and m1 is a turning point above which EMSS may 
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outperform MSS.  Substituting both (4.2) and (4.11) into (4.16) and with (4.8), we obtain 
DWR /10 2 2{MVR( ) 10 /[MVR( )] }critfap Q Nξ λ γ−= ⋅ − . (4.17) 
Since MVR achieves its maximum at c, (4.17) reaches its minimum at γ = ξ = c for any fixed λ. In Fig. 4.1(a), 
γ = ξ = 1.0 has the lowest critical false alarm  (shown by point 3, which is smaller than point 4 and 5) among 
all EMSS curves. In Fig. 4.1(b), EMSS with γ = ξ = 1.0 also has the lowest critical false alarm. Since the 
critical false alarm rate decides the performance at the high false alarm rates (see Fig. 4.1), EMSS with γ = 
ξ = c achieves the best performance at the high false alarm rates. Substituting γ = ξ = c into (4.17), we have 
DWR /10 2 2{ 10 [MVR( )] }critfap Q N c λ−= ⋅ ⋅ − . (4.18) 
Thus, we see that the larger the shape parameter c, the lower the critical false alarm and thus the better the 
performance. 
Now we make performance comparisons between MSS and EMSS. By letting λ = 0 in (4.18), the critical 
false alarm for MSS is given by 
DWR /10 2{ 10 [MVR( )] }critfap Q N c
−= ⋅ ⋅ . (4.19) 
Comparing (4.18) with (4.19), we find that MSS has a lower critical false alarm (shown by point 2 in Fig. 
4.1(a)). The cross false alarm probability is defined as the false alarm probability where ROC curves for 
MSS and EMSS intersect (see point 1 in Fig. 4.1(a)). Since MSS has a lower critical false alarm, the 
probability of miss at the cross false alarm probability is smaller than 0.5. However, since the critical false 
alarm probability for MSS (4.19) and EMSS (4.18) does not differ much if DWR /10 210 [MVR( )] 1N c−⋅ ⋅ >> , the 
probability of miss at the cross false alarm probability would be quite close to 0.5.  This indicates that if 
MSS achieves a probability of miss smaller than 0.5 at a specified false alarm, EMSS can achieve a better 
performance at the same false alarm; otherwise, EMSS is inferior to MSS.  
The advantage of MSS over EMSS at the low false alarm rates is further explained in Fig. 4.2. It is shown 
in (4.12) that the variance of decision statistic under H1 for EMSS is very small when λ = 1.0. Thus, when 
the decision threshold ψ is set between m0 and m1 (in Fig. 4.2), the probability of miss is about 0.0; however, 
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when the threshold is above m1, as indicated in Fig. 4.2, the probability of miss is close to 1.0. This also 
explains the sharp curves for EMSS at γ = ξ in Fig. 4.1(a). However, there is no such a dramatic performance 
drop for MSS. Thus, if the threshold were set above m1 to achieve a low false alarm, MSS would have a 
lower probability of miss. 
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Fig. 4.1. Optimality of EMSS at γ = ξ = c (with DWR = 20dB, c = 1.0, σX = 10.0, N = 2000, λ = 1.0). (a) Critical 
false alarm probability at γ = ξ. (b) Critical false alarm probability at γ ≠ ξ. 
 
m0 m1
H0 H1 (EMSS)
Decision threshold ψ
H1 (MSS)
 
Fig. 4.2. H0 and H1 represent the statistic L(S |H0) and L(S |H1), where m0 = E[L(S |H0)] and m1 = E[L(S |H1)]. 
4.3  Discussions 
4.3.1  Comparisons with other schemes 
An interesting problem is that this chapter formulated the hypothesis where no attack is assumed. Liu 
[101] and Perez-Freire [102] instead considered the optimal detection for a more practical scenario where 
the attack is also included in the hypothesis testing. In this section, we will investigate this scenario. The 
scenario under attacks can be formulated as  
H0: Yi  = Xi + Vi and H1: Yi  = Si  + Vi  for i = 1, 2, … , N. (4.20) 
In this subsection, we consider the normally distributed host signal since the closed-form optimum 
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detection rule for ASS is possible and the performance for EMSS can also be derived under this assumption.  
1) ASS and STDM: For ASS, the performance is given by (3.71). Perez [102] applied the Spread 
Transform Dither Modulation (STDM) scheme (a special case of the general QIM scheme) to the 
watermark verification problems. In this case, the embedding rule is formulated as (2.31) with symmetric 
dithers d = ∆/2. The performance is determined by [102] 
2 2 2 2
0.5 0.5
( ) / ( ) /
k
fa
k X V X V
k kp Q Q
N N
ψ ψ
σ σ σ σ
=+∞
=−∞
   ∆ + ∆ − ∆ + ∆ += −   + +      
∑ , (4.21) 
2 2
1
/ /
k
m
k V V
k kp Q Q
N N
ψ ψ
σ σ
=+∞
=−∞
    ∆ − ∆ +    = − −         
∑ . (4.22) 
where ψ (0 ≤ ψ ≤ ∆/2) is the decision threshold. 
2) MSS: For MSS, the above problem (4.20) can be formulated as H0: Yi  = Xi + Vi and H1: Yi  = Xi(1 + a wi) 
+ Vi. Closed-form optimum decision rules are only possible for Gaussian hosts and attacks. It is also 
difficult to extend the host-interference canceling technique proposed in this chapter to this scenario since 
the attack data cannot be known beforehand. The optimum decision rule can be easily derived from the 
likelihood ratio test and is given as 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1
1( ) /( ) /[ (1 ) ]N i X V i X i ViL Y Y awN
σ σ σ σ== + − + +∑Y . (4.23) 
Thus, the performance is determined by 
2 2
0 0 1( )( ) / 2X Vm σ σ ρ ρ= + + , (4.24) 
2 2 2 2 2 2
0 0 1( ) ( ) /X V Nσ σ σ ρ ρ= + + , (4.25) 
2 2 2 2 2 2
1 0 1{[ (1 ) ] [ (1 ) ] }/ 2X V X Vm a aσ σ ρ σ σ ρ= + + + − + , (4.26) 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 0 1{[ (1 ) ] [ (1 ) ] }/X V X Va a Nσ σ σ ρ σ σ ρ= + + + − + , (4.27) 
where 2 2 2 2 20 1/( ) 1/[ (1 ) ]X V X Vaρ σ σ σ σ= + − + +  and 2 2 2 2 21 1/( ) 1/[ (1 ) ]X V X Vaρ σ σ σ σ= + − − + . If a is small 
enough, (4.23) can be approximated by 
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2 2 2
2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21 1
1 (2 ) 1 (2 )( )
( )[ (1 2 ) ] ( )( )
N NX i X i
i ii i
X V X i V X V X V
aw a awL Y Y
N aw a N
σ σ
σ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ= =
+= ≈+ + + + + +∑ ∑Y  (4.28) 
We recognize that (4.28) differs from (3.66) (with ξ = 2.0) just by some constant and thus is equivalent to 
(3.66). That is, the optimum rule derived under no attack still approximately holds under attacks. 
Nevertheless, (4.23) still enjoys a slight performance advantage over (3.66) under the same level of attacks.  
3) EMSS: The empirical performance of EMSS for non-Gaussian hosts under attacks will be 
demonstrated through experiments in Section 4.5. The theoretical performance for Gaussian hosts can be 
derived by substituting (4.20) into (3.66) with γ = ξ = 2.0. Thus, under H0, we have 
2 2 2 2
0 00,     2( ) /X Vm Nσ σ σ= = + . (4.29) 
Similarly, the decision statistic under H1 is given by 
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 (4.30) 
where (a) follows from (4.5) with γ = 2.0 and the approximation technique (3.12),  and (b) from the fact that 
η is small if N is large enough (see (4.6)). Thus, 
2
1 2 Xm aσ= , (4.31) 
2 2 2 4 4 2 2 2
1 {2[(1 ) 4 ] 2 (4 4 ) }/X V X Va a Nσ λ σ σ σ σ= − + + + + . (4.32) 
Hence the performance for EMSS under attacks can be determined by the above equations.  
4) Comparisons: Please first note that in Fig. 4.3, the text “E” in the legend of figures stands for Empirical 
results, and “T” for Theoretical results. Furthermore, the step size ∆ for STDM is empirically obtained 
through Monte-Carlo simulations. In Fig. 4.3(a), the theoretical performance for EMSS is in line with the 
simulation results. In the figure, we also found that MSS yields a better performance than ASS. This is in 
line with the results in the previous chapter (See Section 3.3.6) since c = 2.0 and σV < σX. Moreover, EMSS 
and STDM produce a nicer performance than ASS and MSS since both schemes cancel the host interference. 
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We also observed that the optimum detector derived under no attack (3.66) achieves almost the same 
performance as the optimum detector derived under attacks (4.23). Please note that the performance of (3.66) 
under attacks is given by (3.85) or obtained by setting λ = 0 in (4.32). In Fig. 4.3(b), the comparison results 
show that EMSS works better than STDM at the low false alarm rates. However, it is still important to note 
that EMSS cannot work so better since the shape parameter c for GGD host signals is usually smaller than 
2.0 for a real image. Nevertheless, the multiplicative spread spectrum scheme can achieve a nicer perceptual 
quality. 
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(a)                       (b) 
Fig. 4.3. Performance comparisons between quantization and spread spectrum schemes under zero-mean 
Gaussian noise attacks at c = 2.0, σX = 10 and DWR = 20dB (namely, a = 1.0 for ASS, ∆ = 2.34 for STDM). (a) 
Performance comparisons at σV = 5. Empirical results for EMSS were obtained on 1,000,000 groups of data. 
Please note that “MSS-OPN” represents the optimum detector given by (4.23). (b) Theoretical performance 
comparisons between EMSS and STDM at N = 2000, λ = 1.0. 
4.3.2  EMSS for multiple DCT coefficients 
In this work, we assume that the host DCT signals have the same shape parameter c. In more practical 
scenarios, multiple coefficients that have different cs may be watermarked to achieve sufficient robustness. 
Here, for instance, we consider two groups of data from different frequencies. Let the first group be denoted 
by {X1, X2, …, XN} and the second by {XN+1, XN+2, …, X2N}. Furthermore, we assume that the first group has 
a shape parameter c1, and the second group has c2. We embed watermarks into each group by EMSS, 
respectively. That is, 
1 1 1
2 2 2
(1 ),                      1,2, ,
(1 ),     1, 2, ,2
i i i i
i i i i
s x a w w c i N
s x a w w c i N N N
λη
λη
= + − = = + − = + +
"
"  
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where a1 and a2 are the embedding strength for the first and second group, respectively, and 
1 1 2 22 2
1 21 1 1 1
( ) ,     ( )N N N Nc c c ci i i i i ii i i N i Nx w x x w xη η= = = + = += =∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ . 
The decision statistic is  
1 22
1 1
1( ) ( )
2
N Nc c
i i i ii i N
L S w S w
N = = +
= +∑ ∑S . 
Thus, the performance is characterized by 
0 0m = ,  1 220 1 1[ ( ) ( )] /(4 )c cNVar X Var X Nσ += + , 
1 2
1 1 1 1 2 2 1[ ( ) ( )]/ 2
c c
Nm a c E X a c E X += + ,  
1 22 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1 2 2 1[(1 ) ] ( ) /(4 ) [(1 ) ] ( ) /(4 )
c c
Nc a Var X N c a Var X Nσ λ λ += − + + − + . 
The performance analysis for this case is much complex. Thus, in this work, we use just one coefficient for 
simplicity. The above discussion can be easily extended to the case where more coefficients are involved. 
4.3.3  Choice of λ 
An important parameter for our scheme is λ. MSS is indeed a special case of EMSS with λ = 0. The 
performance of EMSS with λ < 1.0 is a trade-off between the performance at high and low false alarm rates. 
The choice of λ can be made optimal (through simulations) for some attacks if the attack parameters are 
known. Without the knowledge of the possible attacks, an important characteristic that EMSS has a better 
performance at the probability of miss below 0.5 (see Section 4.2.5) may help to decide which λ to use in a 
real scenario. This characteristic is also reflected in all experimental results (even under attacks) in Section 
4.5. Thus, if a system requires that the probability of miss at a specified false alarm be below 0.5, then 
EMSS (with λ = 1.0) can be selected. However, if the probability of miss for MSS under the worst possible 
attacks is larger than 0.5, then MSS (λ = 0.0) can be pessimistically selected. 
4.4  Monte-Carlo Simulations 
In this section, we perform Monte Carlo simulations to verify the theoretic results derived in this paper. 
All the data in this section are generated by a pseudo-random number generator.  Please note that the text 
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“E” in the legend of the figures stands for empirical results obtained from Monte-Carlo simulations, “T” for 
theoretical results.  
In Fig. 4.4(a), EMSS at γ = ξ = 0.5 achieves the smallest critical false alarm probability, hence validating 
the optimality investigated in Section 4.2.5. The performance of EMSS with λ smaller than 1 is shown in Fig. 
4.4(b). The experimental results in both figures agree with the analytical results derived in the previous 
sections. 
Now the simulations are performed to prove the correctness of the expected distortion (4.7). Fig. 4.5(a) 
shows the expected distortion at different Ns. The theoretical and simulation results match well. As N 
increases, the distortion goes down. The simulation results at different λs are also included in this figure. 
The smaller the λ, the less the distortion EMSS incurs. Fig. 4.5(b) demonstrates the correctness of the 
derived expected distortion for γ ≠ c. The agreement between theoretical and simulation results validates the 
effectiveness of the approximation approach (See (A.8) in Appendix A). Moreover, as shown by (4.8), the 
distortion achieves its minimum at γ = c in Fig. 4.5(b). We have done many other simulations to prove the 
derived theoretical distortion. However, the results are not reported here for space considerations.  
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 (a)                        (b) 
Fig. 4.4. Theoretical and empirical ROC curves derived at DWR = 20dB and N = 2000. Empirical results are 
obtained on 1,000,000 groups of host data. (a) Performance comparisons between EMSS and MSS at c = 0.5, σX 
= 10.0 (and λ = 1.0 for EMSS). (b) Performance of EMSS at c = 1.0, σX = 10.0. 
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(a)                       (b) 
Fig. 4.5. Expected Distortion (The simulation results are obtained on 100, 000 groups of host data with σX = 10.0 
and a = 0.1). (a) At different N (c = 0.5). (b) At different γ (N = 1000, λ = 1.0). 
4.5  Experiments 
First note that the text “T” in the legend of the figures stands for Theoretical results, “E” for Experimental 
results, “MSS” for (3.66) and “EMSS” for (4.4). In this section, the experiments are done on real natural 
images. For each 8×8 DCT block, we use just one coefficient for watermarking since different DCT 
frequency coefficients usually have different shape parameters. Thus, using one coefficient in each block 
can simplify the performance comparisons.  
In this section, we choose γ = c since it has been shown in Section 4.2.5 that EMSS achieves its best 
performance at γ = ξ = c. In the following experiments, we adopt the ML method [103] to estimate the shape 
parameter c and standard deviation σX of the host DCT coefficients. For the 5th (in Zigzag order) coefficient 
of Lena, its estimated c is 0.69 and σX  = 19.74; for the 5th coefficient of Peppers, c = 1.03 and σX = 16.04. 
Since c for the watermarked coefficients does not vary much from that for the original data, we instead set ξ 
as the estimated c of the original data in detection for convenience.  
Fig. 4.6 and Fig. 4.7 display the images watermarked by both MSS and EMSS methods. The averaged 
PSNRs in both figures are obtained over 1,000 watermarked images with different watermark sequences.  
We find that MSS and EMSS achieve almost the same PSNR at the same DWR. Since we do not have a 
large set of natural images with the same shape parameter c and standard deviation σX, we instead permute 
randomly the host signals to obtain different sequences of host data x for the ease of performance 
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comparisons. Each permutation produces a new x, and all the following experimental results are obtained 
on 1,000,000 such permutations. Please also refer to Appendix E for more details. Moreover, in these 
experiments, we also set ξ = γ = c and N = 2000.  
                                   
(a)                              (b) 
Fig. 4.6. Watermarked Lena at DWR = 16.48dB. (a) MSS (averaged PSNR = 56.44dB). (b) EMSS (averaged 
PSNR = 56.36dB).  
 
                                  
(a)                              (b) 
Fig. 4.7. Watermarked Peppers at DWR = 16.48dB. (a) MSS (averaged PSNR = 58.04dB). (b) EMSS (averaged 
PSNR = 57.88dB). 
 
The performance comparisons between EMSS and MSS are displayed in Fig. 4.8. The sharp curves 
discussed in the previous section are also observed in Fig. 4.8(a) and Fig. 4.8(b), and EMSS outperforms 
MSS at the false alarm rates above the cross false alarm probability. The performance for Peppers is much 
better since it has a larger c. The theoretical results for EMSS at λ = 0.5 are also included to verify the 
theoretical conclusion (4.13) and the validity of the estimated parameters.  
All the above experiments are conducted without attacks. Now we examine the performance of our 
scheme under attacks. First we evaluate its performance under noise attacks. The attack noise follows a 
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zero-mean Gaussian distribution with standard deviation 5.0. The results are displayed in Fig. 4.9.  For both 
images, the probability of miss at the cross false alarm is about 0.45, and EMSS outperforms MSS above 
this miss. JPEG is a common attack the watermarked image may undergo. Fig. 4.10 displays the results 
under JPEG attacks with Quality Factor (QF) 50. The same observations can be made.  
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(a)                       (b) 
Fig. 4.8. Performance comparisons under no attack at DWR = 20dB. (a) For Lena. (b) For Peppers 
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(a)                       (b) 
Fig. 4.9. Performance comparisons at DWR = 20dB under noise attacks with the noise distributed as ~ N(0, 25). 
(a) For Lena (b) For Peppers 
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(a)                       (b) 
Fig. 4.10. Performance comparisons at DWR = 20dB under JPEG attacks with QF = 50. (a) For Lena (b) For 
Peppers 
4.6  Conclusions 
In this chapter, we proposed an Enhanced Multiplicative Spread Spectrum (EMSS) watermarking scheme 
that rejects the host interference at the embedder. The new embedder is designed according to the optimum 
decision rules for the detector. Through the matching of newly designed embedders and detectors, the 
performance can be improved at high false alarm rates. This is quite important since in the real scenarios, we 
may increase N or the embedding strength to reduce the cross false alarm probability. In such a case, the 
performance at the high false alarm rates decides the performance of the whole watermarking systems. 
Furthermore, for practical applications, we usually require that the probability of miss be smaller than 0.5 at 
a specified false alarm probability, which thus encourages the use of EMSS. 
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Chapter 5   Enhanced Multiplicative Spread Spectrum Schemes ― 
For Data Hiding 
5.1  Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we investigated a host interference canceling technique for watermark 
verification problems. In this chapter, we extend this technique to the data hiding problems. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.2, we employ the host-interference rejection 
technique proposed in the previous chapter to design a new embedder for data-hiding problems. The 
simulation and experimental results are presented in Section 5.3 and 5.4, respectively, to validate the 
effectiveness of our proposal. The last section concludes this chapter.  
5.2  Embedding rules 
5.2.1  Enhanced multiplicative embedding rule 
For MSS, the embedded bit can be decoded by testing the two alternative hypotheses H0 (b = −1):  Si = Xi 
(1 − a wi) versus H1 (b = +1):  Si = Xi (1 + a wi). Thus, the suboptimal generalized correlator (also called 
ξ-order decoder) discussed in Chapter 3 leads to  
1 1
1( | ) N Ni i ii i
baL b X w X
N N
ξ ξξ
= =≈ +∑ ∑S . (5.1) 
Please also see (3.29) for further reference. We notice that the first term in (5.1) is the host interference on 
the decision statistic, and therefore should be removed to reduce the probability of errors. With this in mind, 
we propose an Enhanced Multiplicative Spread Spectrum (EMSS) scheme whose embedding rule is given 
by  
(1 ),   1,2, , ,i i i is x baw w i Nλη γ= + − = "  (5.2) 
where λ (0 ≤ λ ≤ 1.0) is called the rejecting strength (RS). In the following discussions, we shall see that λ is 
used to reduce the extra distortion incurred by EMSS. Another important parameter η is called the 
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distribution factor (DF) and given by 
1 1
( )N Ni i ii ix w x
γ γη = == ∑ ∑ . (5.3) 
The above embedding rule is called γ-order embedder, and γ is closely related with the shape parameter c. 
Our future discussion will show that the best performance for EMSS is achieved at γ = ξ = c under no attack. 
However, the optimum γ under attacks, for instance, Gaussian noise attacks, is still unknown. The 
distribution factor is an approximately Gaussian random variable whose characteristic has been analyzed in 
Chapter 4. For a small N, it may be statistically very large. Thus, λ often must be smaller than 1.0 to reduce 
the embedding distortion to an imperceptible level.  
5.2.2  Embedding distortion 
From (5.2), it is easy to see that the embedding distortion is  
2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 1
2 2
2 2 2 2
2
1 1 1
2 2 2 2 2 2
1 1( ) ( 2 )
2     
     
N N
w i i
i i
N N N
i i i
i i i
X X
D E X ba E X a b
N N
a E X E X E b X
N N N
a η
λη γ λη γ λ η γ
λ η ηγ γ
σ λ σ σ γ
= =
= = =
   = − = − +      
     = + −          
≈ +
∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑
 (5.4) 
where the fourth equality follows from (B.12) in Appendix B and the fact that p(b = 1) = p(b = −1) = 0.5. 
Alternatively, we have 
2 2 2 2[ / MVR( )] /w X XD a Nσ λ γ σ≈ + .  (5.5) 
The first term in (5.5) is the distortion contributed by MSS (with λ = 0), and the second term is the extra 
distortion incurred by EMSS. Our method uses this extra distortion to compensate the host interference. We 
also notice that the extra distortion does not depend on a. 
5.2.3  Performance of EMSS 
We also employ the generalized correlator (3.14) for watermark decoding. Similarly as we did in the 
previous chapter, the decoder’s performance is characterized by 
1 0 ( )m m aE X
ξξ= − ≈ , (5.6) 
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22 2 2 2
2 2
1 0 2 2
[ ( )] var( )1 var( )
[ ( )]
( )[ ( ) ( ) ( )]2                
( )
E X Xa X
N N E X
E X E X E X E X
N E X
ξ γ
ξ
γ
ξ ξ γ ξ γ
γ
ξ λ ξσ σ γ
λξ
γ
+
+= ≈ +
−−
. (5.7) 
Please see (4.14) and (4.15) for further reference. In particular, the decoder’s performance at γ = ξ is 
depicted by 
2 2 2[ MVR( ) (1 ) ]ep Q a N aξ λ ξ= − + , (5.8) 
which is obtained by substituting both (5.6) and (5.7) (with γ = ξ ) into (3.16). 
5.2.4  Performance Comparisons at γ = ξ 
In this section, we characterize the performance of EMSS at a large and small N respectively. When N is 
large enough, the second term in (5.5) is relatively small when compared with the first term in (5.5). Thus λ 
can be set to a larger value, for instance, 1.0. For λ = 1.0, 
[ MVR( ) / ]ep Q N γ γ= . (5.9) 
Comparing (5.9) with (3.32), we find that EMSS outperforms MSS since usually a << 1/γ. We also note that 
(5.9) does not depend on the embedding strength a. However, the performance of EMSS under attacks does 
depend on a. In addition, it is easy to see that 
20 0
MVR( ) [( 1) / ]lim lim
[(2 1) / ] (1/ ) { [( 1) / ]}
c
c c cγ γ
γ γ
γ γ γ→ →
Γ += = +∞Γ + Γ − Γ + . (5.10) 
Thus, the performance improves as γ decreases.  
The above case becomes impractical when we need to embed a large amount of data. This case requires 
that N be small, and thus we have to use λ to reduce the extra distortion. The following discussions are based 
on the assumption that 2 2 2(1 ) aλ γ−  . This assumption can be easily satisfied by selecting a small λ. Thus 
with (5.5), (5.8) can be expressed as 
DWR /10 2 2MVR( ) (1 ) 10 [MVR( )] (1 )ep Q a N Q Nξ λ γ λ λ−  = − ≈ ⋅ − −    . (5.11) 
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From (5.11), we know that the best performance for EMSS is achieved at γ = ξ = c for a given λ. To 
outperform MSS, we must have 
DWR /10 2 2 DWR /10 210 [MVR( )] (1 ) 10 [MVR( )]N Nγ λ λ γ− −⋅ − − > ⋅ . (5.12) 
By some simple manipulations, we have 
max DWR /10 2
22
1 10 [MVR( )]N
λ λ γ−< = − + . (5.13) 
It is straightforward to see that λmax > 0. Therefore, EMSS outperforms MSS if λ < λmax. To say it more 
clearly, EMSS can always have a better performance than MSS. Now we search for the optimum λ to 
minimize (5.11). Let 
DWR /10 2 2
2
10 [MVR( )]( )
(1 )
Nk γ λλ λ
− −= − . (5.14) 
Therefore,  
DWR /10 2
3
2 10 [MVR( )] 2( )
(1 )
dk Nk
d
γ λλ λ λ
−⋅ −′ = = − . (5.15) 
Thus, it is easy to see that (5.16) achieves its maximum at  
DWR /10 2
opt 10 [MVR( )]Nλ γ−= . (5.16) 
Please also note that λopt should be smaller than λmax.  
5.2.5  Optimality 
In the previous subsection, we found that the best performance is achieved at γ = ξ = c when γ = ξ and λ is 
small. In this subsection, we show that the best performance is nearly achieved at γ = ξ = c for all possible 
choices of γ and ξ. As in the previous subsection, we consider only the scenario of small λ. Let 
( ) ( ) ( )
MMT( , )
( ) ( )
E X E X E X
E X E X
ξ γ ξ γ
ξ γξ γ ξγ
+ −= . (5.17) 
Since m1 = −m0 and σ0 = σ1 (see (5.6) and (5.7)), the decoder’s performance is decided by  
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2 DWR /10 2
1
22
1
2 2
10 [ / MVR( )]
1 2 MMT( , )
[MVR( )] [MVR( )]
m N λ γ
λσ λ ξ γξ γ
−⋅ −≈
+ − ⋅
. (5.18) 
It is easy to prove that if ξ = c, 
MMT( , ) 1/c cγ = . (5.19) 
We notice that (5.19) does not depend on γ. Hence, for ξ = c, (5.18) achieves its maximum at γ = c. Similarly, 
(5.18) also reaches its maximum at ξ = c when γ is fixed at c. For other cases, we must resort to numerical 
calculations to search for the optimal ξ and γ. In fact, the numerical search shows that the best performance 
is not always achieved at γ = ξ = c for all cs. However, we compared the global optimum pe with the pe 
achieved at γ = ξ = c, and found that the performance at γ = ξ = c does not deviate much from the global 
optimum. In Fig. 5.1 for DWR = 13.98dB, we observe that as c increases, the deviation becomes larger. 
However, the deviation is not obvious for the small DWR = 20dB. As a matter of fact, at DWR = 13.98dB, 
the global optimum for c = 2.0 is achieved at γ = 0.25. This is because at λ = 1.0, (5.10) indicates that the 
smaller the γ, the better the performance. Thus, (5.10) is also partly reflected in the case of λ = 0.2. However, 
for practical scenarios (c < 1.5), it is safe to assume that the best performance is achieved at γ = ξ = c. 
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Fig. 5.1. The globally optimum performance versus the performance at γ = ξ = c (with N = 100, λ = 0.2, σX = 10). 
 
5.3  Monte-Carlo Simulations 
In this section, we validate the theoretical results in the previous sections via Monte-Carlo simulations. 
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Please also note that in the legends of the figures, “E” means Empirical results obtained through 
Monte-Carlo simulations, and “T” Theoretical results. However, since the central limit theorem requires a 
considerably large N, the simulation results may not well match the theoretical results for small Ns, 
especially at large ξs. 
We first test the correctness of the derived expected distortion. Fig. 5.2(a) displays the distortion for γ = c. 
We see that the theoretical results (See (B.2) to (B.9) in Appendix B) do agree well with the simulation 
results. However, when γ ≠ c, the case is different since the approximation (See (B.13) in Appendix B) can 
only provide a crude calculation of the distortion. This approximation in Fig. 5.2(b) displays a big 
difference from the real distortion for a small N. However, as N increases, the approximation becomes quite 
accurate. Though the distortion does not well agree with the simulation results, the important point that the 
minimum distortion is achieved at γ = c still holds. Moreover, for small λs, the deviation from the real 
distortion becomes less significant. Fig. 5.3 demonstrates the correctness of (5.6) and (5.7). However, since 
the approximation by normal distributions is not accurate enough for small Ns, the theoretical results do not 
well agree with the simulation results. Nevertheless, the theoretical results do reflect the most important 
point that the best performance is nearly achieved at γ = ξ = c. 
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 (a)                       (b) 
Fig. 5.2. Theoretical and Simulated Distortion. Results are obtained on 100, 000 groups of data with c = 0.5, σX 
= 10, a = 0.1, and λ = 1.0. (a) For γ = c. (b) For γ ≠ c. 
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(a)                       (b) 
Fig. 5.3. Theoretical and simulated performance for EMSS with γ ≠ ξ. Results are obtained on 100, 000 groups of 
data with c = 0.5, σX = 10, N = 100, a = 0.1, and λ = 0.5. (a) At different γs. (b) At different ξs. 
 
5.4  Experimental results 
The above section validates the theoretical results by Monte-Carlo simulations. In this section, however, 
experiments are carried out on real images. As we did in the previous section, we permute the original data 
randomly to fulfill the difficult task of finding a large database of images with the same c and σX. The 
effectiveness of this permutation approach can be validated by the agreement between experimental and 
theoretical results. Please also refer to Appendix E for further information about the effectiveness of 
permutation. Also note that in this section, the text “T” in the legends of the figures stands for theoretical 
results, and “E” for experimental results. 
The test image is Lena, and we embed data in the fifth and fifteenth (in zigzag order) AC coefficients. The 
shape parameter c and standard deviation σX are estimated by ML method [103]. For the 5th coefficient, c = 
0.69 and σX = 19.74; for the 15th coefficient, c = 0.88 and σX = 5.82. Usually data embedding changes c and 
σX. However, since this change is small due to the imperceptibility requirement, we instead use the 
parameters of the original image at the decoder for convenience.  
We first compare the performance of MSS and EMSS at different γs. The performance comparisons are 
shown in Fig. 5.4. For both figures, EMSS achieves its best performance at γ = c. This is in accord with the 
fact that MVR(0.5) = 0.823, MVR(0.69) = 0.831, MVR(1.0) = 0.814 and MVR(1.5) = 0.734 for c = 0.69. 
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For c = 0.88, since MVR(0.88) = 0.938 and MVR(1.0) = 0.936, the performance difference between γ = 1.0 
and γ = 0.88 is very small. Theoretical results are also compared with the experimental results. Fig. 5.5 
demonstrates that theoretical results do match the experimental results. Moreover, it also verifies that the 
estimated shape parameters do agree with the real one. 
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(a)                       (b) 
Fig. 5.4. MSS versus EMSS at the same distortion level (DWR = 20dB, λ = 0.2 with 100,000 embedded bits). (a) 
for the 5th coefficient. (b) for the 15th coefficient. 
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Fig.  5.5. Theoretical and experimental EMSS (DWR = 20dB with 100,000 embedded bits). 
 
Now we examine the performance of MSS and EMSS under attacks. Fig. 5.6 shows the experimental 
results when the watermarked image suffers from Gaussian noise attacks. From Fig. 5.6, we see that the fifth 
coefficients are more robust against noise since it has a larger σX. As the added noise strengthens, EMSS 
converges to MSS since the attack noise overshadows the watermark signal. This is more saliently reflected 
in Fig. 5.6(b) where its σX is small. Fig. 5.6 also includes the results for different λs. In Fig. 5.6(a), the best 
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performance under weak noise attacks is achieved at λopt = 0.69. However, it is not the case for stronger 
noise attacks. The performance for large λs drops very fast as the noise increases. Thus an important point 
for future work is to choose a better λ for known levels of attacks. 
The second experiment reveals the performance of MSS and EMSS under JPEG compression attacks. 
The experimental results are displayed in Fig. 5.7. The performance curve for the 5th is completely different 
from that for the 15th coefficient since JPEG is a kind of quantization attack. Since the quantization step size 
for 5th coefficient is comparatively smaller and the 5th coefficient has a larger σX, the performance 
deteriorates gradually as quality factor (QF) decreases. However, for the 15th coefficient with a small σX, 
since the quantization step size is larger, some small values may be quantized to a larger value and thus 
JPEG may improve the performance at low QFs. However, as QF increases, this phenomenon becomes less 
protruding. The results for different λs also show that larger λs work better for weaker attacks in Fig. 5.7(a). 
In Fig. 5.7(b), EMSS at λ = 0.88 is more vulnerable to attacks due to the small standard deviation of the 15th 
coefficient. 
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(a)                      (b) 
Fig. 5.6. MSS versus EMSS under zero-mean Gaussian Noise attacks (DWR = 20dB, N = 100 with 100,000 
embedded bits). (a) for the 5th coefficient. (b) for the 15th coefficient. 
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(a)                        (b) 
Fig. 5.7. MSS versus EMSS under JPEG attacks (DWR = 20dB, N = 100 with 100,000 embedded bits). (a) for 
the 5th coefficient (b) for the 15th coefficient.  
5.5  Conclusions and future directions 
In this paper, we investigated how to remove the host interference in the embedding process. The idea of 
removing the host interference is inspired by the work [43]. However, in our scheme, the host interference is 
determined by the decision statistic of optimum decoding. Host signals with different shape parameters 
impose different interference on the decision statistic. We also proved that for any γ-order embedder and 
ξ-order decoder, the best performance is nearly achieved γ = ξ = c. N is a critical factor determining the 
performance improvement of EMSS over MSS. Larger Ns will demonstrate even greater improvements. 
However, in this chapter, we focus mainly on small Ns since we may want to embed a large volume of data. 
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Chapter 6   Double Sided Watermark Embedding and Detection 
6.1  Introduction 
In the previous chapters, the performance of the watermarking systems can be greatly improved by 
canceling the host interference at the embedder. However, the host interference rejection schemes, including 
the quantization schemes, have not taken the perceptual quality into account. Their performance advantage, 
in truth, is largely due to the employed MSE metric. In contrast to the SS schemes, it is difficult to 
implement the perceptual models in the host interference rejection schemes. This difficulty thus discourages 
the use of host interference rejection schemes in real scenarios. Can we instead utilize the host information 
without it being rejected at the embedder? This chapter shall answer this question by introducing a very 
simple double-sided technique. It differs from the traditional SS schemes in that it also utilizes the host 
information at the embedder. However, different from the host interference rejection schemes, it does not 
reject the host interference. Due to this nice property of not rejecting the host interference, it has a big 
advantage over the host interference rejection schemes in that the perceptual analysis can be easily 
implemented for our scheme to achieve the maximum allowable embedding level. For most of the 
traditional SS methods, the detector reports the existence of the embedded watermark if its response is 
above a given threshold. However, our double-sided detector reports the existence of the embedded 
watermark if the absolute value of its response exceeds a given threshold. 
The rest of the work is organized as follows. Section 6.2 reviews the traditional decision rules for SS 
methods. Section 6.3 and 6.4 present a simple double-sided technique for both additive and multiplicative 
schemes. Its marriage with host interference rejection techniques will be studied in Section 6.5. However, 
our discussion on the host interference rejection technique is only to reveal its disadvantage as against our 
double-sided schemes. In the real scenarios, we strongly recommend the use of our double-sided schemes 
without host interference rejection. Section 6.6 makes performance comparisons to demonstrate the 
effectiveness of our schemes. Its performance advantages on real images are displayed in Section 6.7. 
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Finally, we conclude the chapter in Section 6.8. 
6.2  Single-sided schemes 
The embedded watermarks can be detected by testing the hypothesis H0: the test data are not watermarked 
versus the hypothesis H1: the test data contain the specific watermark w. The spread spectrum schemes 
detect the watermark by deciding between 
1 0( ) ;   ( )L H L Hψ ψ> ⇒ < ⇒S S , (6.1) 
where ψ is the decision threshold. In this work, we call (6.1) a single-sided decision rule since H1 occupies 
the right side of the decision space. Thus, the traditional SS schemes are also termed single-sided schemes 
in this work. Fig. 6.1(a) draws the pdf of the decision statistic for a typical single-sided scheme. 
Decision threshold ψ
H0 H1 
                      
H0
H1 
-a a2ψ l-l
H1 
 
(a)                          (b) 
Fig. 6.1. The illustrative pdfs of the decision statistic L(S) under H0 and H1, where in the plot H0 and H1 represent 
L(S|H0) and L(S|H1), respectively. (a) Single-sided scheme. (b) Double-sided scheme, where two thick lines 
represent the pdf of L(S|H1) for DS-ASS-HIR (See Section 6.5). 
6.3  Double-sided additive spread spectrum schemes 
The host interference was previously considered a nuisance for SS schemes. Host interference rejection 
schemes reject it at the embedder. However in this work, we introduce a double-sided technique to utilize 
but not reject the host interference. The basic idea comes from the following observation. For a correlation 
detector, the single-sided rule wastes the decision space since the statistic for H0 (See Fig. 6.1(a)) with m0 = 
E(∑1≤i≤N Xiwi) / N = 0 and 20σ = Var(∑1≤i≤N Xiwi) / N2 = 2Xσ  / N  has a rare chance to reach the very negative 
side of the axis, especially at a large N. For instance, the probability of it being smaller than −5σ0 is only 
about Q(5). However our double-sided idea can better utilize the decision space. In this section, we 
investigate how the new idea works for the additive spread spectrum schemes. Its extension to the 
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multiplicative case will be examined in the next section. 
6.3.1  Embedding rules for double-sided ASS 
In this subsection, we present a new Double-Sided Additive Spread Spectrum (DS-ASS) scheme whose 
embedding rule is 
,   if  0;  ,   if  0i i i i i is x aw x s x aw x= + > = − ≤ , (6.2) 
where i = 1, 2, …, N  and x is the projected x on w defined as 
1
1 N
i ii
x x w
N =
= ∑ . (6.3) 
, , , , , ,X s S y Y v V are similarly defined. Equation (6.2) is a simple informed embedder. The idea underlying 
(6.2) is very simple. If the correlation between the host and the watermark is positive, then the watermark is 
multiplied by a positive quantity when it is added to the host. However, if instead the correlation is negative, 
then it is multiplied by a negative quantity when it is added to the host. Thus, the host “interference” is now 
exploited to increase the magnitude of the output of the correlator. Compared with ISS [43] or quantization 
schemes [100−102], the new embedding rule utilizes but does not reject the host interference. However, as 
we shall see in the following text, it can also achieve a great performance improvement over ASS. For the 
above embedding rule (6.2), it is easy to see that we should detect the watermarks by checking whether the 
magnitude of the correlation is above a given threshold, that is, 
1 0( ) ;otherwiseL H Hψ> ⇒ ⇒S , (6.4) 
where L(S) is a correlator given by (3.59). In this work, we call (6.4) a double-sided decision rule. 
Compared with (6.1), it reports the existence of the watermark if the absolute value of the decision statistic 
is above a given threshold. 
Now we examine the close relation between STDM (with only two centroids) and DS-ASS. The 
embedding rule for STDM is si = xi + [qΛ( x ) − x ]wi. Thus for STDM with only two centroids, if x > 0, 
qΛ( x ) = 0.5∆ and if x < 0, qΛ( x ) = −0.5∆. This may be taken as exploiting the host interference. However, 
the second term in [qΛ( x ) − x ] is to reject the host interference. Thus, DS-ASS is identical to a two-centroid 
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STDM, however without the host interference rejection.  
It is also interesting to note that (6.2) gives an important hint [115] that watermark detection is much 
different from watermark decoding, which has been confused by many previous works (for instance, 
traditional SS schemes). The watermark decoder decides between +1 and –1, whereas the watermark 
detector answers a “yes” or “no” question. However, in traditional SS schemes, the embedder usually 
embeds +1 to mean “yes”, and the detector thus decides between +1 and “no” since the “yes” means +1. For 
instance, in watermarking decoding problems, s = x + aw to embed +1 and s = x – aw to embed −1. In 
traditional watermarking detection problems, the embedding rule is s = x + aw. Thus, the presence of 
watermark also means that the embedded information is +1. Here in our scheme the embedder instead 
embeds +1 or –1 to mean “yes” and the detector can only answer a “yes” or “no” question. For instance, the 
embedding rule for DS-ASS is s = x ± aw. It is not possible for the detector to decide from the “yes” answer 
whether +1 or –1 is embedded. That is, whether +1 or –1 is embedded does not really matter. What is 
important is that the watermark is present.  
6.3.2  Advantages over host interference rejection schemes 
In real scenarios, the maximum allowable embedding strength amax is determined by the perceptual 
allowance of the image. It is easy for DS-ASS to achieve the embedding strength amax. However, for STDM 
and DS-ASS-HIR (See Section 6.5), if the embedding strength |qΛ( x )− x | and |±l − x | are larger than amax, 
they will incur visual distortion in the image. However, if they are smaller than amax, they will leave a larger 
perceptual allowance for the attackers to mount stronger attacks. One may argue we can select an 
appropriate λ such that their embedding strength is amax. However, in such a case, STDM and DS-ASS-HIR 
instead reduce to DS-ASS. This problem thus encourages the use of our double-sided schemes without host 
interference rejection since the perceptual analysis can be easily implemented. However, it is difficult to 
implement the perceptual analysis for the host interference rejection schemes to achieve the locally bounded 
maximum embedding strength. 
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6.3.3  Performance under no attack 
In order to evaluate the performance of DS-ASS, we project S on w and have 
,   if  0;  ,   if  0S X a X S X a X= + > = − ≤ . (6.5) 
For the convenience of discussions, we define an indicator I as 
1,   if  0;  0,   if  0I X I X= > = ≤ . (6.6) 
Since all Xis are independently and identically distributed and ∑1≤i≤N wi = 0 (See (2.2)), X has a symmetric 
pdf and P(I = 0) = P(I = 1) = 0.5. In order to obtain the pdf of S , we first present a lemma whose detailed 
proof can be found in Appendix D. 
 
Lemma 6.1: If U is a random variable, and Z is defined by Z = U + a if U > 0 and Z = U – a if U ≤ 0, where 
a is a const. Then Z has a pdf given by 
( ),             if 
( ) 0,              if 
( ),           if 
U
Z
U
f z a z a
f z a z a
f z a z a
− >= − < ≤ + ≤ −
 
 
By invoking the central limit theorem to approximate X by a Gaussian random variable, we have from 
Lemma 6.1 
2
22
2
22
1 ( )exp ,            if 
22
( ) 0,                                      if 
1 ( )exp           if 
22
XX
S
XX
s a s a
f s a s a
s a s a
σπσ
σπσ
  − − >   = − < ≤  − + ≤ −     (6.7) 
We see that the pdf of the S can be characterized by the pdf of X with the right half shifted right by a and the 
left half shifted left by a. Please refer to Fig. 6.1(b) for a better understanding of (6.7). This is why our 
double-sided scheme can better utilize the decision space. From Fig. 6.1(b), (6.4) and (6.7), we see that the 
detector’s performance is delineated by 
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0 0 0( | ) 2 [( ) / ]fap P S H Q mψ ψ σ= > = − , (6.8) 
1 1
1
1 2 [( ) / ],   if 
( | )
0.0,                              if m
Q m a
p P S H
a
ψ σ ψψ ψ
− − >= < =  ≤ , (6.9) 
where ψ is the decision threshold and m0 = 0, m1 = a and 2 2 20 1 /X Nσ σ σ= = . Substituting pfa into pm, we 
obtain 
11 2 [ ( / 2) / ],   if 
0.0,                                                if 
fa X
m
Q Q p a N ap
a
σ ψ
ψ
− − − >=  ≤
 (6.10) 
Comparing Fig. 6.1(a) and Fig. 6.1(b), we find that our method can achieve a zero-miss if the decision 
threshold ψ is set between 0 and a, whereas ASS can never achieve a zero-miss. Therefore, DS-ASS works 
quite as what the quantization schemes [102] do since quantization schemes can also achieve a zero miss 
under no attack.  
Another interesting property is that DS-ASS also outperforms ASS (with correlation detector) at ψ > a 
(see (6.10) and (3.70)), that is, 1 12 [ ( / 2) / ] [ ( ) / ]fa X fa XQ Q p a N Q Q p a Nσ σ− −− > − . This performance 
advantage is largely due to the fact that Q(x) is a fast decaying function of x. In order to provide a 
mathematically proof of it, we first give a lemma that states the fast decaying property of Q(x). 
 
Lemma 6.2: For any real k > 0, Q(z+k)/Q(z) is  a decreasing function of z. 
 
The detailed proof of Lemma 6.2 can be found in Appendix D. Let k = Q−1(pfa/2)−Q−1(pfa) and z = Q−1(pfa). 
It is easy to see that k > 0 and Q(z+k)/Q(z) = 0.5. Since a > 0, we have / Xz a N zσ− < . Thus we have from 
Lemma 6.2 
1 1 1 1
1 1
[ ( ) / ( / 2) ( )] [ ( / 2) / ]
0.5
[ ( ) / ] [ ( ) / ]
fa X fa fa fa X
fa X fa X
Q Q p a N Q p Q p Q Q p a N
Q Q p a N Q Q p a N
σ σ
σ σ
− − − −
− −
− + − −= >− − . 
Thus under no attack, DS-ASS has a complete performance advantage over ASS (with correlation detector).  
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6.3.4  Performance under attacks 
We now inspect the performance of DS-ASS under zero-mean noise attacks. Under attacks, we obtain yi = 
xi ± awi + vi.  Thus by projecting Y on w, we get a pair of hypotheses H1:Y X a V= ± +  and H0: Y X V= + . 
Since both X andV can be approximated by Gaussian random variables, the detector’s performance is given 
by 
0 0( | ) ( ) 2 ( / )fap P Y H P X V Qψ ψ ψ σ= > = + > = , (6.11) 
1
0
0
0
1 1
( | ) ( | 1) ( 1) ( | 0) ( 0)
    ( , 1) ( , 0)
    ( ) ( )  ( ) ( )  
( ) ( )    ( )  
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X X
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p P Y H P X a V I P I P X a V I P I
P X a V I P X a V I
f x P x a V dx f x P x a V dx
x a x af x Q Q dx
ψ ψ ψ
ψ ψ
ψ ψ
ψ ψ
σ σ
∞
−∞
∞
= < = + + < = = + − + < = =
= + + < = + − + < =
= ⋅ + + < + ⋅ − + <
    − − + − + = ⋅ −         
∫ ∫
∫
0
1 1
0
1 1
( ) ( )       ( )  
( ) ( )    2 ( )  
X
X
x a x af x Q Q dx
x a x af x Q Q dx
ψ ψ
σ σ
ψ ψ
σ σ
−∞
∞
    − − − − − + ⋅ −         
    − − + − + = ⋅ −         
∫
∫
 (6.12) 
where 2 2 2 2 20 1( ) / ,   /X V VN Nσ σ σ σ σ= + = . In (6.12), the second equality follows from conditioning on I, and 
the fourth from conditioning on X and the independence of X and V , and the sixth from the fact that X has 
a symmetric pdf. 
6.3.5  Perceptual analysis for DS-ASS  
Now we discuss how to implement the perceptual analysis in DS-ASS scheme. Its detailed discussions 
are delayed until Chapter 8. The global embedding strength will introduce local visual distortion on the 
watermarked contents. Thus, the embedding strength should be locally bounded by Human Visual Systems 
(HVS) for better perceptual quality. Incorporating the perceptual analysis into DS-ASS, we obtain an 
embedding rule  
,  if  0;  ,  if  0i i i i i i i is x a w x s x a w x= + > = − ≤ , (6.13) 
where i = 1, 2, …, N , ai > 0 is the embedding strength locally bounded by HVS (for instance, Watson’s 
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perceptual model [55]) and x is as defined in (6.3). The same linear correlator (3.59) coupled with the 
double-sided rule (6.4) can be employed for watermark detection.  
6.4  Double-sided multiplicative spread spectrum schemes 
In the above section, we studied the double-sided detection for ASS. In this section, we extend this idea to 
the MSS schemes. We first show how the double-sided detection works for Barni’s embedding rules (2.22). 
Then we continue to bring together the ideas of both optimum detection and double-sided detection.  
6.4.1  Generalized Barni’s rule 
In this subsection, we generalize the rule (2.22) to 
i i i is x a x w
ξ= + . (6.14) 
where i = 1, 2, …, N and ξ (0 ≤ ξ ≤1) is the order parameter (OP). Barni’s rule can be obtained by setting ξ 
= 1.0. The order parameter ξ can be chosen to match the exponent wij in Watson’s model (Please see [55] for 
a clear definition of wij or w(i, j) in Section 8.1.3). In particular, we may set ξ to 0.7 since wij has a typical 
empirical value of 0.7. The embedding distortion for this rule is Dw = a2E(|X|2ξ).  
We also employ the linear correlator (3.59) with the single-sided rule (6.1) for watermark detection. The 
detector decides between H0: Si = Xi and H1: Si = Xi + a|Xi|ξwi, and its performance under no attack can also 
be characterized by (3.69) but with m0 = 0, m1 = aE(|X|ξ),  20σ = 2Xσ /N, 20σ = [ 2Xσ +a2Var(|X|ξ)]/N  ≈ 2Xσ /N since 
a << 1.0 and 0 ≤ ξ ≤1. Likewise, the performance under additive noise attacks is determined by m0 = 0, m1 = 
aE(|X|ξ), 2 2 20 ( ) /X V Nσ σ σ= + and 2 2 21 ( ) /X V Nσ σ σ≈ + . 
6.4.2  Double-sided detection for Barni’s rule 
Similarly as we did for DS-ASS, we obtain an improved embedding rule 
,  if 0;  ,  if 0i i i i i i i is x a x w x s x a x w x
ξ ξ= + > = − ≤ , (6.15) 
where i = 1, 2, …, N and x is as defined in (6.3). , , , , , ,X s S y Y v V are defined similarly as (6.3). This 
informed embedding rule is termed as Double-Sided Barni’s Multiplicative Spread Spectrum (DS-BMSS) 
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scheme. Projecting S on w, we obtain L(S|H1) which is given by 
1 1
,  if 0;  ,  if 0N Ni ii i
a aS X X X S X X X
N N
ξ ξ
= == + > = − ≤∑ ∑ . (6.16) 
It is impossible to make an exact analysis for the pdf of S . However, by the weak law of large numbers, 
(∑1≤i≤N |Xi|ξ )/N converges to its mean E(|X|ξ) in probability as N increases [107]. Thus, we may have the 
approximation (∑1≤i≤N |Xi|ξ )/N  ≈ E(|X|ξ). We now give Lemma 6.3 to further the discussion. 
 
Lemma 6.3: ∑1≤i≤N |Xi|ξ is independent of the indicator I, where I is as defined in (6.6). 
 
It is easy to understand Lemma 6.3 since the sign of x does not influence the value of ∑1≤i≤N |xi|ξ. However, 
we still provide a mathematically rigorous proof for it in Appendix D.  Thus Lemma 6.3 leads to L(S|H1, I = 
1) = ( X | I = 1) + a (∑1≤i≤N |Xi|ξ )/N ≈ ( X | I = 1) + aE(|X|ξ). Similarly, we have L(S|H1, I = 0) ≈ ( X | I = 
0)−aE(|X|ξ). Therefore, the pdf of L(S|H1) is also depicted by (6.7) (Please refer to the proof of Lemma 6.1 in 
Appendix D), however with a replaced by aE(|X|ξ). Thus, we have the performance 
11 2 [ ( / 2) ( ) / ],   if ( )
0.0,                                                            if ( )
fa X
m
Q Q p a N E X aE X
p
aE X
ξ ξ
ξ
σ ψ
ψ
− − − >=  ≤
 (6.17) 
Under attacks, we obtain yi = xi ± a|xi|ξwi +vi.  Projecting Y on w, we have 1
N
ii
Y X a X N Vξ== ± +∑ . 
Similarly as we did for DS-ASS (See (6.11) and (6.12)), the performance of DS-BMSS under attacks is 
given by 
02 ( / )fap Q ψ σ= , (6.18) 
( ) ( )1 1
( )
1 1
0
1 1
, 1 , 0
    ( ) , 1 ( ) , 0
( ) ( )    2 ( )  
N N
m i ii i
a
X
p P X a X N V I P X a X N V I
P X aE X V I P X aE X V I
x m x mf x Q Q dx
ξ ξ
ξ ξ
ψ ψ
ψ ψ
ψ ψ
σ σ
= =
∞
= + + < = + − + < =
   ≈ + + < = + − + < =   
    − − + − + = ⋅ −         
∑ ∑
∫
 (6.19) 
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where 2 2 2 2 21 0 1( ), ( ) / , /X V Vm aE X N N
ξ σ σ σ σ σ= = + = and (a) follows from the approximation (∑1≤i≤N 
|Xi|ξ )/N  ≈ E(|X|ξ) and Lemma 6.3. 
6.4.3  Double-sided detection for optimum decision statistic 
In this subsection, we investigate how to design an informed embedder according to the optimum 
decision statistic. In Chapter 3, we introduced a suboptimal generalized correlator (3.66) in no need of the 
embedding strength. It inspired us to propose a new Double-Sided Multiplicative Spread Spectrum 
(DS-MSS) scheme whose embedding rule is given by 
,   if  0;  ,   if  0i i i i i i i is x ax w x s x ax w x= + > = − ≤ , (6.20) 
where i = 1, 2, …, N and 
1
1 N
i ii
x x w
N
ξ
== ∑ . (6.21) 
x is called the projected x on w with order parameter ξ (ξ ≥ 0). In this subsection, X , s , S are similarly 
defined as (6.21). It is also interesting to note that the projected X shares the same form with the suboptimal 
detector (3.66). To detect the embedded watermarks, we also employ the double-sided decision rule (6.4), 
however with L(S) given by 
 
1
1( ) N i iiL S wN
ξ
== ∑S .  (6.22) 
Thus with the approximation technique (3.12), L(S|H1) is 
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1( | ) (1 ) (1 )N N N Ni i i i i i i i ii i i i
aL H X aw w X aw w X w X
N N N N
ξ ξ ξ ξξξ= = = == ± ≈ ± = ±∑ ∑ ∑ ∑S . (6.23) 
Similarly, we can prove that ∑1≤i≤N |Xi|ξ is independent of the indicator I, where I is as defined in (6.6), 
however with X replaced by (6.21). Therefore, we have L(S|H1, I = 1) ≈ ( X | I = 1) + aξE(|X|ξ) and L(S|H1, I 
= 0) ≈ ( X | I = 0) − aξE(|X|ξ). Thus, L(S|H1) also has the pdf depicted by (6.7), however with a replaced by  
aξE(|X|ξ), and hence the performance is 
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ξ
ξ ψ ξ
ψ ξ
− − − >=  ≤
 (6.24) 
which achieves its minimum at ξ = c. We can similarly prove that DS-MSS has a better performance than the 
traditional MSS schemes. However, it is difficult to analyze its performance under attacks.  
6.5  Double-sided detection with host interference rejection 
In the above sections, we have investigated the double-sided detection for SS schemes. For SS schemes, 
the host signals interfere with the successful detection of the embedded watermarks. There are several ways 
to reject this interference, for instance, ISS [43] and Spread Transform Dither Modulation (STDM) [46, 
102]. In fact, the embedding strength for the host interference rejection scheme is a random variable 
dependent on the host signals. In this section, we investigate how to introduce the host interference rejection 
technique into our double-sided schemes.  
6.5.1  Embedding rules 
ISS is a technique that rejects the host interference. As noted by Pérez-Freire et al. [68], ISS is, in essence, 
a quantization scheme with two centroids. In this section, we study how to apply the same technique to our 
scheme. The central idea of host interference rejection in our scheme is to adjust the embedding strength a 
so that the detector outputs only two values, for instance, l and –l. Thus, projecting both sides of (6.2) on w, 
we have  
,    for 0;   ,  for 0.s x a l x a a l x x s x a l x a a l x x= + ⇒ = + ⇒ = − > = − ⇒ − = − ⇒ = + ≤  (6.25) 
where x is defined in (6.3). Furthermore, , , , , , ,X s S y Y v V are similarly defined as (6.3). Substituting a in 
(6.25) into (6.2) leads to a new embedding rule 
( ) ,  if  0;  ( ) ,  if  0i i i i i is x l x w x s x l x w x= + − > = − + ≤ , (6.26) 
where i = 1, 2, …, N. In this work, we call (6.26) a Double-Sided Additive Spread Spectrum with Host 
Interference Rejection (DS-ASS-HIR) scheme. The pdf of L(S|H1) is just two pulses at ±l (See Fig. 6.1(b)). 
In (6.26), we see that x cancels the host xi. This indeed is the key idea of ISS.  
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6.5.2  Embedding distortion 
In this part, we derive the embedding distortion for DS-ASS-HIR. The embedding distortion Dw is  
2 2 2
1
2 2 2 2
2 2
2 2 2
2 2
1 ( ) [( ) | 1] ( 1) [( ) | 0] ( 0)
     [( 2 ) | 1] ( 1) [( 2 ) | 0] ( 0)
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     / 2 2
N
w i
X X
X
D E l X E l X I P I E l X I P I
N
E l lX X I P I E l lX X I P I
l E X E lX I E lX I
l l
l N l
σ σ π
σ
=
 = ± − = − = = + − − = = 
= − + = = + + + = =
= + + − = + =
= + −
= + −
∑
2 /( )X Nσ π  (6.27) 
where I is defined in (6.6), the second equality follows from conditioning on I, the fourth from the fact P(I 
= 1) = P(I = 0) = 0.5, and the fifth from Lemma 6.4. 
 
Lemma 6.4: If Z is a zero-mean Gaussian random variable with standard deviation σZ, then  
2( | 0) 2 /ZE Z Z σ π> = and 2( | 0) 2 /ZE Z Z σ π< = − . (6.28) 
Proof: As already proved in the proof of Lemma 6.1 (See Appendix D), fZ | Z > 0(z | Z > 0) = fZ(z) / P(Z > 0) for 
z > 0 and fZ | Z > 0(z | Z > 0) = 0 for z ≤ 0. Since Z has a symmetric pdf, P(Z > 0) = 0.5 and then 
2 2 2 2
| 0 0 0
( | 0) ( | 0) 2 ( ) 2 exp[ /(2 )] 2 2 /Z Z Z Z Z ZE Z Z zf z Z dz zf z dz z z dzσ πσ σ π∞ ∞ ∞>−∞> = > = = − =∫ ∫ ∫ . 
The second equation in (6.28) can be similarly proved.                      ■ 
 
Due to the second term in (6.27), Dw may be larger than l2 at small Ns. However, it is smaller than l2 at 
larger Ns. Moreover, it converges to l2 as N tends to infinity.  
6.5.3  Performance under attacks 
DS-ASS-HIR employs the linear correlator (3.59) with the double-sided rule (6.4) to detect the embedded 
watermarks. Thus under no attack, we see from Fig. 6.1(b) that pm = 0.0 if ψ < l and pm = 1.0 if ψ ≥ l. Under 
attacks, the detector makes a decision between H0: Y X V= + and H1:Y l V= ± + . Thus, the performance is 
given by 
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02 ( / )fap Q ψ σ= , (6.29) 
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ψ ψ ψ ψ
ψ σ ψ σ
= < = = + < = =
= − < + < = + − < − + < =
= − < + < + − < − + <
= − − − −  (6.30) 
where 2 2 2 2 20 ( ) / , /X V VVN Nσ σ σ σ σ= + = , the first equality in (6.30) follows from conditioning on I, the 
second from the fact that P(I = 0) = P(I = 1) = 0.5 and the third from the independence of V and X . 
6.6  Performance comparisons and discussions 
In this section, we make performance comparisons at the same distortion level to demonstrate the 
effectiveness of our proposed schemes. In the following discussions, “ASS-OPT” stands for the optimum 
detector (3.58) (with ξ = c), and “ASS-COR” for the correlation detector (3.59), “MSS-OPT” for the 
optimum detector (3.66) (with ξ = c), “BMSS” for Barni’s multiplicative schemes (6.14), “DS-ASS” for 
additive schemes with double-sided detection (6.2), “DS-MSS” for multiplicative schemes with 
double-sided detection (6.20), “DS-BMSS” for Barni’s scheme with double-sided detection (6.15), “E” for 
Empirical results and “T” for Theoretical results. Please also note that the empirical results in this section 
are obtained through Monte-Carlo simulations. 
6.6.1  DS-ASS versus ASS 
Fig. 6.2 compares the performance of ASS and DS-ASS at DWR = 20dB. Please note that the 
performance of ASS-COR and DS-ASS is invariant to the shape parameter c. It can be clearly observed 
from the comparison results that DS-ASS has a much better performance than ASS-COR (which is 
optimum at c = 2.0). At the high false alarm rates, above 10−3 in Fig. 6.2(a), DS-ASS can achieve a zero miss. 
Since the performance of ASS-OPT increases as c decreases, DS-ASS, essentially designed for correlation 
detectors, is inferior to ASS-OPT in performance at the low false alarm rates in Fig. 6.2(a) and Fig. 6.2(b). 
However, DS-ASS is also applicable to the data that are difficult to model by a mathematically tractable pdf, 
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for which case it is hard to find an optimum detector. Another disadvantage of ASS-OPT over DS-ASS is 
that ASS-OPT has to be informed of the embedding strength a, which is image-dependent for perceptual 
constraints. 
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Fig. 6.2. ASS-OPT (with ξ = c) versus DS-ASS at DWR = 20dB, N = 1000 and σX = 10.0. Experimental results 
are obtained on 1,000,000 groups of GGD data with shape parameter c and σX = 10.0. (a) Performance 
comparisons under no attack. (b) Performance comparisons under zero-mean Gaussian noise attacks at WNR = 
−5dB. 
6.6.2   DS-ASS, DS-ASS-HIR and STDM 
Pérez-Freire et al. [102] applied STDM scheme [46] to the watermark verification scenarios. Its 
performance is given by (4.22) and (4.23). In Fig. 6.3(a) and Fig. 6.3(b), we notice that DS-ASS-HIR 
achieves almost the same performance with STDM. In fact, as N → ∞, x → 0 and ( )a q x xΛ= − → ±∆/2. 
Thus STDM (2.31) converges to DS-ASS-HIR (6.26) as N increases. It can also be observed from Fig. 6.3(a) 
that both host-interference canceling schemes outperform DS-ASS at the high false alarm rates. However, 
DS-ASS can achieve a better performance at the low false alarm rates in Fig. 6.3(a).  
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Fig. 6.3. (a) DS-ASS, DS-ASS-HIR and STDM at N = 1000, DWR = 20dB, WNR = −10dB, and σX = 10.0. 
Empirical results are obtained on 1,000,000 groups of GGD data with c = 1.0 and σX = 10. (b) Theoretical 
performance comparisons between STDM and DS-ASS-HIR at DWR = 20dB and N = 2000. 
 
0 a
H0
Decision threshold ψ
l-a-l
 
Fig. 6.4. The illustrative pdf of the decision statistics L(Y|H0) and L(Y|H1) under noise attacks. The thick and 
solid curves represent L(Y|H1) for DS-ASS and DS-ASS-HIR, respectively. 
 
Since the embedding distortion for DS-ASS is a2, l in (6.27) must be larger than a to achieve the same 
distortion for DS-ASS-HIR. Under noise attacks, since L(Y|H1) = X a V± + for DS-ASS and L(Y|H1) = 
a V± + for DS-ASS-HIR, Var(L(Y|H1)) for DS-ASS is larger than that for DS-ASS-HIR (see Fig. 6.4). Thus, 
if ψ < l, DS-ASS-HIR has a smaller pm. However, if ψ > l (as indicated in Fig. 6.4), then pm for DS-ASS-HIR 
is larger than that for DS-ASS. This explains why DS-ASS-HIR can achieve a better performance at the 
high false alarm rates and a poorer performance at the low false rates. The distortion Dw for STDM is [102] 
2 2 2( 0.5 ) ( ) (0.5 ) ( ) (0.5 )
i i
w X Xi i
i i
D x i f x dx f x dx
∞ ∞∆+∆ ∆+∆
∆ ∆=−∞ =−∞
= − ∆ − ∆ < ∆ = ∆∑ ∑∫ ∫  (6.31) 
since −0.5∆ < x−0.5∆−i∆ < 0.5∆ for i∆ < x < i∆+∆. Thus to achieve the same distortion a2, ∆/2 must be 
larger than a, which leads to the same advantage of STDM over DS-ASS at the high false alarm rates. 
Though STDM and DS-ASS-HIR achieve a better performance at high false alarm rates, they are not 
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encouraged in real scenarios due to the reason outlined in Section 6.3.2. 
6.6.3  BMSS and DS-BMSS 
In Fig. 6.5, we compared the performance of BMSS and DS-BMSS. It is clearly shown that DS-BMSS 
yields a better performance than BMSS does. Moreover, the effectiveness of the approximation (∑1≤i≤N 
|Xi|ξ )/N  ≈ E(|X|ξ) in Section 6.4.2 is also verified by the nice agreement between theoretical and 
experimental results.  
6.6.4  MSS and DS-MSS 
The same improvement over MSS-OPT can be observed from both Fig. 6.6(a) and Fig. 6.6(b). Moreover 
in Fig. 6.6(a), the empirical performance of DS-MSS agrees with the theoretical one predicted in (6.24). The 
performance decreases as the shape parameter c decreases. The disadvantage of DS-MSS is that it relies on 
the knowledge of the shape parameter c to choose an optimum ξ. This knowledge can be obtained from the 
estimation of the shape parameter c [69, 103]. If ξ is not known beforehand at the detector, it has to be 
estimated from the attacked image and the estimated c would differ from that estimated from the original 
image. However, this difference is quite small [77] due to the imperceptibility requirement. An alternative is 
to adopt the same ξ at both embedders and detectors. However, it is at the cost of performance. 
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Fig. 6.5. BMSS versus DS-BMSS at DWR = 20dB, WNR = −10dB, σX = 10.0 and N = 2000. Empirical results 
are obtained on 1,000,000 groups of data with the specified c and σX = 10.0. In the legends of this figure, “noise” 
represents the results obtained under zero-mean Gaussian noise attacks. (a) c = 1.0 and ξ = 0.7. (b) c = 2.0 and ξ 
= 1.0. 
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Fig. 6.6. MSS-OPT (with ξ = c) and DS-MSS at DWR = 25dB, N = 2000 and σX = 10. Empirical results are 
obtained on 1,000,000 groups of data with shape parameter c and σX = 10. (a) Under no attack. (b) Under 
zero-mean Gaussian noise attacks at WNR = −10dB. 
6.6.5  Comparisons among double-sided schemes 
In this subsection, we make performance comparisons among all double-sided detection schemes. Since 
Dw = a2 for DS-ASS, plugging DWR into (6.10) and substituting ψ with pfa (see (6.8)) leads to 
11 2 [ ( / 2) ],   if 2 ( )
0.0,                                   if 2 ( )
fa fa
m
fa
Q Q p p Q
p
p Q
ρ ρ
ρ
− − − <=  ≥
. (6.31) 
where DWR / 2010 Nρ −= .  (6.32) 
Similarly, the performance of DS-BMSS and DS-MSS can also expressed by (6.31), but with ρ replaced by 
2DWR / 2010 ( ) ( )N E X E Xξ ξρ −= , (6.33) 
DWR / 2010 MVR( )Nρ ξ−= . (6.34) 
for DS-BMSS and DS-MSS respectively. It is easy to see from (6.33) and (6.34) that DS-BMSS has a worse 
performance than DS-ASS since 2( ) ( )E X E Xξ ξ < 1.0. However, DS-BMSS can achieve a better 
perceptual quality since it automatically implements a simple contrast masking of Watson’s perceptual 
model [55]. Moreover, DS-BMSS produces a better performance as ξ decreases. In fact, DS-BMSS 
degenerates into DS-ASS at ξ = 0 (See (6.15) and (6.2)). Since MVR(1.0) = 1.0 at c = 1.0, DS-MSS (at ξ = 
c) outperforms DS-ASS at c above 1.0. Compared with DS-BMSS, DS-MSS achieves a better performance 
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if c > 0.5. These conclusions are also reflected in Fig. 6.7(a). In Fig. 6.7(b), we compared their performances 
under attacks. It can be seen from Fig. 6.7(b) that at c = 2.0, DS-MSS outperforms DS-ASS-HIR and 
DS-ASS at the low false alarm rates, and however, is inferior to DS-ASS-HIR and DS-ASS at c < 1.0. 
Moreover, DS-BMSS also yields a poorer performance than DS-ASS does under attacks. 
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Fig. 6.7. Performance comparisons among double-sided schemes at N = 2000 and σX = 10. (a) Theoretical 
performance comparisons under no attack at DWR = 25dB. (b) Under zero-mean Gaussian noise attacks at 
DWR = 20dB and WNR = −15dB. Empirical results are obtained on 1,000,000 groups of data with shape 
parameter c and σX = 10. 
6.7  Experimental results 
In this section, the experiments are conducted on real natural images, namely, Lena, Peppers, Boat and 
Baboon. For the ease of performance comparisons, we don’t consider the perceptual analysis in this chapter. 
Performance comparisons with perceptual analysis on real images are listed in Chapter 8. For each 8×8 
DCT block, we use just one coefficient for watermarking since different DCT frequency coefficients 
usually have different shape parameters. Thus, using one coefficient in each block can simplify the 
performance comparisons.  
The shape parameter c and standard deviation σX of the host DCT coefficients are estimated by the ML 
method [103]. For the 5th (in Zigzag order) coefficient of Lena, its estimated c is 0.69 and σX  = 19.74; for the 
5th coefficient of Peppers, c = 1.03 and σX = 16.04; for the 5th coefficient of Boat, c = 0.73 and σX = 24.32; for 
the 5th coefficient of Baboon, c = 1.11 and σX = 32.12. Since c for the attacked data does not vary much from 
that for the original data due to the imperceptibility requirement, we instead use the estimated c of the 
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original data in detection for convenience.  
Since we do not have a large set of natural images with the same c and σX, we instead permute the host 
DCT coefficients to obtain different xs. Each permutation obtains a new test data x, and our experimental 
results are obtained on 1,000,000 such permutations. Please also refer to Appendix E for further reference. 
The comparison results under zero-mean Gaussian noise attacks are displayed in Fig. 6.8, Fig. 6.9 and Fig. 
6.10. It can be clearly observed that our double-schemes dramatically improve the corresponding 
single-sided schemes. As also stated in Section 6.6.2, STDM and DS-ASS-HIR achieves almost the same 
performance. Despite their performance advantages over DS-ASS in Fig. 6.8 and Fig. 6.11, the host 
inference rejection schemes are not encouraged in real scenarios for the reason outlined in Section 6.3.2. 
The comparison results under JPEG attacks are displayed in Fig. 6.11, Fig. 6.12 and Fig. 6.13. At Quality 
Factor (QF) = 50, the same performance advantage of double-sided schemes over single-sided schemes can 
be observed. Though ASS-OPT achieves a better performance than DS-ASS does at the low false alarm 
rates under Gaussian noise attacks (See Fig. 6.8), it is inferior to DS-ASS under JPEG attacks.  
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 (c)                      (d) 
Fig. 6.8. Performance comparisons among additive schemes under zero-mean Gaussian noise attacks at DWR = 
25dB, WNR = −5dB and N = 2000. Please also note that ξ = c for ASS-OPT. (a) For the 5th coefficient of Lena. 
(b) For the 5th coefficient of Peppers. (c) For the 5th coefficient of Boat. (d) For the 5th coefficient of Baboon. 
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Fig. 6.9. Performance comparisons between BMSS (ξ = 0.7) versus DS-BMSS (ξ = 0.7) under zero-mean 
Gaussian noise attacks at DWR = 25dB, WNR = −5dB and N = 2000. (a) For the 5th coefficients of Lena and 
Peppers. (b) For the 5th coefficients of Boat and Baboon. 
 
1E-5 1E-4 1E-3 0.01 0.1 1
1E-5
1E-4
1E-3
0.01
0.1
1
 MSS-OPT Lena
 DS-MSS Lena
 MSS-OPT Peppers
 DS-MSS Peppers
pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
 o
f m
is
s
probability of false alarm
1E-5 1E-4 1E-3 0.01 0.1 1
1E-5
1E-4
1E-3
0.01
0.1
1
 MSS-OPT Boat
 DS-MSS Boat
 MSS-OPT Baboon
 DS-MSS Baboon
pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
 o
f m
is
s
probability of false alarm  
(a)                       (b) 
Chapter 6 Double Sided Watermark Embedding and Detection PhD Dissertation 
 93
Fig. 6.10. Performance comparisons between MSS-OPT (ξ = c) and DS-MSS (ξ = c) under zero-mean Gaussian 
noise attacks at DWR = 25dB, WNR = −5dB and N = 2000. (a) For the 5th coefficients of Lena and Peppers. (b) 
For the 5th coefficients of Boat and Baboon.  
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Fig. 6.11. Performance comparisons between additive schemes under JPEG (QF = 50) attacks at DWR = 25dB 
and N = 2000. Please also note that ξ = c for ASS-OPT. (a) For the 5th coefficient of Lena. (b) For the 5th 
coefficient of Peppers. (c) For the 5th coefficient of Boat. (d) For the 5th coefficient of Baboon. 
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Fig. 6.12. Performance comparisons between BMSS (ξ = 0.7) and DS-BMSS (ξ = 0.7) under JPEG (QF = 50) 
attacks at DWR = 25dB and N = 2000. (a) For the 5th coefficients of Lena and Peppers. (b) For the 5th 
coefficients of Lena and Peppers. 
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Fig. 6.13. Performance comparisons between MSS-OPT (ξ = c) and DS-MSS (ξ = c) under JPEG (QF = 50) 
attacks at DWR = 25dB and N = 2000. (a) For the 5th coefficients of Lena and Peppers. (b) For the 5th 
coefficients of Boat and Baboon. 
6.8  Conclusions 
In this chapter, we presented a double-sided technique for SS schemes. Different from the traditional SS 
and host interference rejection schemes, it utilizes but does not reject the host interference. Through both 
theoretical and empirical comparisons, we found that the proposed double-sided schemes could achieve a 
great performance advantage over the traditional SS schemes and overcome the drawbacks of the host 
interference rejection schemes. Though DS-ASS and DS-BMSS are not the best in performance, they are 
the two most appealing schemes that offer advantages  
1) Over its single-sided counterparts (such as ASS-COR and BMSS) in performance. 
2) Over host interference rejection schemes (such as STDM and DS-ASS-HIR): The perceptual analysis can 
be easily implemented to achieve the locally bounded maximum embedding strength, whereas it is difficult 
for host interference rejection schemes. 
3) Over optimal detectors (such as ASS-OPT, MSS-OPT and DS-MSS): They have an advantage over 
ASS-OPT in that they require no knowledge of the embedding strength, especially in the case where the 
embedding strength should be locally bounded by the perceptual analysis. The second advantage is that 
they do not need to estimate the shape parameter for watermark detection. The third is that they both employ 
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a simple linear correlator in no need of expensive computations. The fourth is that they are universally 
applicable to all kinds of data whatever their probabilities of distributions are.  
The idea of DS-ASS is also reflected in a recently submitted paper [116] where the watermark embedding 
and detection are investigated from an information-theoretic approach. This work is quite interesting and 
may be coupled with our work to gain a deeper understanding of the double-sided technique. Moreover, it 
would be much interesting if [116] could produce a better embedding rule without host interference 
rejection. However, ours offers a different treatment of the idea.  
Our embedding rule is also designed according to a given detection function. However, different from the 
works [115] and [116], we did not choose to optimize the embedding function. We follow a very intuitive 
approach to utilize side information to increase the magnitude of the detector’s output. For a simple 
correlator, the correlation between the host signals and the watermark determines whether the embedding 
should take an additive or a subtractive form. Of course, owning to LMP tests, the simple linear correlation 
is further generalized to a generalized form in our work. For instance, DS-MSS and DS-Cauchy (See 
Chapter 8) adopt the generalized correlation in their embedding rules. In fact, these correlators have a nice 
property that their decision statistics for the unwatermarked content are symmetrical about zero. Thus given 
any possible correlator, we can propose a corresponding double-sided embedding function. Therefore with 
our approach, we investigated the double-sided idea in both additive and multiplicative cases. 
Second, we also investigated how to implement the perceptual analysis for DS-ASS (See Chapter 8 for 
details). In fact, in our work, we emphasized on the nice property of our double-sided scheme that it utilizes 
but not reject the host interference. Due to this nice property, double-sided schemes offer a big advantage 
over the host interference rejection schemes that the perceptual analysis can be easily implemented to 
achieve a maximum possible robustness. 
Third, we analyzed its performance under both no attack and attacks on a more practical model of host 
signals, namely, GGD model. Specifically, we provided a simpler proof of its performance advantage over 
ASS-COR for any given N. However, they gave a much involved proof of its performance advantage in the 
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asymptotic sense. 
Fourth, ours offered extensive performance comparisons with other schemes. For instance, in our work, 
performance comparisons under both Gaussian noise attacks and JPEG attacks were conducted to verify the 
performance advantage of our double-sided schemes. However, no empirical performance comparisons 
were provided in their work. 
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Chapter 7   Double Sided Schemes in the DFT Domain 
In the previous chapter, we presented a new double-sided technique and inspected its performance in the 
DCT domain. In this chapter, however, we investigate the performances of the double-sided schemes in the 
DFT domain. DS-ASS is not applicable to the DFT magnitudes since the watermarked data should be 
nonnegative. Thus, we only examine the performance gain of the double-sided multiplicative schemes over 
the traditional multiplicative schemes. 
In the first section of this chapter, we review the single-sided schemes and provide a mathematically 
rigorous analysis of these schemes. As of this writing, no solid performance analysis has been given for the 
optimal detectors in the DFT domain. In the second section, the double-side schemes in the DFT domain are 
briefly outlined with special attention paid to the difference from those in the DCT domain. The following 
section then conduct performance comparisons to justify the advantages of our double-sided schemes. In 
the last section, we perform Monte-Carlo simulations to validate the conclusions drawn in the previous 
sections. 
7.1  Single-sided schemes 
7.1.1  Correlator 
Since the DFT magnitudes are nonnegative, the Barni’s multiplicative rule reduces to the multiplicative 
rule (2.21) which for reference is listed as 
si = xi + a·xi·wi (7.1) 
The performance of the correlator is determined by [42] 
2 2 2
0 0 1 10,  ( ),  ( ),  ( )(1 ) ( )m Var X m aE X Var X a Var Xσ σ= = = = + ≈  (7.2) 
since a is rather small to keep the embedding distortion imperceptible. In order to evaluate its performance 
under attacks, we consider a kind of absolute Gaussian noise attacks to avoid the negative values of 
Gaussian noise. The attack can be expressed as {|V1|, |V2|, …, |VN|}, where Vis are i.i.d. Gaussian random 
Chapter 7 Double Sided Schemes in the DFT Domain PhD Dissertation 
 98
variables with a zero mean and standard deviation σV. Thus under attacks, the detector decides between H0: 
Yi = Xi + |Vi| and H1: Yi = Xi + a·Xi·wi + |Vi|.  It is also easy to see that its performance under attacks is 
depicted by 
2
0 0
2 2
1 1
0,            ( ) ( )
( ),   ( )(1 ) ( ) ( ) ( )
m Var X Var V
m aE X Var X a Var V Var X Var V
σ
σ
= = +
= = + + ≈ +  (7.3) 
7.1.2  Optimum decision statistic  
In [75, 76], DFT magnitudes are assumed to follow a Weibull distribution. The estimation of the shape 
and scale parameters has been outlined in Chapter 2. This assumption thus leads to the likelihood test 
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It thus follows that 
1
1 1( ) ln[ ( )] ln 1
1 (1 )
N
ii
i i
L l s
aw aw
δ
δδ =
 = = + − + + ∑s s  (7.5) 
Since the first term in the above equation is a fixed value for a given w, the above optimum decision statistic 
is thus 
1
1( ) 1
(1 )
N
ii
i
L S
aw
δ
δ=
 = − + ∑S  (7.6) 
It is identical to (3.64) in the DCT domain.  Since a << 1, this optimum decision rule can also be replaced by 
a suboptimal decision statistic [74, 77] 
1
1( ) N i iiL S wN
δ
== ∑S  (7.7) 
Although it is suboptimal, it offers an advantage over (7.6) in that it entails no knowledge of the embedding 
strength. This advantage is vital to the corresponding double-sided schemes. 
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7.1.3  Performance of optimal detectors under no attack 
The performance analysis for (7.7) bears a close resemblance to that of the generalized correlators in the 
DCT domain. Therefore similar results can be obtained as 
11 [ ( ) MVR( )]m fap Q Q p a N δ−= − −  (7.8) 
However, for Weibull pdf, 
1
0
1
0
( 1) (1 ) 1 1
0
0
( 1) 1
( ) ( ) exp[ ( ) ]
           ( ) exp[ ( ) ]
           exp( )    (Let )
           exp( )
           ( / 1) exp( ) (
E X x x x dx
x x dx
y y y dy x y
y y dy
y y
ξ δ δ ξ
δ ξ ξ δ
δ ξ δ ξ δ δ
ξ δ ξ
ξ δ ξ
δ θ θθ
δ θ θ θθ
θ θ
θ
ξ δ θ
∞ −
∞ + −
∞ + − −
∞
+ −
= −
= −
= − =
= −
= Γ + − Γ
∫
∫
∫
∫
0
/ 1)
           ( / 1)
dy
ξ
ξ δ
ξ δ θ
∞ +
= Γ +
∫
  (7.9) 
and thus 
2 2 2 2 2( ) ( ) [ ( )] (2 / 1) [ ( / 1)]Var X E X E Xξ ξ ξ ξ ξξ δ θ ξ δ θ= − = Γ + − Γ +  (7.10) 
Hence, MVR is 
2
( ) ( ) ( / 1)MVR( )
( ) (2 / 1) [ ( / 1)]( )
E X E X
Var XVar X
ξ ξ
ξ ξ
ξ ξ ξ ξ δξ ξ δ ξ δ
Γ += = = Γ + − Γ +  (7.11) 
We see from the above equation that MVR(·) does not depend on θ. It is difficult to maximize (7.11) 
analytically. However, we found through the numerical search that MVR achieves its maximum at ξ = δ for 
all δ in [0.1, 4.0]. Moreover, substituting ξ = δ into the above equation, we have 
MVR( )δ δ= . (7.12) 
7.1.4  Performance of generalized correlators under attacks 
The decision statistics for H0 and H1 under attacks are  
0 1
1( | ) [ ]N i i iiL H X V wN
δ
== +∑Y and 1 11( | ) [ (1 ) ]N i i i iiL H X aw V wN δ== + +∑Y , (7.13) 
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respectively. Therefore, the performance for the generalized correlator (7.7) is determined by 
2
0 00,     ([ ] ) /m Var X V N
δσ= = + , (7.14) 
1
{[ (1 ) ] } {[ (1 ) ] }
2
E X a V E X a V
m
δ δ+ + + − += , (7.15) 
2
1
{[ (1 ) ] } {[ (1 ) ] }
2
Var X a V Var X a V
N
δ δ
σ + + + − += , (7.16) 
where numerical convolutions are employed to obtain the pdf of X + |V|, X(1+a) + |V| and X(1−a) + |V|.  
7.2  Double-sided schemes in the DFT domain 
7.2.1  Double-sided scheme for Barni’s rules 
In this subsection, we investigate the performance of DS-BMSS schemes in the DFT domain. The 
embedding rule for DS-BMSS (with ξ = 1.0) is given by  
,   if 0;  ,   if 0i i i i i i i is x ax w x s x ax w x= + > = − ≤ , (7.17) 
where 
 
1
1 N
i ii
x x w
N =
= ∑ . (7.18) 
The performance is thus given by (6.17), however with ξ = 1.0. Please also note that E(|X|) = E(X) since X is 
nonnegative. The performance under attacks is similarly characterized by (6.18) and (6.19), but with 
2 2
1 0 1( ), [ ( ) ( )]/ , ( ) /m aE X Var X Var V N Var V Nσ σ= = + =  (7.19) 
7.2.2  Double-sided scheme for optimum decision rules 
In this section, we examine the performance of DS-MSS in the DFT domain. The embedding rule is 
described in (6.20) and (6.21). Its performance under no attack is also depicted in (6.24), however with 
MVR replaced by (7.11). It also achieves its best performance at ξ = δ.  
7.3  Performance comparisons 
In this section, we make performance comparisons between the double and single sided schemes in the 
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DFT domain. Please first note that in the legends of the following figures, “MSS-OPT” stands for the 
suboptimal detector (7.7), “E” for Empirical results, “T” for Theoretical results and other notations follow 
the definitions in the previous chapter. 
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(a)                        (b) 
Fig. 7.1. Theoretical performance comparisons between single and double-sided schemes at DWR = 25dB and N 
= 1000 (a) θ = 0.05, δ = 1.5. (b) θ = 0.1, δ = 1.8. 
 
1E-5 1E-4 1E-3 0.01 0.1 1
1E-5
1E-4
1E-3
0.01
0.1
1
 T BMSS
 T DS-BMSS
 T MSS-OPT
 E DS-MSS
pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
 o
f m
is
s
probability of false alarm
1E-5 1E-4 1E-3 0.01 0.1 1
1E-5
1E-4
1E-3
0.01
0.1
1
pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
 o
f m
is
s
probability of false alarm
 T BMSS
 T DS-BMSS
 T MSS-OPT
 E DS-MSS
 
(a)                       (b) 
Fig. 7.2. Performance comparisons between single and double sided schemes under absolute zero-mean 
Gaussian noise attacks at DWR = 25dB, WNR = −10dB and N = 1000. Empirical results are obtained on 
1,000,000 Weibull data with the designated scale and shape parameter. (a) θ = 0.05, δ = 1.5. (b) θ = 0.1, δ = 1.8. 
 
We see from Fig. 7.1 and Fig. 7.2 that the double-sided schemes have a great performance advantage over 
the corresponding single-sided schemes, especially at large false alarm rates.  It is also interesting to note 
that the suboptimal detector only enjoys a slight performance advantage over BMSS. This observation also 
holds for the corresponding double-sided schemes, that is, DS-MSS is only slightly better than DS-BMSS 
in performance. Now we see why the performance gain of MSS-OPT over BMSS is so small. Since at ξ = 
Chapter 7 Double Sided Schemes in the DFT Domain PhD Dissertation 
 102
1.0, MSS-OPT and DS-MSS reduce to BMSS and DS-BMSS, respectively, the performance of MSS-OPT 
can be obtained by substituting ξ with 1.0 in (6.24). Thus, the performance of BMSS can also be 
characterized by 
11 [ ( ) MVR(1.0)]m fap Q Q p a N
−= − −  
Thus the performance of BMSS or DS-BMSS is determined by MVR(1.0), whereas MSS-OPT’s or 
DS-BMSS’s performance is decided by MVR(δ). Fig. 7.3 plots the different MVR values at different δs. 
The figure clearly indicates that MVR(1.0) does not differ much from MVR(δ) = δ and this difference 
increases as δ grows. Thus, we conclude that using BMSS and DS-BMSS instead does not result in a big 
performance loss. 
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Fig. 7.3. MVR(1.0) and MVR(δ) 
7.4  Monte-Carlo Simulations 
In this section, we verify the theoretical results obtained in the previous sections through Monte-Carlo 
simulations. The comparison results are displayed in Fig. 7.4, Fig. 7.5 and Fig. 7.6. All these figures 
demonstrate the nice agreements between theoretical and empirical results. Moreover, the advantages of 
double-sided schemes over single-sided ones are well observed in Fig. 7.4 and Fig. 7.5. Please also note the 
sharp turns for double-sided schemes, above which the double-sided schemes can achieve a zero probability 
of miss. Another important observation is that BMSS and DS-BMSS produce a better performance at a 
larger shape parameter since MVR(1.0) increases as δ increases. 
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Fig. 7.4. Theoretical and empirical performances for BMSS and DS-BMSS at DWR = 25dB and N = 1000. 
Empirical results are obtained on 1,000,000 Weibull data with the designated scale and shape parameter. (a) 
Under no attack. (b) Under absolute zero-mean Gaussian noise at WNR = −10dB. 
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Fig. 7.5. Theoretical and empirical performances for MSS-OPT and DS-MSS at DWR = 25dB and N = 1000. 
Empirical results are obtained on 1,000,000 Weibull data with the designated scale and shape parameter.  
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Fig. 7.6. Theoretical and empirical performances under absolute zero-mean Gaussian noise attacks for 
MSS-OPT at DWR = 25dB, WNR = −10dB and N = 1000. Empirical results are obtained on 1,000,000 Weibull 
data with the designated scale and shape parameter. 
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Chapter 8   Double-Sided Schemes with Perceptual Analysis 
8.1  Watson’s perceptual model 
In Chapter 6, we have outlined how to implement the perceptual analysis for the double-sided additive 
spread spectrum schemes. In this chapter, we detail its implementations in the DCT (8×8) domain and 
evaluate its performance by experiments. 
Perceptual analyses have been widely employed in watermarking systems to improve the image fidelity 
at a maximum allowable embedding level [56−63, 117, 118]. Watson [55] originally proposed a perceptual 
model to design a custom quantization matrix tailored to a particular image. The model consists of 
frequency, luminance and contrast masking. In this section, we first review this model. 
Let the (i, j)th DCT coefficient at block k of the image be denoted by x(i, j, k) with 0 ≤ i, j ≤ 7. The masked 
threshold m(i, j, k) estimates the amounts by which x(i, j, k) may be changed before resulting in any 
perceptible distortions. 
8.1.1  Frequency masking 
Peterson et al. [109, 110, 111] have provided measurements of thresholds m(i, j, k) for DCT basis 
functions. For each frequency (i, j) they measured psychophysically the smallest coefficient that yielded a 
visible signal. By Peterson’s method, Cox [3] computed the masks m(i, j, k) and tabled them in a DCT 
frequency sensitivity table (which for reference is given as Table 8.1.) 
Table 8.1. DCT frequency sensitivity table (See Table 7.2 in Chapter 7 of [3]). 
 
1.4 1.01 1.16 1.66 2.4 3.43 4.79 6.56
1.01 1.45 1.32 1.52 2 2.71 3.67 4.93
1.16 1.32 2.24 2.59 2.98 3.64 4.6 5.88
1.66 1.52 2.59 3.77 4.55 5.3 6.28 7.6
2.4 2 2.98 4.55 6.15 7.46 8.71 10.17
3.43 2.71 3.64 5.3 7.46 9.62 11.58 13.51
4.79 3.67 4.6 6.28 8.71 11.58 14.5 17.29
6.56 4.93 5.88 7.6 10.17 13.51 17.29 21.15  
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8.1.2  Luminance masking 
The frequency sensitivity measures the thresholds for DCT basis functions as a function of the mean 
luminance of the display. However, the local mean luminance in the image also has a great influence on the 
DCT thresholds. Watson called this luminance masking and formulated it as 
( , , ) ( , , ) [ (0,0, ) / (0,0)] Tam i j k m i j k x k x= ⋅ , (8.1) 
where m(i, j, k) in the right side of (8.1) is the frequency masking discussed in the previous subsection, x(0, 
0, k) is the mean luminance (or DC coefficient) of the block k of the original image, x (0, 0) is the mean 
luminance of the original image (or the mean of DC coefficients), and aT is a constant with a suggested 
value of  0.649. 
8.1.3  Contrast masking 
The threshold for a visual pattern is typically reduced in the presence of other patterns, particularly those 
of similar spatial frequency and orientation. Watson called this contrast masking and described the 
threshold for a coefficient as a function of its magnitude, that is, 
( , ) 1 ( , )( , , ) max{ ( , , ),   ( , , ) ( , , ) }w i j w i jm i j k m i j k x i j k m i j k −= ⋅ , (8.2) 
where m(i, j, k) in the right side of (8.2) is obtained in the previous subsection and w(i, j) is an exponent that 
lies between 0 and 1 with a typical empirical value of 0.7. Since the threshold m(i, j, k) roughly scales 
proportionally to the host coefficient x(i, j, k), the multiplicative rule can thus automatically achieve a nicer 
perceptual quality. In fact, if the perceptual model is employed, an additive embedding rule is sort of a 
multiplicative rule. 
8.2  Previous single-sided works 
Podilchuk and Zeng [56] are the first to take the perceptual quality into account. The embedding rule for 
such a case becomes 
i i i is x am w= + , (8.3) 
where mi is the mask threshold determined in the previous section. The early methods detect the embedded 
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watermark by a simple linear correlator. Later, Hernandez [69] designed an optimum detector by assuming 
that the host DCT coefficients follow a GGD distribution. The pdf of a GGD distribution is given by (2.7). 
Based on this assumption, an optimum decision statistic can be formulated as [69] 
1
1( )
N
c c
i i i i
i
L S S am w
N =
= − −∑S , (8.4) 
which is in line with the optimum detector (3.57) in Chapter 3 where the perceptual analysis is not 
considered. In [72, 73], the author describes the host signals by a Cauchy distribution whose pdf is given by 
2 2
1( )
( )X
f x
x
γ
π γ δ= + − , (8.5) 
where γ is the scale parameter and δ is the location parameter. For a symmetric pdf, δ = 0. In this work, we 
focus primary on symmetrical data. Thus, the above pdf is simplified as 
2 2
1( )Xf x x
γ
π γ= + . (8.6) 
The scale parameter can be estimated by [112, 113] or by solving numerically the equation 
2 2
1
2N
i i
N
x
γ
γ γ== +∑ . (8.7) 
In [72], the authors give a non-linear Cauchy detector with a decision statistic 
2 2
1
2( )( )
( )
N
i i
i i
S wL S
S
δ
γ δ=
−= + −∑ . (8.8) 
Since δ = 0 in this work, the above statistics can be rewritten as 
2 2
1
1( )
N
i i
i i
S wL S
N Sγ== +∑ . (8.9) 
It is also important to note in [69, 72], only frequency and luminance masking are considered. Though 
they call their detectors optimal, they are never optimal since mi is taken as a fixed value in their derivation 
of the optimum detectors. In real scenarios, mi is image-dependent and not fixed. However, their detectors 
do achieve a performance improvement over linear correlators if only frequency and luminance masking are 
considered. This is because mi does not vary much and thus can be roughly taken as fixed. Nevertheless, if 
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the contrasting masking is implemented, mi would be dependent on xi (See (8.2)) and their detector should 
never be optimal at all. Instead, we will see in the future experiments that their detectors yield a very poor 
performance in such a case.  
8.3  Double-sided schemes 
8.3.1  Double-sided Additive Spread Schemes 
In Section 6.3.5, we have briefed how to implement the perceptual analysis in the double-sided additive 
spread spectrum schemes (DS-ASS). The embedding rule is given by 
,   if  0;  ,   if  0i i i i i i i is x am w x s x am w x= + > = − ≤ , (8.10) 
where x is as defined in (6.3). We employ the same linear correlator with the double-sided rule for 
watermark detection. 
8.3.2  Double-sided Cauchy schemes 
It is difficult to propose a double-sided scheme for the optimum detector designed by Hernandez [69] 
since their detector requires the knowledge of embedding strength. However, it is possible to design a 
Double-Sided Cauchy (DS-Cauchy) scheme for Briassouli’s scheme with an embedding rule 
,   if  0;  ,   if  0i i i i i i i is x am w x s x am w x= + > = − ≤  (8.11) 
where 
2 2
1
1( )
N
i i
i i
x wx L x
N xγ== = +∑ . (8.12) 
We apply the same decision statistic (8.9) with the double-sided rule (6.4) to the watermark detection. To 
see how this rule works, substituting (8.11) into (8.9), we obtain 
1 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 1 1
( )1 1 1( | )
( ) ( ) ( )
N N N
i i i i i i i
i i ii i i i i i i i i
x am w w x w mL H a
N x am w N x am w N x am wγ γ γ= = =
±= = ±+ ± + ± + ±∑ ∑ ∑s . (8.13) 
Since a·mi is usually much smaller than xi, thus 
Chapter 8 Double-Sided Schemes with Perceptual Analysis PhD Dissertation 
 108
1 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 1 1
1 1 1( | )
( ) ( )
N N N
i i i i
i i ii i i i i i i
x w am amL H x
N x N x am w N x am wγ γ γ= = =≈ ± = ±+ + ± + ±∑ ∑ ∑s  (8.14) 
Thus, we see from (8.11) and (8.14) that the second term of (8.14) is of the same sign with x , which is the 
essence of double-sided schemes.  
8.4  Discussions 
8.4.1  Performance in the sense of Mean Squared Errors (MSE) metric 
In real scenarios, mi depends on the host signal xi. However, to simplify the discussion, we assume that mi 
is fixed in this subsection. Thus, the performance of DS-ASS can be described as 
11 2 [ ( / 2) / ],   if 
0.0,                                                if 
fa X
m
Q Q p k N kp
k
σ ψ
ψ
− − − >=  ≤
, 
where 
1
1 N
ii
k a m
N =
= ⋅∑  
Please refer to Section 6.6.3 for the detailed derivation of the above equation. In the sense of MSE metric, 
we may assume that the embedding distortion Dw is 
2 2
1
1 N
w ii
D a m
N =
= ∑ . 
By Cauchy’s inequality, we have 
2
2 2 2
1 1
1 1N N
i i wi i
k am a m D
N N= =
 = ≤ =  ∑ ∑ , 
where the equality holds at m1 = m2 = … = mN. That is, the best performance of DS-ASS is achieved at m1 = 
m2 = … = mN. Hence, the perceptual shaping reduces the performance of DS-ASS at the same distortion 
level (in the sense of MSE metric). It also implies that performance analyses without taking perceptual 
quality into account may be quite misleading. Of course, the above rationale holds similarly for ASS 
schemes. 
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8.4.2  Disadvantages of host interference rejection schemes 
The host interference rejection schemes have been adapted to watermark detection problems and proven 
to be superior in performance. However, they haven’t taken the perceptual analysis into account. Indeed, it 
is difficult to implement the perceptual analysis for them. In this subsection, we conjecture a possible way to 
implement the perceptual analysis for STDM and then discuss its disadvantages.  
Suppose that the maximum allowable embedding strength for the host data is amax. The perceptual 
analysis for our schemes can be simply implemented as maxi i i is x a m w= ± to achieve the maximum possible 
embedding strength. With the help of the spread transform technique, we can also obtain the embedding rule 
for STDM with perceptual analysis. Projecting both sides of (8.3) on w, we have 
1
1 N
ii
s x a m
N =
= + ∑  (8.15) 
where both x and s are defined as (6.3). Let ( )s q xΛ=  and we immediately have 
( )1
( )
N
ii
q x xa
m N
Λ
=
−= ∑ . (8.16) 
Substituting (8.16) into (8.3) leads to an embedding rule for STDM scheme with perceptual analysis. A 
recent paper [119] proposed to implement the perceptual analysis in STDM scheme for watermark decoding 
problems. The underlying idea is much similar to our conjecture. Now, we examine the disadvantages of the 
above embedding rule. In the above equation, a should be smaller than amax to keep the distortion 
imperceptible. However, if it is smaller than amax, it leaves a larger perceptual allowance for the attacker. 
One may argue that we can select an appropriate step size to make the embedding strength a = amax. 
However, it is not workable since in such a case the detector has no chance of knowing what the step size is 
used. In fact, the major inherent problem with the host interference rejection schemes is that it is hard to 
control the embedding strength since it depends on x over which we have no control. 
8.5  Experimental results 
In this section, we make performance comparisons between the above single-sided and double-sided 
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schemes. The host data come from the fifth coefficient (in Zigzag order) of Lena, Peppers, Boat and Baboon. 
As also explained in the previous chapters, we permute the host signals to obtain different x for tests. Each 
such permutation generates one x. In the following experiments, the empirical results are obtained over 
1,000,000 such permutations. Finally, in the legends of the figures, “Briassouli” stands for the scheme [72] 
or (8.9), “Hernandez” for the scheme [69] or (8.4), “ASS-COR” for the widely used linear correlator, 
“DS-ASS” for the scheme (8.10) and “DS-Cauchy” for the scheme (8.11). 
8.5.1  Perceptual analysis with frequency and luminance masking 
As done in [69, 72], only frequency and luminance masking are considered in this subsection. In the first 
experiment, the γ and c at the detector are the same with those of the original images. The experimental 
results with this setup are displayed in Fig. 8.1 to Fig. 8.3. In the second experiment (only for Lena and 
Peppers), the γ and c at the detector are instead estimated from the test images. Table 8.2 and Table 8.3 
compare the parameters estimated from the original images and watermarked images under both no attack 
and attacks. These results are obtained over an average of the estimated parameters on 1,000 watermarked 
images (with 1,000 different watermark sequences). In real scenarios, each run of test should be fed with a 
different parameter estimated from the test data; however, it is time-consuming to perform the parameter 
estimations. Thus, we instead use the average of the estimated parameters (shown in Table 8.2 and Table 8.3) 
to save the simulation time. Moreover, even under attacks, the masks estimated from the test image are 
almost the same with those estimated from the original image. Thus, for Hernandez’s detector, we use mis of 
the original image for convenience. The experimental results obtained on the parameters displayed in Table 
8.2 and Table 8.3 are listed in Fig. 8.4, Fig. 8.5 and Fig. 8.6. 
From Fig. 8.1 to Fig. 8.6, we conclude that 
First, Hernandez’s and Briassouli’s schemes enjoy a better performance than ASS-COR. This is because 
mi does not vary much and can be roughly taken as fixed. It is also quite interesting to point out that the 
theoretical analysis in their works [69, 72] are unreasonable since the optimum tests are derived on the 
assumption that wi is not a random variable whereas their analyses take wi as random. The correct analysis 
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should take xi as random and wi as fixed. Please refer to Appendix E for further information. 
Second, it is hard to conclude that a Cauchy non-linear detector produces a better performance than a 
GGD optimum detector. In [72], its detector’s performance is compared with a GGD model with the shape 
parameter c fixed at c = 0.5 (Note: Cheng [77] believes that c = 0.5 is very typical of the shape parameters of 
most images.) However, if c is not fixed and instead estimated from the host image, then Cauchy non-linear 
detectors do not necessary yield a better performance. This is also reflected in another paper by Briassouli 
[73]. 
Third, the double-sided detection can be implemented for Briassouli’s scheme since its detector does not 
require the knowledge of the embedding strength and the perceptual masks. In these figures, we observe 
that DS-Cauchy does achieve a better performance than its single-sided counterpart. 
Fourth, in accordance with conclusions drawn in the previous chapter, DS-ASS improves ASS-COR. 
Finally, it is really hard to decide whether DS-ASS is better than DS-Cauchy. DS-Cauchy can achieve a 
better false alarm since it is based on a suboptimal detector. Nevertheless, as explained in the previous 
chapter, DS-ASS is much simpler and entails no parameter estimation. 
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Fig. 8.1. Performance comparisons under no attack (with a = 1.0, N = 2000). (a) Lena. At embedder, γ = 6.69; at 
detector, γ = 6.69 and c = 0.69. (b) Peppers. At embedder, γ = 7.35; at detector, γ = 7.35 and c = 1.03. (c) Boat. At 
embedder, γ = 8.65; at detector, γ = 8.65 and c = 0.73. (d) Baboon. At embedder, γ = 15.59; at detector, γ = 15.59 
and c = 1.11. 
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Fig. 8.2. Performance comparisons under zero-mean Gaussian noise attacks N(0, 25) (with a = 1.0, N = 2000). (a) 
Lena. At embedder, γ = 6.69; at detector, γ = 6.69 and c = 0.69. (b) Peppers. At embedder, γ = 7.35; at detector, 
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γ = 7.35 and c = 1.03. (c) Boat. At embedder, γ = 8.65; at detector, γ = 8.65 and c = 0.73. (d) Baboon. At 
embedder, γ = 15.59; at detector, γ = 15.59 and c = 1.11. 
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Fig. 8.3. Performance comparisons under JPEG (QF = 50) attacks (with a = 1.0, N = 2000). (a) Lena. At 
embedder, γ = 6.69; at detector, γ = 6.69 and c = 0.69. (b) Peppers. At embedder, γ = 7.35; at detector, γ = 7.35 
and c = 1.03. (c) Boat. At embedder, γ = 8.65; at detector, γ = 8.65 and c = 0.73. (d) Baboon. At embedder, γ = 
15.59; at detector, γ = 15.59 and c = 1.11. 
 
Table 8.2. Estimated scale parameter γ 
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Image Scheme Hypothesis Unattacked JPEG QF=50 Noise N(0, 25)
Lena Briassouli unwatermarked(H 0) 6.69 5.9 8.04734
Lena Briassouli watermarked(H 1) 6.79513 6.00041 8.11382
Lena DS-Cauchy unwatermarked(H 0) 6.69 5.9 8.04734
Lena DS-Cauchy watermarked(H 1) 6.79943 6.00866 8.1178
Peppers Briassouli unwatermarked(H 0) 7.35 6.86 8.47844
Peppers Briassouli watermarked(H 1) 7.43631 7.03595 8.52656
Peppers DS-Cauchy unwatermarked(H 0) 7.35 6.86 8.47844
Peppers DS-Cauchy watermarked(H 1) 7.44517 7.05036 8.53412  
 
Table 8.3. Estimated shape parameter c 
 
Image Scheme Hypothesis Unattacked JPEG QF=50 Noise N(0, 25)
Lena Hernandez unwatermarked(H0) 0.69 0.79 0.84393
Lena Hernandez watermarked(H1) 0.71259 0.7897 0.85095
Peppers Hernandez unwatermarked(H0) 1.03 1.11 1.22832
Peppers Hernandez watermarked(H1) 1.04191 1.09775 1.23613  
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Fig. 8.4. Performance comparisons under no attack (with a = 1.0, N = 2000). The parameters used at the detector 
are specified in Table 8−2 and Table 8−3. (a) Lena. At embedder, γ = 6.69. (b) Peppers. At embedder, γ = 7.35. 
 
Chapter 8 Double-Sided Schemes with Perceptual Analysis PhD Dissertation 
 115
1E-5 1E-4 1E-3 0.01 0.1 1
1E-5
1E-4
1E-3
0.01
0.1
1
 Briassouli
 Hernandez
 ASS-COR
 DS-ASS
 DS-Cauchy
pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
 o
f m
is
s
probability of false alarm
1E-5 1E-4 1E-3 0.01 0.1 1
1E-5
1E-4
1E-3
0.01
0.1
1
 Briassouli
 Hernandez
 ASS-COR
 DS-ASS
 DS-Cauchy
pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
 o
f m
is
s
probability of false alarm  
(a)                       (b) 
Fig. 8.5. Performance comparisons under zero-mean Gaussian noise attacks N(0,25) (with a = 1.0, N = 2000). 
The parameters used at the detector are specified in Table 8−2 and Table 8−3. (a) Lena. At embedder, γ = 6.69. 
(b) Peppers. At embedder, γ = 7.35. 
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Fig. 8.6. Performance comparisons under JPEG (QF = 50) attacks (with a = 1.0, N = 2000). The parameters used 
at the detector are specified in Table 8−2 and Table 8−3. (a) Lena. At embedder, γ = 6.69. (b) Peppers. At 
embedder, γ = 7.35. 
 
From Table 8.2 and Table 8.3, we see that the parameters estimated from the test images do not differ 
much from those of the original images. This is the reason why in almost all experiments, we just use the 
parameters of the host images for the ease of performance comparisons. In fact, using the parameters of the 
host images does not make much influence on the detector’s performance. This we show in Fig. 8.7 to Fig. 
8.9. In these figures, E1 denotes the scenario where the detector uses the parameters of the original images 
and E2 the scenario where the detector uses the parameters estimated from the test images (shown in Table 
8.2 and Table 8.3). 
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Fig. 8.7. Performance comparisons between E1 and E2 for Hernandez’s scheme. (a) Under zero-mean Gaussian 
noise attacks N(0, 25). (b) Under JPEG (QF = 50) attacks. 
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Fig. 8.8. Performance comparisons between E1 and E2 for Briassouli’s scheme. (a) Under zero-mean Gaussian 
noise attacks N(0, 25). (b) Under JPEG (QF = 50) attacks. 
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Fig. 8.9. Performance comparisons between E1 and E2 for DS-Cauchy. (a) Under zero-mean Gaussian noise 
attacks N(0, 25). (b) Under JPEG (QF = 50) attacks. 
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8.6  Perceptual analysis with frequency, luminance and contrast masking 
In this subsection, the contrast masking is also included in the perceptual analysis. For the ease of 
performance evaluations, the scale and shape parameters adopted at the detector are the same with those 
estimated from the original images. Moreover, the perceptual masks mi and the embedding strength a are 
also presumed to be known at the Hernandez’s detector. In real scenarios, mi has to be computed 
independently from the test images. The comparison results are demonstrated in Fig. 8.10 to Fig. 8.12.  
Hernandez’s scheme is very poor in performance since the perceptual masks mi (with contrast masking) 
depends on host signals xi and thus the proposed detector is not optimal at all. Briassouli’s scheme achieves 
a slight better performance, but is also not optimal. Their performance is even much worse than that of the 
correlator. This thus gives rise to an interesting problem whether we should implement contrast masking in 
real scenarios. However, if we do not implement contrast masking at the embedder, it will leave a larger 
allowance for the attackers to mount stronger attacks on the watermarked contents.  
Second, as expected, DS-Cauchy still achieves a better performance than Briassouli’s scheme. 
Third, most important of all, DS-ASS yields a much better performance than ASS-COR does. This thus 
encourages the use of DS-ASS in real scenarios. 
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Fig. 8.10. Performance comparisons under no attack (with a = 0.3, N = 2000). (a) Lena. At embedder, γ = 6.69; at 
detector, γ = 6.69 and c = 0.69. (b) Peppers. At embedder, γ = 7.35; at detector, γ = 7.35 and c = 1.03. (c) Boat. At 
embedder, γ = 8.65; at detector, γ = 8.65 and c = 0.73. (d) Baboon. At embedder, γ = 15.59; at detector, γ = 15.59 
and c = 1.11. 
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Fig. 8.11. Performance comparisons under zero-mean Gaussian noise attacks N(0, 25) (with a = 0.3, N = 2000). 
(a) Lena. At embedder, γ = 6.69; at detector, γ = 6.69 and c = 0.69. (b) Peppers. At embedder, γ = 7.35; at detector, 
Chapter 8 Double-Sided Schemes with Perceptual Analysis PhD Dissertation 
 119
γ = 7.35 and c = 1.03. (c) Boat. At embedder, γ = 8.65; at detector, γ = 8.65 and c = 0.73. (d) Baboon. At 
embedder, γ = 15.59; at detector, γ = 15.59 and c = 1.11. 
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Fig. 8.12. Performance comparisons under JPEG (QF = 50) attacks (with a = 0.3, N = 2000). (a) Lena. At 
embedder, γ = 6.69; at detector, γ = 6.69 and c = 0.69. (b) Peppers. At embedder, γ = 7.35; at detector, γ = 7.35 
and c = 1.03. (c) Boat. At embedder, γ = 8.65; at detector, γ = 8.65 and c = 0.73. (d) Baboon. At embedder, γ = 
15.59; at detector, γ = 15.59 and c = 1.11. 
8.7  Conclusions 
In this chapter, we further demonstrated the advantage of double-sided schemes over its single-sided 
counterparts in a scenario where the Watson’s perceptual model was implemented to improve the fidelity of 
the watermarked contents. However, through performance comparisons, we found that DS-ASS is still the 
most appealing scheme. Even if the contrast masking is not implemented, DS-ASS is not inferior to 
DS-Cauchy in performance. However, if the contrast masking is implemented, it offers a dramatic 
performance advantage over DS-Cauchy. Moreover, DS-ASS is widely applicable to almost all kinds of 
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host data whatever their probability of distributions. Thus, it is also applicable to audio and video 
watermarking. 
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Chapter 9   Conclusions and Future Work 
9.1  Conclusions 
The embedder and the detector (or decoder) are the two most important components of the digital 
watermarking systems. Thus in this work, we discuss how to design a better embedder and detector (or 
decoder). We first explore the optimum detector or decoder according to a particular probability distribution 
of the host signals. The optimum detection is not new since it has already been widely investigated in the 
literature. However, our work offers new insights into its theoretical performance. First, we examined its 
theoretical performance analytically and experimentally. The theoretical analyses presented in the literature 
are not correct since their analyses (with the watermark sequence as a random vector) are not in accordance 
with the prerequisite that the watermark sequence is fixed in their deriving the likelihood ratio tests. Second, 
we found that for MSS in both DCT and DWT domain, its performance depends on the shape parameter c or 
δ of the host signals. Third, without perceptual analysis, ASS also has a performance dependent on the host 
signals and outperforms MSS at the shape parameter below 1.3.  
For spread spectrum schemes, the detector or the decoder’s performance is reduced by the host 
interference. Thus, we came up with a new idea of host-interference rejection idea for MSS scheme. In this 
work, we call this new host interference rejection scheme EMSS whose embedding rule is tailored to the 
optimum decision rule. We particularly examined its performance in the DCT domain and found that they 
produce a nicer performance than the traditional non-rejecting schemes.  
Though the host interference schemes enjoy a big performance gain over the traditional spread spectrum 
schemes, their drawbacks that it is difficult for them to be implemented with the perceptual analysis to 
improve the fidelity of the watermarked contents discourage its use in real scenarios. Thus, in the final 
several chapters of this thesis, we introduced a new double-sided idea to combat this difficulty. This idea 
differs from the host interference scheme in that it does not reject the host interference at the embedder. 
However, it also utilizes the side host information at the embedder. Though it does not reject the host 
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interference, it can also achieve a great performance enhancement over the tradition spread spectrum 
schemes. Moreover, it also has a big advantage over the host interference rejection schemes in that we can 
embed the watermark with a maximum allowable level of perceptual distortion.  
In short, this work contributes in 
1. Theoretical performance analyses for optimal detectors in the DCT and the DFT domains, and 
finding that the performance of MSS depends on the shape parameters of the host signals, 
2. Proposing a host interference rejection scheme whose embedding rule is tailored to the 
corresponding optimal detection or decoding rules, 
3. Most important of all, presenting a new watermarking model — double-sided watermark 
embedding and detection. 
9.2  Future work 
For double-sided schemes, we have only investigated their performances under noise and JPEG attacks. 
In real scenarios, the watermarked contents may also suffer from geometrical attacks. The geometrical 
attacks coupled with, for instance, JPEG attacks, comprise the most severe attacks for the watermarked data. 
Almost all schemes proposed up till now are not robust enough against these attacks. This constitutes one of 
the major reasons why the digital watermarking is still in its infancy. Thus our future work would be 
directed to investigate the robustness of our double-sided schemes against geometrical attacks. My 
very tentative idea is to embed a template to rectify the possible geometrical distortions before watermark 
detection. 
Second, I have mainly examined the spread spectrum schemes in both the DCT and the DFT domains. An 
interesting problem is that in both domains, we found that the performance of MSS (DS-MSS) depends on 
the shape parameter c (δ) of the host signals. In the DCT domain, the performance is decided by 
MVR( )c c= . (9.1) 
In the DFT domain, 
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MVR( )δ δ= . (9.2) 
Thus in which domain should we embed our data? For the 8×8 DCT coefficients, we found that the 
average c over a set of 93 standard images is about 1.0. However, if the DCT coefficients are obtained by 
transforming the whole image, then the average c would be about 1.6, with some even quite close to or 
larger than 2.0. On this set of images, we found that the average δ is about 1.7. Thus from both (9.1) and 
(9.2), we found that a better performance can be achieved in the DFT domain. Therefore, it may be an 
interesting future task to compare their performances in the real images. These arguments are also 
applicable to the information hiding in these domains.  
Finally, quantization schemes such as QIM or SCS have been a state-of-art technique for information 
hiding schemes. Many previous works claimed that they greatly improve the performance of information 
hiding systems. To my viewpoint, this is quite questionable. As to now, most of these works concentrate on 
a theoretical analysis of their performances. And their advantage over spread spectrum schemes are based 
on the assumption that the distortion is measured by MSE. Furthermore, it is difficult to implement the 
perceptual analysis in the quantization schemes to achieve the maximum allowable embedding distortion. 
An interesting problem is that even without the perceptual analysis, the quantization schemes are not as 
superior as claimed. For instance, QIM’s embedding rule can be formulated as 
[ ]( )i i b is x q x x w= + − . (9.3) 
Suppose that the maximum embedding strength for the host data is amax. Thus, if | ( )bq x x− | is larger than 
amax, QIM will result in the perceptible distortion. However, if | ( )bq x x− | is smaller than amax, QIM will 
leave a perceptual allowance for the attacker to mount a stronger attacks on the watermarked contents. 
However, it is quite easy for the spread spectrum schemes to achieve the maximum embedding strength. 
The perceptual analysis for the spread spectrum schemes can be simply implemented as 
maxi i i is x a m w= + . (9.4) 
From this equation, we may also incorporate the perceptual analysis into the quantization schemes. To see 
how it works, we first substitute a with amax in the above equation 
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i i i is x am w= + . (9.5) 
Projection both sides on w, we obtain 
1
1 N
ii
s x a m
N =
= + ∑ . (9.6) 
Let ( )bs q x= , we immediately have 
( )1
( )b
N
ii
q x xa
m N=
−= ∑  (9.7) 
In fact, the above idea is formulated in a recent paper [119]. However, such an implementation of the 
perceptual analysis has an inherent problem that discourages its use in the real scenarios. In the above 
equation, a should be smaller than amax to keep the distortion imperceptible. However, if it is smaller than 
amax, it leaves a perceptual allowance for the attacker. Thus, it is still hard to say whether quantization 
schemes really surpass the spread spectrum schemes in performance. It remains a very challenging future 
research direction to compare quantization schemes with spread spectrum schemes. 
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Appendix A    
A.A  Lemma A.1 
Lemma A.1. Let Z be a GGD random variable with a pdf given by (2.7). Then |Z|c has a Gamma distribution 
with shape parameter 1/c and scale parameter 1/βc. 
Proof: Let U = |Z|γ (γ > 0). Thus, for u > 0,  
1 1 1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )Z ZP U u p Z u p u Z u F u F u
γ γ γ γ γ≤ = ≤ = − ≤ ≤ = − − , 
where FZ is the cumulative density function of Z. Therefore, 
1 1 1 11 1
1 11 1
1 1
1 1
/
1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 1         exp( ) exp( )
2         exp( )
U Z Z
c c
c c
df u P U u u f u u f u
du
u A u u A u
A u u
γ γ γ γ
γ γγ γ
γγ
γ γ
β βγ γ
βγ
− −
− −
−
= ≤ = + −
= ⋅ − + ⋅ − −
= −
 
If γ = c, U has a Gamma distribution with shape parameter 1/c and scale parameter 1/βc.       ■  
A.B  Corollary A.1 
Corollary A.1. Let Z1, Z2, …, ZN be i.i.d. random variables with pdf given by (2.7). Then |Z1|c+|Z2|c +… 
+|ZN|c has a Gamma distribution with shape parameter N/c and scale parameter 1/βc. 
Proof: Let Ui = |Zi|c. Since U1, U2, … , UN are Gamma random variables (by Lemma A.1), it is thus easy to 
derive this corollary by using the moment generating function of a sum of independent Gamma random 
variables (see Example 4.6.8 at page 183 in [107]).                                                                     ■ 
A.C  Lemma A.2  
Lemma A.2. If Y and Z be two independent random variables with Y ~ Gamma (θ1, δ) and Z ~ Gamma (θ2, δ), 
then Y/(Y+Z) and Y+Z are independent. 
Proof: Let U = Y/(Y+Z), and V = Y+Z. Therefore, Y = UV and Z = V−VU. As a result, the determinant of the 
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Jacobian matrix is  
1
V U
J V UV UV V
V U
= = − + =− − . 
Hence,  
1 2
1 2
1 2
1 1
1
, ,
1 2
(1 )( , ) ( , ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
v
U V Y Z Y Z
u uf u v J f uv v uv vf uv f v uv v e
θ θ
θ θ δ
θ θθ θ δ δ
− −
+ − −−= − = − = Γ Γ  
Thus, f U, V (u, v) can be factored into a function only of u and a function only of v. Therefore, U and V are 
independent (by Lemma 4.2.7 at page 153 in [107]).                                                  ■ 
A.D  Corollary A.2 
Corollary A.2. Let Z1, Z2, …, and ZN be i.i.d. random variables with Zi ~ Gamma(θ, δ). Then 
Zi/(Z1+Z2+…+ZN) and (Z1+Z2+…+ZN) are independent.  
Proof: Since Zi ~ Gamma(θ, δ) and Z1+…+Zi−1+Zi+1+…+ZN ~ Gamma((N−1)θ, δ) (see Example 4.6.8 at 
page 183 in [107]), Zi/(Z1+Z2+…+ZN) and (Z1+Z2+…+ZN) are independent by Lemma A.2.       ■ 
A.E  Theorem A.1 
Theorem A.1. Let Z1, Z2, … , and ZN be i.i.d. random variables, and Zi / (Z1+Z2+…+ZN) be independent of 
(Z1+Z2+…+ZN). Then for any k distinct { }1 2, , , 1,2, ,ki i i N∈" " , 
( )
( )
( )
1 2 1
1 2
1 2
1 2
1
1
1
1
k
j
k j
k
k
k
k
j
j
n mNnn n
i i i iinn n
i i i
mN nNii
ii
E Z Z Z E Z
Z Z Z
E
Z E Z
=
=
−
=
=
=
 ∑          =   ∑       
∑
∑ ∑
…
…
 
Proof: 
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( )
( )
( )
( )
1 2
1 2
1 2
1 2
1 2
1 2
1 2
1 2
1 2
1
1
1
1
1
1 1 1
( )
k
k
k
k
k
k
k
k
k
nn n
i i i
mN
ii
n n n mNnn n
i i i ii
n n nN
ii
n n n
n n n mNii i
iN N N i
i i ii i i
a
i
Z Z Z
E
Z
Z Z Z Z
E
Z
ZZ Z
E Z
Z Z Z
Z
E
Z
=
+ + + −
=
+ + +
=
+ + + −
=
= = =
     
  =    
            =              
=
∑
∑
∑
∑∑ ∑ ∑
"
"
"
…
…
"
( )1 2 1 22 1
1 1 1
k
k
k
n n n
n n n mNii
iN N N i
i i ii i i
ZZ
E Z
Z Z
+ + + −
=
= = =
                               
∑∑ ∑ ∑
""
 (A.1) 
where (a) follows from the fact that Zi / (Z1+Z2+…+ZN) is independent of (Z1+Z2+…+ZN) and functions of 
independent random variables are still independent. The first expectation in (a) can be evaluated by 
( )
( )
1 2
1 2
1 2
1 2
1 2
1 2
1 2
1 2
1
1 1 1
1
1 1 1
k
k
k
k
k
k
k
nn n
i i i
n n n
n n nNii i
iN N N i
i i ii i i
n n n
n nNii i
iN N N i
i i ii i i
E Z Z Z
ZZ Z
E Z
Z Z Z
ZZ Z
E E Z
Z Z Z
+ + +
=
= = =
+ + +
=
= = =
  
            =              
            =              
∑∑ ∑ ∑
∑∑ ∑ ∑
"
"
…
"
" kn   
 (A.2) 
Plugging (A.2) into (A.1), we get Theorem A.1.                        ■ 
A.F  Proof of (4.6) 
Let Zi = |Xi|γ / ∑1≤j≤N |Xj|γ. Since Xis are all identically distributed, Zis are all identically distributed. 
Therefore, from (2.2), we have  
1
( ) ( ) 0N i iiE w E Zη == =∑  (A.3) 
( )
2 2 2 2 2
1 1 21 1 1,
( ) ( ) ( )
aN N N
i i i j i ji i j j i
E E Z w Z Z w w NE Z NE Z Zησ η = = = ≠ = = + = − ∑ ∑ ∑  (A.4) 
where (a) follows from the fact that all Zis are identically distributed, and that in the second term the number 
of negative wiwj is (N2/2) and that number for the positive wiwj is (N2/2−N). In order to evaluate (A.4), we 
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consider two cases, the first case being γ = c and the second γ ≠ c.  
(1)  Case γ = c 
By Lemma A.1, Corollary A.2 and Theorem A.1 (with k = 1, n1 = 2 and m = 2), we have 
( )2221 1 1( ) ( ) N iiE Z E X E Xγ γ= =   ∑  (A.5) 
Similarly, with k = 2, n1 = 1, n2 = 1 and m = 2, we obtain 
( )21 2 1 2 1( ) ( ) N iiE Z Z E X X E Xγ γ γ= =   ∑  (A.6) 
Therefore, substituting (A.5) and (A.6) into (A.4), we get 
2
2 2
var( ) var( )
var( ) [ ( )] [ ( )]
X X
X N E X N E X
γ γ
η γ γ γσ = ≈+  (A.7) 
(2)  Case γ ≠ c 
 The above derivation works for γ = c. For the case γ ≠ c, Lemma A.2 does not hold since |X|γ does not 
have a Gamma distribution. Thus, we resort to an approximation approach to calculate E(X/Y). Usually it is 
difficult to calculate E(X/Y). However, if Y is a function of N independent random variables and converges 
to a constant C in probability as N increases, then 
E(X / Y) → E(X / C) = E(X) / C (A.8) 
By the weak law of large numbers, 
1
( )N ii X N E X
γ γ
= →∑  (A.9) 
Thus by Theorem 5.5.4 at page 233 in [107], we obtain 
2 2
1
( ) [ ( )]N ii X N E X
γ γ
= →∑  (A.10) 
Therefore, with (A.8), we have 
( )
2 2
1 12
1 22 2 2
1
[ ]1( )
[ ( )]N
ii
X E X
E Z E
N N E XX N
γ γ
γγ
=
  = ≈   ∑
 (A.11) 
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E(Z1Z2) can be evaluated similarly. Finally, we find that (A.7) is still valid, however, in the approximation 
sense.  The accuracy of this approximation method has also been verified through Monte-Carlo simulations 
(See Fig. 4.5(b) in Chapter 4 where the same approximation technique (A.8) is employed to calculate the 
embedding distortion (See Appendix B)).  
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Appendix B    
B.A  Lemma B.1 
Lemma B.1.  Let Z be a random variable distributed as Gamma (θ, δ). Then [ ] ( ) ( )r rE Z rδ θ θ= Γ + Γ . 
Proof: 
1 / 1 /
0 0
( ) ( ) / ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
x r r x
r r
r
x e r x ex dx dx r
r
θ δ θ δ
θ θ
θ δ δ θ θθ δ θ θ δ
− − + − −+∞ +∞
+
Γ += = Γ + ΓΓ Γ Γ +∫ ∫ . ■ 
B.B  Proof of (4.7) 
Proof: 2 2 2 2 2 2[ ( , )] ( )w X XD E DT a ησ λ γ σ σ= ≈ +S X  (B.1) 
Proof: In order to prove (4.7) or (B.1), we disintegrate (B.1) into several parts and obtain 
2 2
1
2 2 2 2 2
1
2
2 2 2 2 2
21 1
1[ ( , )] ( )
1                    ( 2 )
2                    [ ]
N
ii
N
ii
N N
i ii i
E DT E X a
N
E X a a
N
aa E X E X E X
N N
λη γ
λη γ λ η γ
λ λη ηγ γ
=
=
= =
 = − 
 = − + 
   = − +   
∑
∑
∑ ∑
S X
 (B.2) 
In the above equation, it is easy to see that 
2 2
1 1 1 1
2 2
1 1 1,
1
( )
( ) ( )( )
                     
                     0
N N N N
i i i i ii i i i
N N N
i i i j ji i j j i
N
ii
a
E X E X w X X
X w X X w
E
X
γ γ
γγ
γ
η = = = =
+
= = = ≠
=
 =  
 + =   
=
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑
∑
 (B.3) 
where (a) follows from (2.2). In order to evaluate the third expectation in (B.2), we first expand it into 
several simple terms, and these terms can then be simplified into  
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2 2
2 2 1 1
1 2
1
22 2
1 1 1 1,
2
1
2 2( )
1
2
1
( )( )
( )
( )
( )( )
                       
( )
                       
( )
N N
N i i ii i
i Ni
ii
N N N N
i i i i j i ji i i j j i
N
ii
a
N
ii
X X w
E X E
X
X X w X X w w
E
X
X
NE
X
γ
γ
γγ γ
γ
γ
γ
η = ==
=
= = = = ≠
=
+
=
  =   
 + =   
= 
∑ ∑∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
∑
∑
2 2
1 2
2
1
2 2
1 2 1 2 3
2 2
1 1
( 1)
( )
                          2 ( 2)
( ) ( )
N
ii
N N
i ii i
X X
N N E
X
X X X X X
NE N N E
X X
γ
γ
γ γ γ γ
γ γ
=
+
= =
    + −    
      − − −      
∑
∑ ∑  (B.4) 
where in the above equation (a) we have used the fact that Xis are identically distributed. Care must be taken 
to derive the above equation since some terms are cancelled due to (2.2). There are two cases to consider in 
evaluating (B.4), the first case being γ = c and the second being γ ≠ c. We first consider the case γ = c. Let Zi 
= |Xi|γ. By Lemma A.1, Zis are Gamma random variables. Thus, by Corollary A.2, Zi/(Z1+Z2+…+ZN) and 
(Z1+Z2+…+ZN) are independent. As a result of Theorem A.1 (with k = 1, n1= 2+2/γ, m = 2), we have 
2 2 22 2
1 11
2 2 2
1 1
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
N
ii
N N
i ii i
E X E XX
E
X E X
γ γ γγ
γ γ γ
++
=
+
= =
      =      
∑
∑ ∑
 (B.5) 
We can similarly calculate the other three expectations in (B.4) and finally have 
2 2
1
N
ii
E X R Fη =  = ⋅ ∑  (B.6) 
where 
2 2 2( ) ( )i iR E X E X
γ γγ γ+   =    ∑ ∑  (B.7) 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2( ) 2 ( ) ( ) ( 1) ( ) ( ) ( 2) ( )[ ( )]F NE X NE X E X N N E X E X N N E X E Xγ γ γ γ γ+ += − + − − −  (B.8) 
Moreover, since ( , )X Gammaγ θ δ∼ at γ = c, where 1 ,   1 ccθ δ β= = , Corollary A.1 and Lemma B.1 lead 
to 
2 2 2
2
( 2 ) ( )
( ) ( 2 2) ( 2 )( 2 1)
c cN c c N cR
N c N c c N c c N c c
β β
β
+Γ + Γ= =Γ Γ + + + + +  (B.9) 
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The above calculation is exact. In order to prove (B.1), with Lemma A.1 (or directly from (3.34)) and since 
2/c << N/c, we can approximate (B.9) by 
2 2 2 2 21/[ (1 ) (1 ) ] 1/{ [ ( )] }cR N c N E X γβ≈ =  (B.10) 
Moreover, by discarding some less important terms in (B.8), namely, the first and second terms, and 
approximating (N−2) and (N−1) by N, we get 
2 2 2 22 2 2 2( ) ( ) ( )[ ( )] ( ) var( )F N E X E X N E X E X N E X Xγ γ γ≈ − =  (B.11) 
Substituting both (B.10) and (B.11) into (B.6) will lead to 
22 2 2 2 2
1
[ ] ( ) var( ) [ ( )]N i XiE X E X X E X N
γ γ
ηη σ σ= ≈ =∑  (B.12) 
Thus, (B.1) follows easily from the above arguments. The above derivation works for γ = c. For the case γ ≠ 
c, Lemma A.2 does not hold since |X|γ does not have a Gamma distribution. Thus, we have to resort to the 
approximation approach given by (A.8). Hence, as we did for (A.11), we obtain 
2 2 2 2
1 1
2 22
1
( )
[ ( )]( )N ii
X E X
E
N E XX
γ γ
γγ
+ +
=
   ≈  ∑  (B.13) 
Other terms in (B.4) can be approximated similarly to reach the same result (B.12). 
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Appendix C    
In this appendix, we prove (4.14) and (4.15). It is easy to see from (2.2) that 
1
( ) 0N iiE X
ξη = =∑ . Thus 
(4.14) is justified and  
2 2 2 2 2
1 1{[ ( | )] } [ ( )]E L H a E X
ξσ ξ= −S   (C.1) 
We expand the first term in (C-1) (also see (4.9)) as 
[ ]21 1 2 3 4 5 6( | )L H T T T T T T= + + + + +S  (C.2) 
where 
2
1 2 1
1 ( )N i iiT X wN
ξ
== ∑  (C.3) 
2 2
2
2 2 1
( )N ii
aT X
N
ξξ
== ∑  (C.4) 
2 2
2 2
3 2 2 1 1 1
( ) ( )N N Ni i i ii i iT X X w XN
ξ γ γλ ξ
γ = = == ∑ ∑ ∑  (C.5) 
4 2 1 1
2 ( )( )N Ni i ii i
aT X w X
N
ξ ξξ
= == ∑ ∑  (C.6) 
2
2
5 2 1 1 1
2 ( ) ( )N N Ni i i ii i i
aT X X w X
N
ξ γ γλξ
γ = = == − ∑ ∑ ∑  (C.7) 
1
6 2 1 1
1
2 ( )( )
N
N N i ii
i i i Ni i
ii
X w
T X w X
N X
γ
ξ ξ
γ
λξ
γ
=
= =
=
= − ∑∑ ∑ ∑  (C.8) 
By (2.2), it is easy to see that 
4 5( ) ( ) 0E T E T= =  (C.9) 
Now we begin to evaluate the expectation of other terms in (C.2). Likewise we first consider the case γ = c. 
By simple algebraic operations, we obtain, 
1
1( ) ( )E T Var X
N
ξ=  (C.10) 
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222 2 2 2
2 2 2
1 1 1
2 2 2
2 2
( )
         ( ) ( )
N N N
i i i
i i i
a aE T E X Var X E X
N N
a Var X a E X
N
ξ ξ ξ
ξ ξ
ξ ξ
ξ ξ
= = =
          = = +                     
 = +  
∑ ∑ ∑
 (C.11) 
In order to evaluate E(T3), we first have 
2 2 2
2
3,1 3,2 3,32
( )( )
( )
i i j i j ii i
i i j i ii
i
ii i
i i
X X X w w XX w
E X E T T T
X X
γγ γ ξγ
ξ
γ γ
≠
     +      = = + +                  
∑ ∑∑ ∑∑ ∑∑ ∑  (C.12) 
where 
2 2
3,1 2
( )( )
( )
i i
i i
i
i
X X
T E
X
γ ξ
γ
  =    
∑ ∑
∑
 (C.13) 
2
3,2 2
( )( )
( )
i j i j i
i j i i
i
i
X X w w X
T E
X
γγ ξ
γ
≠
  =     
∑∑ ∑
∑
 (C.14) 
3,3 2
( )( )
( )
i j i j i j
i j i i j i
i
i
X X w w X X
T E
X
γ ξγ ξ
γ
≠ ≠
  =     
∑∑ ∑∑
∑
 (C.15) 
Then, we disintegrate (C.13) into several parts, that is, 
2 2
3,1 2
2 2 2 2
1 1 2
2 2
2 2
1 2 1 2 3
2 2
( )( )
( )
     ( 1)
( ) ( )
         2 ( 1) ( 1)( 2)
( ) ( )
i i i j
i i i j i
i
i
i i
i i
i i
i i
X X X X
T E
X
X X X
NE N N E
X X
X X X X X
N N E N N N E
X X
ξγ ξ ξ
γ
γ ξ γ ξ
γ γ
γ ξ ξ γ ξ ξ
γ γ
≠
+
+
 + =     
      = + −         
   + − + − −    
∑ ∑ ∑∑
∑
∑ ∑
∑ ∑
3,1 3      F R
   
= ⋅  (C.16) 
Appendix PhD Dissertation 
 135
where 
2 2 2 2 2
3,1 1 1 2 1 2
2
1 2 3
( ) ( 1) ( ) 2 ( 1) ( )
         ( 1)( 2) ( )
F NE X N N E X X N N E X X
N N N E X X X
γ ξ γ ξ γ ξ
γ ξ ξ
+= + − + −
+ − −  (C.17) 
2 / 2 2 /
3 1 1
( ) ( )N Ni ii iR E X E X
γ γξ γ ξ γ+
= =
   =    ∑ ∑  (C.18) 
Similarly, we obtain 
2 2
1 2 1 2 3
3,2 3,2 32 2
2 ( 2)
( ) ( )i i
i i
X X X X X
T NE N N E F R
X X
γ ξ γ γ γ ξ
γ γ
+      = − − − = ⋅         ∑ ∑
 (C.19)  
where 
2 2
3,2 1 2 1 2 32 ( 2)F NE X X N N E X X X
γ ξ γ γ γ ξ+   = − − −     (C.20) 
Finally, we have 
3,3 3,3 3T F R= ⋅  (C.21) 
where 
3,3 1 2 1 2 3
1 2 3 4
2 ( ) 4 ( 2) ( )
         ( 2)( 3) ( )
F NE X X N N E X X X
N N N E X X X X
γ ξ γ ξ γ ξ γ ξ
γ γ ξ ξ
+ + += − − −
− − −  (C.22) 
Summarizing all the above arguments, we readily have 
( ) ( )2 2 3 3 3,1 3,2 3,3 31 1 1 ( )N N Ni i i ii i iE X w X X F R F F F Rγ γ ξ= = =  = ⋅ = + + ⋅  ∑ ∑ ∑  (C.23) 
with 
2 2 2 2 2
3 1 1 2 1 2
2 2
1 2 3 1 2 1 2
2
1 2 3 1 2 3
1 2 3 4
( ) ( 1) ( ) 2 ( 1) ( )
       ( 1)( 2) ( ) 2 ( ) 2 ( )
       ( 2) ( ) 4 ( 2) ( )
       ( 2)( 3) ( )
  
F NE X N N E X X N N E X X
N N N E X X X NE X X NE X X
N N E X X X N N E X X X
N N N E X X X X
γ ξ γ ξ γ ξ ξ
γ ξ ξ γ ξ γ γ ξ γ ξ
γ γ ξ γ ξ γ ξ
γ γ ξ ξ
+ +
+ + +
+
= + − + −
+ − − − −
− − − −
− − −
23 2 2 [ ( )] { ( ) [ ( )] }N E X E X E Xξ γ γ≈ −  (C.24) 
Since ( , )X Gammaγ θ δ∼ (By Lemma A.1), where 1 ,   1 ccθ δ β= = , Corollary A.1 and Lemma B.1 
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lead to 
2 /
3 2 2 /
2 2 2 2 2 2
( 2 / ) ( )
( ) ( 2 / 2)
1 1 1    
( 2 / 1)( 2 / ) [ ( )]
N NR
N N
N N N N E X
ξ γ
ξ γ
γ
θ ξ γ δ θ
θ θ ξ γ δ
δ θ ξ γ θ ξ γ θ δ
+
Γ + Γ= Γ Γ + +
= ≈ =+ + +
 (C.25) 
Therefore,  
2 2
3 3 32 2
23 2 3 2 22 2
2 2 2 2
22 2
2 2
( )
( )[ ( )] [ ( )] [ ( )]
        
[ ( )]
[ ( )] var( )
        
[ ( )]
E T F R
N
N E X E X N E X E X
N N E X
E X X
N E X
γ ξ γ ξ
γ
ξ γ
γ
λ ξ
γ
λ ξ
γ
λ ξ
γ
= ⋅
−≈
≈
 (C.26) 
Please note that in computing T3,3, we have used the fact that  
,
( )( )
   ( , )
     ( , , )
     ( , )
  
i j i j i j
i j i i j i
i j i j k w
i j i k w k
i j i j i j
i j i
i j i j i w
i j i w i j
i j i j j i
i j i
i j i j j
i j i
X X w w X X
X X w w X X
X X w w X X k i w j
X X w w X X k i w i j
X X w w X X k j w i
X X w w X
γ ξγ ξ
γγ ξ ξ
γ ξγ ξ
γγ ξ ξ
γ ξγ ξ
γ ξγ
≠ ≠
≠ ≠
≠
≠ ≠
≠
≠
=
= = =
+ = ≠
+ = =
+
∑∑ ∑∑
∑∑ ∑∑
∑∑
∑∑ ∑
∑∑
∑∑
,
,
,
, , ,
   ( , , )
     ( , , )
     ( , , )
     ( , , , , )
w
w i j
i j i j k i
i j i k i j
i j i j k j
i j i k i j
i j i j k w
i j i k i j w i j k
X k j w i j
X X w w X X k i j w i
X X w w X X k i j w j
X X w w X X k i j w i j k
ξ
γγ ξ ξ
γ ξγ ξ
γγ ξ ξ
≠
≠ ≠
≠ ≠
≠ ≠ ≠
= ≠
+ ≠ =
+ ≠ =
+ ≠ ≠
∑
∑∑ ∑
∑∑ ∑
∑∑ ∑ ∑  (C.27) 
The above combinations of sums can be expressed by the following graph to prevent errors occurring in the 
calculation process. 
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k not equal to w
w
not i, j
=j
=i
k
not i, j
=j
=i
 
Fig. C.1. Matching graph in summation. 
 
The above equation (C.27) can be simplified into 
,
,
, ,
( )( )
  
  
  
i j i j i j
i j i i j i
i j i j i j i j w
i j i i j i w i j
i j i j i j i j w
i j i i j i w i j
i j i j k i j i j k
i j i k i j i j i k i j
i j
X X w w X X
X X w w X X w w X
X X w w X X w w X
X X w w X X X w w X
X X w
γ ξγ ξ
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≠ ≠
++ +
≠ ≠ ≠
+ ++
≠ ≠ ≠
++
≠ ≠ ≠ ≠
= +
+ +
+ +
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∑∑ ∑∑ ∑
∑∑ ∑∑ ∑
∑∑ ∑ ∑∑ ∑
, , ,
 i j k w
i j i k i j w i j k
w X Xξ ξ
≠ ≠ ≠
∑∑ ∑ ∑
 (C.28) 
Now we begin to compute E(T6). As we did to calculate E(T3), we have 
2
2
,
( )( )( )
( )( )
( )
   
i i i i i i
i i i j i j ii i j i i
ii
i i ji i j i
ii
i j i j i j i j k i ji j i i j i k i j
ii
E X w X X w X
X w X X w w X
E
X
X X X
E
X
X X w w X X X X X w w
E
X
ξ ξ γ γ
ξξ γ ξ ξ
γ
ξξ γ ξ γ
γ
γ ξ γξ ξ ξ ξ
γ
+
≠
+ +
≠
≠ ≠ ≠
  
 + =   
 + =   
 + + +   
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
∑
∑ ∑ ∑
∑
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
∑
 (C.29) 
Thus, 
6 6 62
2( )E T F R
N
λξ
γ= − ⋅  (C.30) 
where 
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2 2
6
2
( ) ( 1) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
        ( ) ( ) ( 2) ( ) ( ) ( )
    ( )[ ( ) ( ) ( )]
F NE X N N E X E X NE X E X
NE X E X N N E X E X E X
N E X E X E X E X
ξ γ ξ γ ξ ξ γ
ξ γ ξ ξ ξ γ
ξ γ ξ ξ γ
+ +
+
+
= + − −
− − −
≈ −  (C.31) 
2 / 1 2 /
6 1 1
( ) ( )N Ni ii iR E X E X
γ γξ γ ξ γ+
= =
   =    ∑ ∑  (C.32) 
Since ( , )X Gammaγ θ δ∼ (By Lemma A.1), where 1 ,   1 ccθ δ β= = , Corollary A.1 and Lemma B.1 
lead to 
2 /
6 1 2 /
( 2 / ) ( )
( ) ( 2 / 1)
1 1 1    
( 2 / 1) ( )
N NR
N N
N N NE X
ξ γ
ξ γ
γ
θ ξ γ δ θ
θ θ ξ γ δ
δ θ ξ γ θδ
+
Γ + Γ= Γ Γ + +
= ≈ ≈+ +
 (C.33) 
We readily have 
6
( )[ ( ) ( ) ( )]2( )
( )
E X E X E X E X
E T
N E X
ξ γ ξ ξ γ
γ
λξ
γ
+ −≈ −  (C.34) 
Combining all above arguments, we obtain the desired result (4.15). For the case γ ≠ c, we resort to the 
approximation approach given by (A.8) and obtain the same result. 
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Appendix D    
D.A  Proof of Lemma 6.1 
Lemma 6.1. If U is a random variable, and Z is defined by Z = U + a if U > 0 and Z = U – a if U ≤ 0, where 
a is a const. Then Z has a pdf given by 
( ),           if  
( ) 0,              if  
( ),         if  
U
Z
U
f z a z a
f z a z a
f z a z a
− >= − < ≤ + ≤ −  (D.1) 
Proof:  Let I be an indicator defined as I = 1 if U > 0 and I = 0 if U ≤ 0. Thus we obtain 
| 1
1( | 1) ( | 1) [ ( , 1) / ( 1)] (0 )
( 1)
                      ( ) / ( 1),   where 0
U I
U
d d df u I P U u I P U u I P I P U u
du du P I du
f u P I u
= = = ≤ = = ≤ = = = ⋅ < ≤=
= = >  (D.2) 
Similarly, we have fU | I = 0(u | I = 0) = fU(u) / P(I = 0), where u ≤ 0. Since (Z | I = 1) = [(U + a) | I = 1] = (U | 
I = 1) + a and (Z | I = 0) = (U | I = 0) − a, we have 
| 1
( ) / ( 1),   if 
( | 1)  
0                               if 
U
Z I
f z a P I z a
f z I
z a=
− = >= =  ≤  (D.3) 
| 0
( ) / ( 0),   if 
( | 0)  
0                                if 
U
Z I
f z a P I z a
f z I
z a=
+ = ≤ −= =  > −  (D.4) 
Since | 0 | 1( ) ( | 0) ( 0) ( | 1) ( 1)Z Z I Z If z f z I P I f z I P I= == = = + = = , (D.3) and (D.4) thus lead to (D.1).   ■ 
D.B  Proof of lemma 6.2 
Lemma 6.2. For any real k > 0, Q(z+k)/Q(z) is a decreasing function of z. 
Proof: Let u(z) = Q(z+k)/Q(z). Thus the first derivative is 
2 2
2 2
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) exp[ ( ) / 2] ( ) ( )exp( / 2)( )
( ) 2 ( )
Q z k Q z Q z k Q z z k Q z Q z k zu z
Q z Q zπ
′ ′+ − + − − + + + −′ = =  
Now we prove that 2 2exp[ ( ) / 2] ( ) ( )exp( / 2) 0z k Q z Q z k z− − + + + − < , that is, 
2 2exp[ ( ) / 2]/ ( ) exp( / 2) / ( )z k Q z k z Q z− + + > −  (D.5) 
Let g(z) = exp(−z2/2)/Q(z). Thus the first derivative of g(z) is 
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2 2 2 2 2
2 2
2 2
2
exp( / 2) ( ) exp( / 2) ( ) exp( / 2) ( ) exp( / 2)exp( / 2) 2( )
( ) ( )
exp( / 2)[ ( ) exp( / 2) 2 ]        
( )
        0
z z Q z z Q z z z Q z z zg z
Q z Q z
z zQ z z
Q z
π
π
′− − − − − − + − −′ = =
− − + −=
>
 
since 2( ) exp( / 2) /( 2 )Q z z z π< − for z > 0 (see Equation (71) at page 39 in [105]). Therefore g(z) is an 
increasing function of z and (D.5) holds. Thus, u′(z) < 0 and u(z) is a decreasing function of z for any given 
positive k.                                        ■ 
D.C  Proof of Lemma 6.3 
Lemma 6.3: Prove that ∑1≤i≤N |Xi|ξ is independent of the indicator I, where I is defined in (6.5). 
Proof: Let T = ∑1≤i≤N |Xi|ξ. Since N is an even integer, we may suppose that N = 2m, where m is also an integer. 
For the convenience of the proof, let w1 = w2 = … = wm = 1, and wm+1 = wm+2 = … = w2m = −1. For any given 
t ≥ 0, let Ω1 = {(x1, x2, …, xN): x > 0 and ∑1≤i≤N |xi|ξ < t} and Ω0 = {(x1, x2, …, xN): x < 0 and ∑1≤i≤N |xi|ξ < t}, 
where x is defined in (6.3). Since all Xis are independent, we have 
1 1
1 2 1 21
( , 1) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )N i X X X N NiP T X t I f d f x f x f x dx dx dx
ξ
= Ω Ω= < = = =∑ ∫ ∫X x x " "  (D.6) 
0 0
1 2 1 21
( , 0) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )N i X X X N NiP T X t I f d f x f x f x dx dx dx
ξ
= Ω Ω= < = = =∑ ∫ ∫X x x " "  (D.7) 
Define a permutation Φ from Ω1 to Ω0 such that y1 = xm+1, y2 = xm+2, …, ym = x2m,  ym+1 = x1, ym+2 = x2, …, y2m 
= xm+1, where (x1, x2, …, x2m) ∈ Ω1 and (y1, y2, …, y2m) ∈ Ω0. It is well defined since y = (∑1≤i≤N yi·wi)/N = 
(∑1≤i≤m yi −∑m+1≤i≤2m yi )/N = (∑m+1≤i≤2m xi −∑1≤i≤m xi )/N < 0 and ∑1≤i≤N |yi|ξ = ∑1≤i≤N |xi|ξ < t. Moreover, Φ is 
one-to-one and onto for it is a simple permutation. Since the absolute value of the Jacobian |∂(x1, x2, …, xN)/ 
∂(y1, y2, …, yN)| is 1, the change of variables theorem (See page 460 in [106]) results in 
0
1
1
1 2 2 1 2 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
1 2 2 1 2 2
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
X X X m m
X m X m X X m m
X X X m m
f x f x f x dx dx dx
f y f y f y f y dy dy dy
f x f x f x dx dx dx
Ω
+Ω
Ω
=
=
∫
∫
∫
" "
" " "
" "
 
Therefore, we have P(T < t, I = 1) = P(T < t, I = 0) from (D.6) and (D.7). Since P(T < t, I = 1) + P(T < t, I = 
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0) = P(T < t), P(T < t, I = 1) = P(T < t, I = 0) = 0.5·P(T < t). Since P(I = 1) = P(I = 0) = 0.5, we have P(T < 
t, I = 1) = P(I = 1)P(T < t) and P(T < t, I = 0) = P(I = 0)P(T < t). Thus, T is independent of I.     ■ 
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Appendix E   Important notes for experiments in this work 
In the literature, there are two kinds of setups for experiments to evaluate the detector’s performance. In 
the first setup (adopted in this work), wi is fixed and also satisfies the restriction (2.2). In the second setup, 
the watermark sequence is taken as a sequence of independent Bernoulli random variables with P(wi = 1) = 
P(wi = −1) = 0.5.  
E.A  Case 1 
First we consider the first setup where (2.2) is satisfied. For the convenience of discussions, ,1mp
X stands 
for the probability of miss for the case where X is a random vector and w is fixed; ,,1mp
X W for the case where 
both X and W are random; ,1mp
W for the case where only W is random. Since for most cases in this work, 
,1mp
X does not depend on w (due to (2.2)), we obtain 
,
,1 1
1
,1
,1
{ ( | ) }
        { ( | , ) } { }
        { }
        
m
m
m
p P L H
P L H P
p P
p
ψ
ψ
= <
= = < =
= ⋅ =
=
∑
∑
X W
w
X
w
X
S
S W w W w
W w
 (E.1) 
,
,1 1
1
,1
{ ( | ) }
        [ ( | , , ) ] ( ) ( )
        ( )
m
m
p P L H
P L H P f d
p f d
ψ
ψ
= <
 = = = < = ⋅  
= ⋅
∑∫
∫
X W
X
wx
W
X
x
S
S W w X x W w x x
x x
 (E.2) 
Thus, we see that 
,1 ,1 ( )m mp p f d= ⋅∫X W X
x
x x  (E.3) 
Hence we know that ,1mp
W cannot be larger than ,1mp
X  since if ,1mp
W > ,1mp
X , we would have 
,1 ,1 ,1( ) ( )m m mp f d p f d p⋅ > ⋅ =∫ ∫W X XX X
x x
x x x x  (E.4) 
Similarly, ,1mp
W cannot be smaller than ,1mp
X . Since ,1mp
W depends on a given x, we thus conclude that for some 
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xs, ,1mp
W is larger than ,1mp
X ; for other xs, ,1mp
W is not larger than ,1mp
X . 
E.B  Case 2 
In this subsection, ,2mp
X stands for the probability of miss for the case where X is a random vector and w is 
fixed; ,,2mp
X W for the case where both X and W are random; ,2mp
W for the case where only W is random. 
However, in these definitions, w is not necessary to satisfy the restriction (2.2).  Since (2.2) is not met, 
,2mp
X does depend on w and thus ,,2 ,2m mp p≠X W X . However, we still have 
,
,2 ,2 ( )m mp p f d= ⋅∫X W W X
x
x x  (E.5) 
Let Ω2 = {+1, −1}N, namely all binary sequence of length N,  and Ω1 = { w: w ∈ Ω2 and ∑1≤i≤N wi = 0}. It 
is easy to see that Ω1 ⊂ Ω2 and therefore 
2
1
,2 1
1
,1
[ ( | , , ) ] ( )
      [ ( | , , ) ] ( )
      
m
m
p P L H P
P L H P
p
ψ
ψ
∈Ω
∈Ω
= = = < =
> = = < =
=
∑
∑
W
w
w
W
S W w X x W w
S W w X x W w
 (E.6) 
Similarly, we have 
, ,
,2 ,2 ,1 ,1( ) ( )m m m mp p f d p f d p= ⋅ > ⋅ =∫ ∫X W W W X WX X
x x
x x x x  (E.7) 
E.C  Comparisons between the first and second setup 
We now compare the performance of the first setup ,1mp
X with that of the second setup ,2mp
W . If ,1mp
W > ,1mp
X , 
since (E.6), we have 
,2 ,1 ,1m m mp p p> >W W X . 
The second setup would produce a poorer performance. If ,1mp
W < ,1mp
X , then it is hard to compare 
,2mp
W with ,1mp
X . We now consider an average case. If x is fixed and W is random, then the decision statistic 
L(S|H0) and L(S|H1) is often expressed as a sum of g0(xi, Wi), g1(xi, Wi), that is 
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0 0 1 1
1 1( | ) ( , ),   ( | ) ( , )i i i i
i i
L H g x W L H g x W
N N
= =∑ ∑S S . 
For instance, the decision statistic in [69] is given by 
0 1( , ) ,   ( , )
c c c c
i i i i i i i i i i i ig x W x x a W g x W x a W x= − − = + − . 
Therefore, we have 
0 0 0
1 [ ( ,1) ( , 1)]
2 i ii
m g x g x
N
= + −∑ , 
2 2 2
0 0 0 02 2
2 2 2
0 0 0 0
2 2
1 1[ ( , )] {[ ( , )] } { [ ( , )]}
[ ( ,1)] [ ( , 1)] [ ( ,1) ( , 1)]    
2 4
i i i i i i
i i
i i i i
i
Var g x W E g x W E g x W
N N
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+ − + −= −
∑ ∑
∑
 
Thus by the weak law of large numbers, we have 
0 0
0
[ ( ,1)] [ ( , 1)]
2
E g X E g Xm + −→  
2 2 2
2 0 0 0 0
0
{[ ( ,1)] } {[ ( , 1)] } {[ ( ,1) ( , 1)] }
2 4
E g X E g X E g X g X
N N
σ + − + −→ −  
that is, the mean and variance converge to fixed values in probability. Similarly, m1 and 21σ also converge to 
fixed values in probability. Therefore, if N is large enough, ,2mp
W can be roughly taken as a fixed value 
(invariant to x) with a large probability. It thus follows from (E.1) and (E.7) that 
, ,
,1 ,1 ,2 ,2 ,2( )
W
m m m m mp p p p f d p= < = ⋅ ≈∫X X X W W WX
x
x x  (E.8) 
Therefore, this asserts that in most cases, the first setup would produce a better performance than the second 
setup does. That is, assuming that x is fixed and W random would underestimate the true performance of the 
detector. Since (2.2), we can similarly argue by the weak law of large numbers that ,1mp
W converges to a fixed 
value in probability and thus 
,
,1 ,1 ,1m m mp p p≈ =W X W X  (E.9) 
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E.D  Hints for experiments on real images 
In real scenarios, it is not possible to have a large database of host data with the same shape parameter and 
standard deviation. In this work, we instead permute the host signals to generate new test data xs. For 
instance, if the host data are of size M, we randomly permute this data and take the previous N data for 
experiments. It is important that N should be smaller than M. The smaller the N, the better the effects we can 
achieve. If M = N, the permutation of host data is equivalent to the second setup that we are using different 
watermark sequences. In such a case, we know from (E.9) that using different watermark sequences can 
reflect the true performance ,1mp
X with a large probability. If however the watermark sequence w is a random 
sequence without the restraint (2.2) being satisfied, such an experimental setup is equivalent to the second 
setup discussed in the previous sections. Thus, due to (E.8), the experimental results cannot well predict the 
detector’s theoretical performance.  
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